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ABSTRACT
In recent years, economists have shown concern with a number 
of aspects of the relationship between debt management and monetary 
policy. After the famous Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of March,
19511 the central bank undertook a series of steps which eventually 
led to the emergence of the "even keel" policy, an open market operat­
ing strategy which replaced the policy of lending direct support to 
Treasury financings. The purpose of this research project has been to 
provide a detailed and comprehensive analysis of "even keel" policy 
over an extended period.
In light of this objective, an extensive historical analysis 
of the evolution of the "even keel" strategy was conducted. This 
analysis focused special attention on the changing role of the central 
bank with respect to the strategies it has employed during Treasury 
financing operations. It was concluded that the "even keel" policy 
became an operational concept with the adoption of the "bills only" 
guidelines on March 4-5, 1953. At this time, the Trading Desk was in­
structed to refrain, during Treasury financing periods, from any pur­
chases of "rights," "when-issued" securities, or outstanding securities 
of comparable maturity to those being offered in exchange. In addition, 
the System, during Treasury financings, extended repurchase agreements 
to non-bank dealers and avoided any actions indicative of a shift in the 
stance of monetary policy. The inauguration of "operation twist" in
vli
1961 did. not alter the "even keel" strategy as it was practiced under 
the "bills only" guidelines.
The research also included a detailed empirical analysis of 
the "even keel" policy during the January, 1960-August, 1968, period. 
The empirical analysis first concentrated on the relationship between 
central bank policy and Treasury operations. Special emphasis was 
placed upon determining under what circumstances the System maintained 
an "even keel" in the money market. It was found that the central bank 
usually pursued an "even keel" strategy during both advanced and regu­
lar refundings, regardless of the volume of the offer or the type of 
security involved in the financing. The System has normally "even 
keeled" cash refundings and cash offers involving coupon issues, but 
rarely such operations in Treasury bills. The seasonal pattern of 
"even keel" directives was explained by the timing of major refundings 
and the level of adjusted Treasury operating balances.
Secondly, the empirical analysis concentrated upon a statis­
tical evaluation of a number of alternative definitions of "even keel" 
policy. Employing one-way analysis of variance techniques, it was 
found that the "even keel" strategy was implemented through the use of 
repurchase agreements with non-bank dealers. However, these reserve 
injections were not sufficient to either ease or stabilize money market 
conditions during "even keel" periods, as reflected in the behavior of 
marginal reserves and short-term interest rates. Strong evidence was 
found that the "even keel" strategy did entail the avoidance of overt 
shifts in credit policy during Treasury financing periods. The System
viii
has normally limited the Implementation of Its quantitative credit 




The purpose of this introductory chapter is twofold. It 
first enumerates the major issues and questions concerning the 
Federal Reserve’s "even keel" policy which are examined in detail in 
the analysis. Secondly, this section presents the organizational 
outline followed in the study, while simultaneously previewing some 
of the major conclusions reached in the historical and empirical 
analysis.
The Major Issues
The term "even keel" has come to he associated in recent 
years with that Federal Reserve System policy which has been imple­
mented during Treasury financing periods. The "even keel" strategy 
evolved gradually in the years following the Treasury-Federal Reserve 
Accord as a replacement for the central bank policy of direct support 
purchases. As its name implies and as later analysis shows, the "even 
keel” strategy is an attempt by the central bank authorities to main­
tain a steady course in credit control policy during Treasury financ­
ing periods. The major rationale for the "even keel" strategy has 
been the necessity of the central bank to undertake actions aimed at 
smoothing the marketing process of Treasury financing operations.
1
2The recent literature dealing with Federal Reserve "even 
keel" policy has raised a number of major issues and questions to 
which this analysis has addressed itself. The historical and empiri­
cal analysis which follows attempts to clarify a number of issues 
which are discussed below.
The first question to be examined is how the "even keel" 
policy evolved. Why was the "even keel" strategy deemed the appro­
priate policy to pursue during Treasury financings? When was the 
"even keel" strategy established and how has this policy been altered 
as major innovations in monetary policy have occurred? What is the 
purpose of the "even keel" strategy? How is this strategy implemented?
A second issue examined in this study concerns the question 
of when the "even keel" policy is employed. That is, under what con­
ditions does the central bank maintain an "even keel" posture in the 
money market? What type of Treasury operations call forth an "even 
keel" directive? Does the size of the securities offered in the 
Treasury operation influence the decision of the System as to whether 
or not to issue an "even keel" directive?
The final and major issue to be examined in the analysis con­
cerns the definition of "even keel" policy, as well as the implications 
of this strategy for credit control policy. Does the "even keel" 
policy entail explicit support of Treasury operations? Does the imple­
mentation of an "even keel" policy result in a one-way shift toward 
ease? Is the stability of money market conditions the primary goal of 
this policy? Does the maintenance of an "even keel" affect the timing 
of monetary policy actions? Does the "even keel" policy preempt
3shifts in the stance of credit policy? This study attempts to 
clarify these issues and questions within the organizational frame­
work detailed below.
The Study Plan
Chapter II traces the historical evolution of "even keel" 
policy within the framework of the changing relationship between debt 
management and monetary policy. It emphasizes the gradual adaptation 
of central bank policy to the changing environment of the 1950's.
The shift from a pegged to a free government securities market was 
examined in order to determine when the "even keel" policy emerged as 
an operational concept. Special consideration is given to the 
Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord, the transition to free markets, and 
the "bills only" policy. The analysis concludes that the "even keel" 
strategy became operational on March 4-5, 1953> with the adoption of 
the "bills only" guidelines. By this date, both the general guide­
lines for open market operations and the operating techniques utilized 
by the Trading Desk during Treasury financings, which later came to be 
associated with the maintenance of an "even keel," had been establish­
ed.
The major objective of Chapter III was to provide the reader 
with a more detailed picture of the "even keel" strategy during the 
1960-1968 period. This section focuses on the major innovations in 
System open market policy and Trading Desk operating techniques that 
are of special relevance to "even keel" policy. It was found that the 
inauguration of "operation twist" did not alter the major characteristics
of the "even keel" strategy as it was practiced under the "bills 
only" guidelines.
This section of the analysis also discusses some of the alter­
native definitions of "even keel" policy found in the literature. In 
addition, an explanation of the basic rationale which underlies this 
strategy, as well as a discussion of the time span covered by "even 
keel" directives, is offered. Finally, Appendix A details the pro­
cedure followed in Identifying "even keel" directives, as well as 
offering an exhibition and explanation of some typical current 
economic policy directives.
The quantitative analysis is initiated in Chapter IV which 
deals with various relationships between "even keel" policy and 
Treasury operations during the 1960-1968 period. This section of the 
analysis attempts to identify the major determinants of "even keel" 
policy, that is, under what circumstances has the central bank pursued 
an "even keel" policy. The major factors evaluated include the type 
of financing technique employed, the volume of the offer, and the type 
of securities involved in the Treasury operation. Of these factors, 
the type of financing technique employed in a particular operation 
seems to have the most influence on central bank policy. In addition 
to a discussion of the procedure employed in dating "even keel" 
periods, this section also attempts to explain the frequency and 
seasonal pattern displayed by "even keel" directives during the 1960- 
1968 period. Money market conditions, Treasury financing activity, 
and Treasury operating balances were the factors that explained both 
the yearly and monthly frequency patterns of "even keel" policy.
Chapter V empirically tests the alternative definitions of 
"even keel" policy. After a detailed discussion of the statistical 
testing procedure employed in the analysis» the implementation of 
"even keel" policy is examined. It was found that the "even keel" 
strategy was implemented primarily through the extensive use of re­
purchase agreements during the 1960-1968 period. A detailed explana­
tion of three distinct definitions of "even keel" policy, categorized 
as falling within either the "support" or "neutrality" school, 
follows. Each of these definitions is tested in terras of the behavior 
of marginal reserves and short-term interest rates. The results of 
these tests support most strongly the "neutrality" school interpreta­
tion of "even keel" policy which views that strategy in terms of the 
avoidance of overt monetary policy actions during Treasury financing 
periods.
Chapter VI reviews and summarizes the entire analysis. This 
section synthesizes the results of the empirical tests and presents 
the author’s definition of "even keel" policy based upon the quantita­
tive analysis of this Federal Reserve open market operating strategy 
during the 1960-1968 period. This chapter concludes with a discussion 
of some of the major implications of the "even keel" strategy for 
monetary policy.
CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL 
RESERVE "EVEN KEEL" POLICY
The Major Modifications in Monetary 
and Debt Management Policies
The "even keel" policy of the Federal Reserve System has been 
a pragmatic and gradual evolution of an open market operating tech­
nique, a refinement emerging from an atmosphere of changing views as 
to the proper integration of monetary theory and debt management 
policy.* In order to fully comprehend and appreciate the significance
"Tor the purposes of this paper, a clear distinction is made 
between debt management and monetary and fiscal policy. Debt manage­
ment consists of all actions of the Federal government which directly 
influence the composition and terms of the publicly held Federal debt, 
whether initiated by the Treasury or the Federal Reserve System.
Fiscal policy entails the manipulation of tax receipts and government 
expenditures, whether discretionary or automatic, by the Federal 
government. Fiscal policy actions ultimately determine the level of 
Federal government debt outstanding. Monetary policy encompasses 
those actions taken by the Federal Reserve System which affect the 
money supply, bank credit, and the reserve positions of member banks. 
The major tools employed by the System are variations in the reserve 
requirement ratio, manipulation of the discount rate, and the purchase 
and sale of government securities in the open market. The net amount 
of debt bought and sold by the central bank in the conduct of its open 
market operations is a matter of monetary policy as opposed to debt 
management. This definition of debt management does not include so- 
called non-interest bearing "debt," either in the form of currency held 
outside the Federal government or non-Federal government deposits at 
the Federal Reserve banks.
Similar definitions have been employed. See, for example, 
Thomas R. Beard, "Debt Managements Its Relationship to Monetary Policy,
6
7and implications of "erven keel" policy as practiced by the System 
during the January, I960, through August, 1968, period, it is neces­
sary to trace its development in an historical context. The follow­
ing pages will delineate the major modifications in monetary and debt 
management policies since 19^6, with the intention of emphasizing the 
rationale for the emergence of this Federal Reserve operating 
strategy.
A. The Pre-Accord Pegging
The necessity of financing the huge deficit incurred as a 
result of World War II forced the Federal Reserve System to lend 
direct support to Treasury efforts to market debt instruments used to 
finance that deficit. In the postwar period, the System continued its 
wartime policy of pegging the yields on government securities, fearing 
that investors would not willingly hold the large war debt and antici­
pating that debt markets were highly susceptible to destabilizing 
speculative fluctuations. In some quarters it was feared that in­
stability of security prices would destroy public confidence in the 
government's credit and undermine investment incentives. The System,
(continued) 1951-1962," in Readings in Money, National Income, 
and Stabilization Policy, ed, by Warren L, Smith and Ronald L. Teigen 
(Homewood, Illinois* Richard D, Irwin, Inc., 1965)» p. 4-l6| and U.S., 
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Debt Management in the United 
States, by Warren L. Smith, Joint Economic Committee, Study Paper No.
19 (Washington, D.C.t Government Printing Office, I960). By way of 
contrast, a broader definition which includes non-interest bearing 
"debt" has been suggested by James Tobin, "An Essay on Principles of 
Debt Management," Fiscal and Debt Management Policies (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.* Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963)» PP. 1^3-218.
8in light of these considerations, committed Itself to a policy of 
maintaining a fixed pattern of yields on government securities.
From 19*1-6 to 1951* "the Federal Reserve, serving as the resid­
ual buyer of Treasury securities, became the ultimate underwriter of 
the Federal government’s debt. All Treasury financings were guaranteed 
success as the System stood committed to purchase in unlimited amounts 
those securities not absorbed by the private sector in order to insure 
the maintenance of yield levels. This pegging policy, initially con­
sidered appropriate in light of the unusual wartime conditions, was 
pursued long after the necessity for direct support had probably 
vanished.
The emergence of inflationary pressure in the postwar economy 
caused consternation among both academic economists and Federal Reserve 
officials as to the propriety of this pegging policy. The pegging 
policy adopted by the System was criticized for a number of reasons.
The subordination of the central bank to the Treasury led to conse­
quences that were unacceptable in light of inflationary developments. 
With monetary management relegated to insuring the liquidity of the 
public debt through the stabilization of security prices, all debt 
instruments, regardless of their nominal maturities, were rendered 
virtually as liquid as the shortest-term instrument. In addition, the 
entire government debt became a composite of debt instruments, all of 
which were only slightly less liquid than money. Finally, with respect 
to the money supply, the availability of money was regulated hy the 
spending and investment decisions of government bondholders. The
Gilford C. Gaines, Techniques of Treasury Debt Management (New 
York* The Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, and the 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 59.
System was rendered impotent to maintain the effective regulatory 
Influence upon the monetary aggregates requisite to the pursuit of 
countercyclical objectives. The conflict between Federal Reserve 
officials, concerned with controlling inflationary pressures, and 
Treasury authorities, who regarded the minimization of interest rate 
cost, rather than countercyclical debt management, as their'primary 
goal, reached an apex with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.
The initiation of hostilities brought, on one hand, a boom in 
speculative activity which raised market rates and again meant that 
support of government securities at prior rates would lead to an 
expansion in the money stock that the System could not control; and, 
on the other, a possibility of large government deficits, which made 
the Treasury exceedingly sensitive to the state of the market for 
government securities. Although neither possibility was realized, 
the fear of the former ty System officials led them to seek the 
authority necessary to regulate both the money supply and credit 
availability.^
B. The Accord
As a result of a series of discussions between Treasury and 
Federal Reserve officials, the now-famous Treasury-Federal Reserve 
Accord was reached. The wording of the official Joint statement, 
issued on March J*, 1951» nay be worthwhile to recallt
3
Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of 
the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton, N.J.* Princeton University 
Press, 1963), p . 623.
10
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have 
reached full accord with respect to debt management 
and monetary policies to be pursued In furthering their 
common purpose to assure the successful financing of 
the Government's requirements andB at the same time, 
to minimize monetization of the public debt.^
The agreement became feasible, especially at this time, as there were
no maturities of Treasury securities scheduled for the first five
calendar months of 1951.
In monetary history the Accord was a landmark. The two
agencies agreed, under the wording of the official joint statement,
that the central bank continue to recognize a responsibility to assure
that the main objective of debt management would be achieved, i.e.,
that the government's cash requirements would be financed. But the
agreement also clearly acknowledged the necessity for an independent
central monetary authority, one free to regulate the money supply and
credit availability, at its own initiative, in order to pursue economic
stabilization. The Accord ended the period which was characterized by
the subordination of Federal Reserve credit control objectives to
Treasury interest rate goals. The agreement effectively converted the
public debt from an extension of the money supply into a body of
financial assets of varying degrees of liquidity.-’
The Accord marked the triumph of those who advocated placing
the power to regulate monetary aggregates in the hands of System
officials. The Accord was the first step toward a flexible monetary
William McChesney Martin, Jr., "The Transition to Free 
Markets," Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. XXXIX (April, 1953)* PP. 330.
-’Gaines, Debt Management, pp. 62-66.
11
policy Implemented through the Initiative of the central hank. In 
addition, this agreement was the first tentative warning to the 
monetary authorities that the System had to fashion a positive policy 
with respect to the appropriate conduct to he followed during Treasury 
financing periods. The Accord was the first step in the establishment 
of an independent central hank. The evolution of the "even keel" 
strategy, as the proper program to utilize during Treasury financings, 
took some time.
C, The Transition to Free Markets
With the announcement of the Accord on March 4, 1951» the 
Federal Open Market Committee (F.O.M.C.) moved toward the freeing of 
the government securities market. At the F.O.M.C, meeting held on 
May 17, 1951* an ad hoc subcommittee (hence referred to as the Craft 
Subcommittee) was authorized to study the effects of System operations 
upon the functioning of the government securities market. In the 
22-month period which elapsed between the appointment of the Craft 
Subcommittee and the adoption of its recommendations on March 4-5, 
1953* the behavior of the System and Treasury authorities might best 
be described as a pragmatic conversion to a free government securities 
market.^
The transition to an autonomous market was a gradual process 
characterized by close Treasury-Federal Reserve cooperation. The 
policy pursued by the System through the remainder of 1951 placed
Ira 0. Scott, Jr., Government Securities Market (New Yorki 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), PP. 160-161.
12
primary emphasis on the maintenance of price-yield stability of short­
term government securities. Specifically, System officials agreed
rt
not to raise the discount rate above 1-3A percent during 1951. The 
conduct of open market operations, up until the Treasury refunding of 
December, 1952, entailed the lending of direct support to Treasury 
financings. This support took the form of central bank purchases of 
"rights" to new issues, new issues on a "when issued" basis, and out-
g
standing securities in the market comparable to the new issues.
Despite central bank underwriting, the majority of Treasury offerings 
through the end of 1952 consisted of short-term securities. The 
Treasury conducted the bulk of its financing needs through the medium 
of 1-7/8 percent certificates.^ The Treasury refrained from issuing 
securities of more than one year to maturity until February, 1953, so 
as not to interfere with continuing portfolio adjustments to the new 
and reduced liquidity characteristics of intermediate and longer-term 
government issues.^®
During this transition period, the actions of the Federal 
Reserve with respect to direct support operations and the Treasury 
practice of confining financing operations to certificates, are 
explicable in light of the objectives of the two agencies as expressed 
by Secretary of the Treasury John W, Snyder. Secretary Snyder sum­
marized those objectives as followst
n
Gaines, Debt Management, p. 66.
®Beard, "Debt Management," pp. ^17-^18. 
q
Gaines, Debt Management, p. 69.
10Ibld., p. 66.
13
Throughout the period since the close of World War 
II the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System were 
agreed upon the fundamental objective of maintaining 
a high level of production, employment, and Income 
with as great price stability as possible under the 
varying conditions which existed in the economy.
The related objectives which were Involved as the 
postwar period proceeded were a matter of agreement 
between the two agencies. They included* (l) main­
tenance of confidence In the credit of the Government;
(2) maintenance of a sound market for the securities 
of the United States Government; (3) restraint, during 
much of the period, of overall credit expansion; (4) 
increase in the ownership of Government securities by 
nonbank investors and reductions in the holdings of 
the banking system; (5) adjustment from time to time 
in the wartime pattern of interest rates, as this 
became appropriate.H
The result of the emphasis on maintaining "confidence in the 
Government's credit" and a "sound" securities market was the continua­
tion of a trend toward shortening the maturity structure of the debt. 
The Report of the Craft Subcommittee underscored the limitations 
placed upon the central bank in effectuating credit control policy 
while the System was committed to a policy of direct support. The 
ability of the System to restrict credit expansion was effectively 
curtailed by the necessity of making sizable and frequent support pur­
chases. In addition, it was felt that support operations did estab-
12llsh a pegged market, at least during the Treasury financing period. 
The importance of these arguments has been questioned and the commit­
ment of the System to temporary pegging may have resulted in a
^Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Thirty-Ninth 
Annual Report, 1952 (Washington, D.C.t Federal Reserve System, 1953)* 
P. 12.
12
Beard, "Debt Management," p. 418.
14-
psychological market phenomenon which ultimately led to a smoother
13transition to free markets.
Due to the criticisms of direct support operations, officials 
of the two agencies experimented with various methods of minimizing 
or eliminating official intervention in the government securities 
market. In connection with a small refunding operation, the System 
decided in December, 1952, to refrain from purchasing maturing secu­
rities, or "rights" as they were called. In February, 1953« when the 
Treasury refinanced a large maturity with an attractive offer, no sup­
port purchases were made by the central bank. The success of both
financings demonstrated the feasibility of reliance on freely
14-fluctuating markets rather than on official intervention.
The curtailment of System direct support of Treasury financ­
ings marked the second step in the evolution of the "even keel" policy. 
Up until December, 1952, the Federal Reserve maintained essentially 
the same policy of direct support operations as was practiced prior to 
the Accord. The strategy of direct support purchases was gradually
13It has been argued that the transition to a free government 
securities market was aided by a probably mistaken notion on the part 
of market participants, that there was still a minimum price support 
level (at 96 on 2-1/2 percent long-term securities) below which the 
Federal Reserve authorities would not allow the market price to fall. 
Although there was no officially stated minimum support price, the 
barrier was not broken until December, 1952. The belief in this 
phantom support price by market participants probably did lend some 
support to the relatively moderate degree of price-yield fluctuation 
that occurred during the transition period. See, for a similar 
analysis, Gaines, Debt Management, p. 67.
14-
Martin, "Transition to Free Markets," p. 333.
15
abandoned as the transition to free markets was completed. With the 
abandonment of this policy, the necessity of developing a substitute 
operating technique became apparent. The recommendations of the 
Craft Subcommittee proposed a positive policy to replace the direct 
support program. However, it was some time before the System adopted 
a positive solution to the problem.
D. The "Bills Only" Policy
The "bills only" or "bills preferable" policy was the govern­
ing rule employed by the System for the conduct of open market 
operations during the 1953-1960 period. The acceptance of this 
operational doctrine completed the evolution initiated by the March, 
1951» Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord in establishing an independent 
central monetary authority whose operations were to be executed in the 
environment of a free government securities market. The Craft Sub­
committee Report, submitted to the F.O.M.C. on November 12, 1952» laid 
the groundwork for the unanimous adoption of the "bills only" policy 
in March, 1953.15
The reader might find it useful to consult the Craft Sub­
committee, Report of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Government 
Securities Market of the Federal Open Market Committee, Robert H. 
Craft, technical consultant to the Ad Hoc Subcommittee, Appendix C, 
November 12, 1952. This section has most recently been reprinted 
intact in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency, 
The Federal Reserve System After Fifty Years, Hearings, before the 
Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the Committee on Banking and 
Currency, House, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 196*1’ (Washington, D.C.t Govern' 
ment Printing Office, 1962). The Craft Subcommittee Report was first 
published in U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 
United States Monetary Policy! Recent Thinking and Experience, Hear­
ings, before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization (Flanders 
Committee) of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 83rd Cong., 
2d sess., 195^ (Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office, 195*0.
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The findings of the Graft Subcommittee with respect to the 
effect of System open market operations on the government securities 
market were concerned primarily with the operational efficiency of the 
market. The recommendations were aimed at Improving market perfor­
mance. The relevant passage in the Graft Subcommittee Report was*
The Subcommittee finds that a disconcerting degree 
of uncertainty exists (in the Government securities 
market) . . ,, an uncertainty that is detrimental to 
the development of depth, breadth, and resiliency of 
the market. In the judgment of the Subcommittee, 
this uncertainty can be eliminated by an assurance 
from the Federal Open Market Committee that hence­
forth it will intervene in the market, not to impose 
on the market any particular pattern of prices and 
yields but solely to effectuate the objectives of 
monetary and credit policy, and that it will confine 
such intervention to transactions in very short-term 
securities, preferably bills.1®
Thus, the Craft Subcommittee characterized an efficiently 
functioning market as one possessing "depth, breadth, and resiliency.'1? 
These traits were defined in terms of the orders on dealers' books.
The market is said to possess "depth" when there are orders, either
Federal Reserve System, Federal Open Market Committee,
Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, March k-5, 1953* in Clay 
J. Anderson, A Half-Century of federal Reserve Policymaking, 191k- 
196^ (Philadelphia* Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1965), 
ppTllk.115.
17Besides these more technical criteria, it is generally agreed 
that an adequate functioning government securities market would have 
the capacity to accommodate Treasury financings, Federal Reserve open 
market operations, and private investment transactions. Such a 
market would be characterized by continuity in trading at prices 
which reflect supply and demand and would not exhibit the sustained 
sharp price movements that might reflect investor or dealer unwill­
ingness to maintain an active, functioning market. For this view, 
see Louise Freeman Ahearn, "Government Securities Market Performance 
in the Wake of Official Operations in Coupon Issues Day-to-Day Perfor­
mance, " a staff study of the Report of the Joint Treasury-Federal 
Reserve Study of the U.S. Government Securities Market (Washington,
D.C.i Federal Reserve System, 1969)* P. k, 1
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actual orders or orders that can be readily uncovered, both above and
below the market. The market has •’breadth” when these orders are in
volume and come from widely divergent investor groups. It is
"resilient" when new orders pour promptly into the market to take
18advantage of sharp and unexpected fluctuations in prices. The solu­
tion proposed to counteract the uncertainty in the market, stated 
that the F.O.M.C, should conduct open market operations solely to ef­
fectuate monetary and credit control objectives. In addition, the 
Craft Subcommittee recommended that these transactions be confined to 
the short-term end of the market. The philosophy underlying these 
proposals was that the System should minimize the degree of interven­
tion it exercised in the market.
While laying down these guidelines for the normal conduct of 
open market operations, the Craft Subcommittee also made more specific 
recommendations with respect to the operating techniques to be employed 
by the Trading Desk during Treasury financing periods. Specifically, 
that the F.O.M.C, should direct the Account Manager toi
. . . agree to suspend during these periods (of 'suf­
ficiently infrequent* Treasury financings) any open 
market operations in which it normally might be 
engaged . . , ,,” in particular, to "refrain from 
any sales in the market beginning with the period of 
the Treasury's preliminary announcement of the general 
terms . . . ” and ”, , .to prevent a rise in open 
market Treasury bill rates from exceeding the highest 
rates that had prevailed during the period between the
18U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Employment,
Growth, and Price Levels, Hearings, before the Joint Economic Committee, 
86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959 (Washington, D.C.* Government Printing 
Office, 1959), P. 1801.
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preliminary announcement and the announcement of the 
specific terms.^9
These passages from the Graft Subcommittee Report delineate the con­
ception of not only the now-defunct "bills only" policy, but the first 
official statement of a conscious attempt to outline the appropriate 
open market strategy to be utilized by the Trading Desk during 
Treasury financings. This operating technique was designed to re­
place the practice of making direct support purchases during Treasury
financings while at the same time preventing the appearance of "dis-
20orderly markets" during such operations. Although these recommen­
dations have been cited as direct causes of the curtailment of the
System's support purchases during the December, 1952, and February,
211953, refundings, they were not adopted intact by the F.O.M.C.
The official pronouncement marking the start of the "bills 
only" policy was unanimously adopted at the F.O.M.C. meeting held in 
March, 1953. The statement detailed the following operational guide­
lines t
(1) Under present conditions, operations for the 
System Account should be confined to the short end 
of the market (not including correction of "dis­
orderly markets"))
(2) It is not now the policy of the Committee to 
support any pattern of prices and yields in the
19Craft Subcommittee, Report, in U.S., Congress, The Federal 
Reserve System After Fifty Years, Hearings, p. 2052.
^^William P. Yohe and Louis C. Gasper, "The 'Even Keel* 
Decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee," Financial Analysts 
Journal (November-December, 1970), p. 1.
^^Rudolph Thunberg, "'Even Keel's The Reconciliation of 
Monetary Policy and Debt Management" (an unpublished manuscript, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York), p. 4.
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government securities market, and Intervention In 
the government securities market is solely to ef­
fectuate the objectives of monetary and credit 
policy (including correction of "disorderly 
markets")|
(3) Pending further study and further action by 
the Committee, it should refrain during a period 
of Treasury financing from purchasing (l) any 
maturing issues for which an exchange is being 
offered, (2) "when-issued" securities, and (3; 
outstanding issues of comparable maturity to 
those being offered for exchange.^2
The three policies adopted in March were made, in effect, con­
tinuing operating policies in September, 1953. The F.O.M.C. approved 
a motion that these policies be followed until suspended or modified 
by further action of the Committee. It adopted a fourth continuing 
directive in December, 1953* "Transactions for the System Account in 
the open market shall be entered into solely for the purpose of provid­
ing or absorbing reserves (except in the correction of 'disorderly 
markets'), and shall not include offsetting purchases and sales of
securities for the purpose of altering the maturity pattern of the
23System's portfolio." An analysis of these directives sheds light 
upon the underlying philosophy of System authorities concerning the 
conduct of open market operations. In addition, they denote a major 
step in the evolution of "even keel" policy.
The "bills only" policy, encompassing the associated prohibi­
tion against both swaps and the direct System support of new offerings, 
enumerated the general ground rules under which the F.O.M.C. would
^Federal Reserve System, Minutes, March 4-5, 1953* in Federal 
Reserve System, Annual Report, 1953* P. Bb.
^■^Federal Reserve System, Minutes, December 15# 1953# in 
Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 1914-1964, p. 118,
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operate until I960. The major goals of the "hills only" policy in­
cluded the establishment of an independent central bank and free
oh
government securities market. System officials sought an open 
market operating technique which would be consistent with a laissez- 
faire philosophy emphasizing minimal System intervention in the 
government securities market, while at the same time it would promote 
the more efficient functioning of that market.
The "bills only" policy emphasized the objective of minimal 
intervention hy declaring that the sole purpose of open market 
operations was to effectuate the objectives of monetary and credit 
control. The System specifically stated that it had no intention of 
influencing the prices of particular securities or maintaining any 
particular rate structure. Further, what operations were necessary 
for monetary and credit control policy were to be confined to the 
short-term end of the market, preferably bills. By confining opera­
tions to the bill sector, the impact of central bank activity would
25be kept as broad and impersonal as possible. That is, the short­
term market, which is characterized as being highly price elastic, can 
more easily absorb System operations with a minimal degree of price 
fluctuation.
These operational guidelines were to be adhered to, except in 
the case of "disorderly markets," Emphasis shifted from defining and
2b
Ervin Miller, "Monetary Policies in the United States Since 
1950« Some Implications of the Retreat to Orthodoxy," Canadian 
Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. XXVII (May* 1961),
P. 2lS.
^Beard, "Debt Management," p. b20.
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maintaining an orderly market to efforts directed at correcting only 
disorderly conditions in the government securities market. This 
alteration in emphasis was consistent with, and reflective of, the 
goal of minimal intervention.
The "bills only" policy had, as an important correlative 
goal, the improvement in the performance of the markets made by govern­
ment securities dealers. Improvement in the government securities 
market was generally pursued in terms of reducing the degree of un­
certainty in the market. To this end, the System decided in 1953 to 
confine its operations to the short end of the market and to terminate 
swapping transactions in the central bank's Treasury bill portfolio.
In addition to the rather specific objections to direct sup­
port purchases, it was felt that System operations in other than the 
shortest end of the market (except those necessary in the correction
of disorderly conditions) would interfere unduly with the operational
27excellence of the market. Central Bank operations in the intermedi­
ate or long-term securities market, by increasing the degree of price 
uncertainty faced by market participants, would reduce the "depth,
pO
breadth, and resiliency" of the market.
26
Martin, "Transition to Free Markets," p. 334.
27
Beard, "Debt Management," p. 420.
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The argument that the operational excellence of the market 
would be impaired by official operations outside the short-term 
securities market is as follows. System operations are normally 
absent in the markets for intermediate and long-term issues. This 
factor reduces the degree of uncertainty faced hy the market partici­
pants with respect to price fluctuations. System operations are 
normally transacted in the short-term market, a highly price elastic 
market, which can more easily absorb official operations with a 
minimal degree of price fluctuation.
22
The adoption of the fourth policy directive in December,
1953. did not reflect a change in the objectives for which open mar­
ket operations were to be used, so much as an effort to prevent swap 
transactions. In November, 1953. some swap transactions had been 
authorized to achieve a better maturity distribution of the System's 
Treasury bill portfolio. At the next meeting of the F.O.M.C. on 
December 15, 1953. the directive prohibiting swaps was adopted. The 
majority of the Committee opposed swap transactions on the basis that 
they would create confusion and uncertainty and thereby militate
29against the better functioning of the government securities market.
Thus, during the 1953-1960 period, the F.O.M.C. was firmly 
committed to an open market policy which emphasized minimal System 
intervention in the government securities market, a policy commonly
28(continued) Thus, given both the interest rate expectations 
and level of System operations necessary for credit control purposes, 
the pursuit of the "bills only" policy would generate the minimal 
amount of price fluctuations, thus reducing the degree of uncertainty 
faced by the underwriters and investors. Quite simply, the Investors 
have one less participant to deal with in the intermediate and long­
term markets.
Restricting operations to the short end of the market reduces 
the degree of uncertainty in a free government securities market.
This argument, of course, has no validity in a pegged market where 
no uncertainty exists, save the possible collapse of the government. 
However, a pegged government securities market and an independent 
central bank are mutually exclusive goals.
Probably the best arguments in defense of the "bills only" 
policy appear in Winfield W. Riefler, "Open Market Operations in Long- 
Term Securities," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. XLIV (November,
1958), pp. 1260-1274| and Ralph A. Young and Charles A. Yeager, "The 
Economics of 'Bills Preferably,'" Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
LXXIV (August, I960), pp. 341-373.
29
Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 191^-196^, p. 118.
referred to as "bills only." In a period of less than three years,
open market policy had shifted from one extreme to the other, from
intervening as necessary to maintain a pegged market, to fostering a
30free market with a minimum of System intervention.
The Emergence of the "Even Keel" Strategy
The primary purpose of this section of the analysis is to 
establish as accurately as possible the date on which "even keel" 
policy emerged as the open market operating technique utilized during 
Treasury financings. The "even keel" policy evolved as a consequence 
of the movement toward an independent central bank operating within a 
free government securities market, A review of the major alterations 
which occurred in open market policy during the 1950's does reveal a 
number of steps which eventually led to the inauguration of the "even 
keel" strategy.
Although this historical analysis will review the major 
changes in open market policy, special emphasis will be placed on the 
variations in the open market operating techniques which were employed 
during Treasury financing periods. This emphasis is necessitated by 
the fact that the "even keel" policy is the strategy pursued by the 
System during Treasury operations. Thus, the analysis attempts to 
highlight the basic changes in System behavior during financing 
periods in order to identify a date which marks the inception of "even 
keel" policy.
Sometime 'between the period encompassing the Craft Subcommit­
tee recommendations which were presented to the F.O.M.C. on November 
12, 1952f and the Initial use of the term in the minutes of the 
F.O.M.C. meeting held on December 12, 1957, "even keel" emerged as a 
positive operating strategy. Keeping in mind the fact that the "even 
keel" policy replaced the direct support program, these two dates mark 
the outer bounds of the period within which the "even keel" policy was 
inaugurated. The recommendations of the Craft Subcommittee have been 
cited as the cause of the curtailment of System support purchases 
during both the December, 1952, and February, 1953, Treasury refund­
ings. Thus, these proposals effectively denote the demise of the 
direct support program. On the other hand, the date of the initial 
use of the terra "even keel" can be cited as the terminal point in 
the interval within which "even keel" had become an operational con­
cept. The actual use of the term would imply and hopefully necessi­
tate that the Account Manager could translate it into an operational 
concept. These two dates then mark solely the outer limits of the 
period to be scrutinized.
The temptation of designating either of the above dates as 
marking the commencement of "even keel" policy was avoided. Rather, 
a critical analysis of official F.O.M.C. statements was undertaken in
order to more accurately identify the inauguration of this open mar- 
31ket strategy. In order to sharply contrast the changes in System 
31In any evolutionary process, whether economic, political, or 
biological in nature, it is difficult to identify a precise date which 
accurately marks the birth of a new policy or life form. Any analysis 
attempting this feat, however, must avoid two major pitfalls.
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behavior during Treasury financing periods, the historical analysis 
starts during the period prior to the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord. 
This investigation is executed primarily in terms of the changes in 
the F.O.M.C. directives authorising transactions for the System Ac­
count. The analysis will trace the important developments in Federal 
Reserve policy throughout three major periods* these intervals include 
the pre-Accord days, the transition to free markets, and the post 
"bills only" era.
A. The Pre-Accord Period
In the period preceding the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord, 
the System was committed to the objective of maintaining a fixed 
price-yield pattern on government securities. For the period follow­
ing the close of World War II until the F.O.M.C. meeting held on 
March 1-2, 1951* the maintenance of a pegged government securities
31(continued) One error the historical researcher is apt to 
make would be the designation of the date which marked the demise of 
the original policy as the same date which denoted the birth of the
new policy. Commonly, there exists an interval or gap between these
two moments, quite often an interlude within which neither policy is
operational. For example, the overthrow of the Czarist regime in 
Russia did not coincide with the inauguration of communism, rather 
these two steps were separated by the interval of Bolshevik rule. 
Analagously, the Craft recommendations on November 12, 1952, marking
the curtailment of the direct support program, did not simultaneously
initiate the "even keel" strategy.
The second pitfall would involve identifying the labeling of 
a new policy as denoting the inception of that policy in an opera­
tional sense. It is conceivable that a new policy or strategy might 
well be operational prior to the instant on which a name is adopted 
for it, just as the birth of a child predates its christening. Thus, 
the initial use of the term "even keel” does not simultaneously 
identify the first moment on which that strategy was implemented by 
the System. It is possible that those open market tactics, which on 
December 12, 1957* were labeled as "even keel" policy, were already 
an established Trading Desk operating technique.
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market was the primary goal which determined central bank operations.
This policy Is succinctly summarized in the F.O.M.C. directives to
the executive committee which enumerated the guidelines under which
the authority to effect transactions in the System Account was
granted. A typical directive, such as the one issued at the F.O.M.C.
meeting held on January 31* 1951* read as follows*
The executive committee is directed, until otherwise 
directed by the Federal Open Market Committee, to 
arrange for such transactions for the System open 
market account, either in the open market or directly 
with the Treasury (including purchases, sales, exchanges, 
replacement of maturing securities, and letting matu­
rities run off without replacement), as may be necessary, 
in the light of current and prospective economic con­
ditions and the general credit situation of the country, 
with a view to exercising restraint upon inflationary 
developments, to maintaining orderly conditions in the 
Government security market, to relating the supply of 
funds in the market to the needs of commerce and 
business, and to the practical administration of the 
account; provided that the aggregate amount of securities 
held in the accGunt at the close of this date other than 
special short-term certificates of indebtedness purchased 
from time to time for the temporary accommodation of 
the Treasury shall not be increased or decreased by more 
than 2 billion dollars.
The executive committee is further directed, until 
otherwise directed hy the Federal Open Market Committee, 
to arrange for the purchase for the System open market 
account dlrect-from the Treasury of 3uch amounts of 
special short-term certificates of~indebtedness as may 
be necessary from time to time for the temporary accom­
modation of the Treasury; provided that the total amount 
of such certificates held in the account at any one time 
shall not exceed 1 billion dollars.32
federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1951, P. 95. The 
author has taken the liberty of underlining sections of the directive. 
These phrases are of particular importance with respect to the develop­
ment of the "even keel" policy.
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This particular directive, with only minor alterations, was Issued 
at successive F.O.M.C. meetings spanning November 27, 1950, through 
December 8, 1952.
Avoiding excessive detail, System open market policy prior to 
the Accord espoused a policy whose implementation required substantial 
and continuous purchases of both long-term and short-term securities. 
During periods between Treasury financings, the System made substan­
tial purchases of long-term bonds which were being offered on the 
market by institutional investors. The purpose of these operations 
was to prevent price declines in order to maintain orderly conditions 
in the government securities market. Federal Reserve purchases during 
December, 1950, and January, 1951# were particularly large and re­
sulted in a 7 billion dollar increase in the volume of commercial bank
33loans since August, 1950.
Direct support purchases during Treasury refundings was a 
common System operating procedure. In light of the objective of main­
taining orderly markets, substantial support purchases, particularly 
for the maturing issues, were undertaken, with the express purpose of 
lending aid to Treasury refundings. Throughout the period, purchases 
of both short-term and long-term securities were consistently made 
during financing periods in order to enable the Treasury to success­
fully market its new issues.
Consternation with respect to the propriety of the support 
program reached a crescendo by early 1951. The dilemma of maintaining 
a pegged market in the face of inflationary developments led to
33Ibld., p. 96.
discussions between monetary and fiscal authorities. The announcement 
of the Accord delineated the start of the second major period in the 
analysis of the evolution of "even keel" policy.
B. The Transition to Free Markets Period
At the F.O.M.C. meeting on March 1-2, 1951» the Committee 
unanimously approved the public announcement of the Accord. The 
official statement read as follows*
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have 
reached full accord with respect to debt management 
and monetary policies to be pursued in furthering 
their common purpose to assure the successful financing 
of the Government'8 requirements,and, at the same time, 
to minimize monetization of the public debt.
This statement reflects the mutual agreement between the two agencies, 
that the main objectives to be sought were the maintenance of a broad 
and healthy market for Treasury securities and the restraint of 
further inflationary expansion of bank credit."^ Although no substan­
tial changes occurred in the form or wording of the F.O.M.C. direc­
tives up through and including December 8, 1952, System policy under­
went some important alterations. These changes can be traced via 
statements made in the summary of the discussion leading to the F.O.M.C, 
directives.
The major innovation in open market policy was the curtailment 
of continuous direct support purchases. The System gradually discon­
tinued purchases of short-term and long-term securities during the 
periods between Treasury financing operations. The pending task of
refunding the large volume of short-term securities maturing or 
callable in the near future presented an immediate problem. The 
solution adopted called for the System to immediately reduce or dis­
continue purchases of short-term securities, allowing the short-term 
market to adjust to a position at which banks could depend on borrow­
ing from the Federal Reserve in order to make the necessary adjust­
ments in their reserves. By the end of March, 1951* the short-term 
market operated without System support purchases. The freeing of the 
short-term market was accomplished with the aid of the System main­
taining a 1-3fh percent ceiling on the discount rate throughout the
36
remainder of 1951.
The large volume of long-term bonds overhanging the market 
and being offered for sale daily in March, 1951» presented the other 
immediate problem. The solution adopted involved a Treasury offer to 
exchange them for a nonmarketable 2-3A percent, 29-year bond, which 
was redeemable at the holder's option before maturity only by con­
version into a 5-year marketable Treasury note. The System agreed to 
make a limited volume of open market purchases after the announcement 
of the exchange. With the objective of maintaining orderly conditions 
in the market, the System purchased substantial amounts of long-term 
restricted 2-1/2 percent Treasury bonds. The purchases, initially at 
fixed support prices, within a period of a few days were rapidly re­
duced in volume and carried out on the basis of a scale-down of prices. 
By the closing of the books on April 6, 1951* the fixed support
30
37policy for long-term bonds was abandoned. Thus, within one month 
of the Accord, both the short-term and long-term government securities 
markets operated without continuous open market purchases.
During the transition to free markets, the nature of System 
open market operations during Treasury financing periods also under­
went a major adaptation. Direct support operations involving System 
purchases of "rights" to new issues, new issues on a "when-issued" 
basis, and outstanding securities in the market comparable to the new 
issues were slowly abandoned. By the end of 1952, Treasury financings 
were carried out without direct support purchases. In accommodating 
the Treasury, the System came to rely increasingly on the use of re­
purchase agreements. A brief review of these developments is illu­
minating in the analysis of "even keel" policy.
In the period between March, 1951» and October, 1951»
Treasury financing operations were substantial in both the short-term 
and long-term markets. Between May and October alone, over 18 billion 
dollars of maturing notes and bonds had been refunded in four financ­
ing operations, and 2 billion dollars of new money had been raised by 
means of increases in the weekly Treasury bill offerings. In June and 
September, substantial purchases were made by the System to aid the 
Treasury. The Federal Reserve purchases of both short-term and long­
term securities were reduced to amounts (often substantial) needed at 
times to aid Treasury refunding operations plus occasional small
37Ibid.
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amounts for orderly market purposes, which purchases were largely
38offset by sales or redemptions at other times.
The F.O.M.C. meeting on October 4, 1951* reiterated the 
general stance of System policy which had been adopted by the Commit­
tee on May 17, 1951. The same directive was adopted with a view to 
the pursuit of a "neutral" policy by the System which would permit
market forces of supply and demand to operate with a minimum of
39Federal Reserve intervention. At this meeting, the Committee also 
repeated its authorization for each Federal Reserve Bank to enter into 
repurchase agreements with non-bank dealers in government securities. 
Such agreements were to cover only short-term Treasury obligations, 
be for periods of 15 days or less, be made at rates close to the 
average issuing rate on the most recent issue of 3-month Treasury 
bills, and be for the purpose of aiding temporary money market adjust­
ments. It was apparent that this instrument would become increasingly 
important as one of the mechanisms available to the System in execut­
ing open market policy. It was emphasized that repurchase agreements 
would be used in the interest of orderly conditions in the government 
securities market. It was felt that this instrument would enable 
dealers to absorb as much of the buying and selling in the market as
possible and to carry the necessary inventory of securities to provide
kn
a market, leaving the System as only a residual buyer.
Between October 4, 1951* and November 12, 1952, there was 





the Treasury's exchange offering, for which the subscription books 
were opened on December 3* 1951* the System generally made purchases
i}. i
to aid the Treasury in its refundings. Large Treasury financings
in June, August, and September, 1952, brought forth substantial 
l\2
System purchases. Although increased emphasis was placed on the 
repurchase agreement mechanism, the System still aided the Treasury 
via direct purchases of government securities during financing 
periods. Up to this point, "even keel" policy was nonexistent.
On November 12, 1952, the recommendations of the Craft Sub­
committee were presented to the F.O.M.C, Those proposals and their 
partial adoption represent a major evolutionary step in analysis of 
"even keel" policy. The Craft Subcommittee proposed a set of 
operational guidelines for the conduct of open market transactions 
during Treasury refundings, as well as the interim periods between 
such dates. As previously noted, the recommendations were aimed at 
improving the efficiency of the government securities market.
The F.O.M.C. adopted partially the suggestions of the Craft 
Subcommittee at the meeting held on March 4-5, 1953. In addition to 
a change in the directive, the F.O.M.C. also adopted three policies 
with respect to operations for the System Account. These developments 
mark the inauguration of the "bills only" policy.
Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1952, p, 91.
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C. The "Bills Only" Policy
The proposals of the Craft Subcommittee for open market 
operations between Treasury financing periods were adopted intact by 
the F.O.M.C. The new operating procedure was reflected by a change 
in the wording of the F.O.M.C. directive to the Account Manager.
The change provided that the System should arrange for transactions 
in the System open market account, with a view, among other things,
"to correcting a disorderly situation in the Government securities 
market," rather than as previously, "to maintaining orderly conditions 
in the Government security market," J The F.O.M.C. further adopted 
the following policiest
(1) Under present conditions, operations for the 
System Account should be confined to the short end
of the market (not Including correction of "disorderly 
markets")|
(2) It is not now the policy of the Committee to 
support any pattern of prices and yields in the 
Government securities market, and intervention in 
the Government securities market is solely to ef­
fectuate the objectives of monetary and credit policy 
(including the correction of "disorderly markets"),^
Thus, it can be seen from the official statements of record that the
inauguration of the "bills only" policy represented the official
F.O.M.C. adoption of the view that open market operations should be
implemented with the objective of minimizing System intervention In
the government securities market.
The Craft Subcommittee’s recommendations with respect to the
appropriate open market operating techniques to be employed during




Treasury financings were only partially adopted by the F.O.M.C.
The Craft Subcommittee recommended that the F.O.M.C.t
. . . agree to suspend during these periods (of 
"sufficiently infrequent" Treasury financings) any 
open market operations in which it normally might 
be engaged , . .," in particular, to "refrain from 
any sales in the market beginning with the period 
of the Treasury's preliminary announcement of the 
general terms . . . "  and ". . .to prevent a rise 
in open market Treasury bill rates from exceeding 
the highest rates that had prevailed during the 
period between th - • • an£
It was felt that this policy would replace the direct support program 
previously utilized during financing periods while, at the same time, 
it would prevent the appearance of "disorderly markets." Although 
this recommendation has been cited as being responsible for the cur­
tailment of direct support purchases during the December, 1952, and 
February, 1953» financings, it was not officially adopted by the
At the F.O.M.C. meeting on March 4-5, 1953» the Committee 
adopted the following policy regarding the conduct of open market 
operations during Treasury financings. The policy officially adopted 
stated that*
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Craft Subcommittee, Report, in U.S., Congress, The Federal 
Reserve System After Fifty Years, Hearings, p. 2052. It should be 
carefully noted that the proposal of the Craft Subcommittee was more 
specific in nature than the policy actually adopted by the F.O.M.C. on 
March 4-5, 1953. The recommendation specified a policy in terms of 
the desired behavior of a single money market indicator, the Treasury 
bill rate. The policy adopted, on the other hand, contained no 
reference to any particular money market variable. The author does 
not imply, however, that the Craft Subcommittee proposal was superior 




Thunberg, "'Even Keel'* The Reconciliation," p. 4.
35
(3) Pending further study and action by the Com­
mittee, it should refrain during a period of Treasury 
financing from purchasing (l) any maturity issues for 
which an exchange is being offered, (2) "when-issued" 
securities, and (3) outstanding issues of comparable 
maturity to those being offered for exchange.47
It is the contention of the author that this policy, though negative
in one sense, can be interpreted as being the new set of guidelines
which the System adopted to govern the conduct of the Trading Desk
lift
during financing periods. Thus, the official adoption of this 
policy delineates the birth of the "even keel" strategy. It is the 
conclusion of this analysis that, even though the strategy was not 
christened until December 12, 1957* "even keel" policy became opera-—  
tional on March 4-5, 1953.**^
Although this conclusion is not universally accepted, it can 
be defended on a number of grounds,^  First, direct support purchases
bo
Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1953* P. 88.
48This policy is negative only in the sense that the guide­
lines adopted at this meeting specified what the F.O.M.C. should not 
do during financing periods. The policy was stated in terms of what 
type of open market operations were inappropriate, and thus prohibited, 
during periods when the Treasury was an active participant in the 
market. This is not to imply that just because the program was stated 
negatively that it did not have operational significance. On the 
contrary, the policy adopted did specify certain operating procedures 
which were not to be employed by the Desk.
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The period between the recommendations of the Craft Subcom­
mittee and the inauguration of the "bills only" policy on March 4-5, 
1953* has been treated as the interlude between the demise of the 
direct support program and the birth of the "even keel" strategy which 
replaced it. Although open to question, it is felt that inauguration 
of a new policy requires the official sanction of the full Committee.
^°The conclusions of Yohe and Gasper disagree with the author's 
analysis. They point out that in 1957 a Subcommittee on Treasury 
Relations was established within the F.O.M.C. Although frequent 
mention was made in the Minutes of the F.O.M.C. of this Subcommittee's 
deliberations, a report is neither referred to or included in the 
Minutes, Yohe and Gasper contend the "even keel" as an explicit
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to aid Treasury financings were not practiced by the System after 
the December, 1952, refunding, except in correcting "disorderly con­
ditions" in the government securities m a r k e t . T h e  System deviated 
from its policy of minimal intervention on only two occasions in the
CO
1953-1960 period. Secondly, repurchase agreements with non-bank
dealers had come to be recognized after October 1951* as an
important policy instrument. "Defensive" open market operations, in
the form of the extension of repurchase agreements to non-bank dealers
during large Treasury financings, had been used to smooth the money
53market impact of such operations. The System, in addition, had
(continued) operating strategy was worked out in that 
Subcommittee. They further conclude that there is some evidence that 
"even keel" policy began to evolve as early as 1955# See, specifi­
cally, Yohe and Gasper, "The 'Even Keel* Decisions," p. 2.
51A disorderly market has been defined as a "situation in 
which selling feeds on itself, that is, a situation in which a fall 
in prices, instead of eliciting an increase in the amount of securi­
ties demanded and a decrease in the amount supplied, elicits the re­
verse, a falling away of bids and a rise in both the number and the 
size of offerings." The quotation is taken from a statement submitted 
by the Board of Governors to the Joint Economic Committee. See U.S., 
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Employment, Growth, and Price 
Levels, Hearings, before the Joint Economic Committee, 86th Cong.,
1st sess., 195v (Washington, D.C.* Government Printing Office, 1959)» 
pp. 1278-1279.
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The System purchased 168 million dollars of "when-issued" 
certificates in November and December, 1955» in order to facilitate 
the Treasury refunding during a period of money market stringency. 
Chairman Martin justified intervention because "disorderly conditions" 
seriously threatened the market. The System purchased a large amount 
of securities involved in the Treasury refunding during July and 
August, 1958, in order to facilitate that financing. In this instance 
the justification for these purchases was that "disorderly conditions" 
had actually emerged in the market. See Thunberg, "'Even Keel'i The 
Reconciliation," p. 5.
"*^ For a discussion of "defensive" open market operations as 
related to Treasury financings, see Robert V. Roosa, Federal Reserve 
Operations in the Money and Government Securities Markets (New Yorks 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1956), pp. 83-87.
specifically avoided overt shifts in monetary policy because of 
financing operations, especially in terms of citing Treasury activity 
as a factor which militated against a tightened stance in credit 
policy. Thus, by March 4-5, 1953» those general policies and specific 
operating procedures which in subsequent years have come to be as­
sociated with the "even keel" strategy were already employed by the 
System, The fact that no Treasury refunding failed during the 1953- 
1957 period is considered sufficient evidence that the System did 
pursue a policy which, if it did not specifically aid the Treasury, 
at least did not hinder the Treasury. Thus, this study concludes 
that "even keel" policy became operational with the inception of the 
"bills only" policy.
Summary and Conclusion
This analysis has attempted to delineate the major innovations 
which have occurred in monetary policy with respect to the effect of 
these developments on the evolution of "even keel" policy. Special 
emphasis was placed upon the changing relationship between System open 
market operations and Treasury financings. The major conclusion of 
the author’s research is that the "even keel" strategy developed as 
part of the general evolution of System open market policy. This 
study has identified March 4-5, 1953* a-s being the date upon which 
"even keel" became an operational phenomenon. Although disagreement 
is possible, it is hoped that the method of analysis was proper.
What is of crucial importance in the analysis is the purpose 
for which it was undertaken. The object of this study was to impart
38
to the reader a general understanding of what "even keel" policy 
entails In the context of reviewing the changing environment of which 
it was a product. In light of this analysis, it may be concluded
"Even keel" is to Federal Reserve support of 
Treasury financings as "bills only" is to the 
conduct of open market operations! they are 
operating techniques "lease inconsistent with
ention" in the Government
that:
5b
Yohe and Gasper, "The 'Even Keel' Decisions," p. 1,
CHAPTER III
FEDERAL RESERVE "EVEN KEEL"
POLICY IN THE SIXTIES
This chapter attempts to provide the reader with a broad 
understanding of "even keel" policy during the I960's. In order to 
accomplish this task, this section focuses upon three related topics. 
First, an historical analysis of the major developments in monetary 
policy is presented. Emphasis is placed upon those evolutionary 
changes which occurred in both System open market policy and Trading 
Desk operating techniques that are of special relevance to "even keel" 
policy. Secondly, a discussion of some alternative definitions of the 
"even keel" policy which have appeared in the literature is offered.
And, finally, an explanation of the basic rationale which underlies 
this strategy, as well as a discussion of the time span covered hy 
"even keel" operations, is presented.
"Operation Twist" and "Even Keel" Policy
The major change in Federal Reserve open market policy during 
this period consisted of the replacement of the "bills only" guidelines 
by the "operation twist" or "nudge" policy. The emergence of "operation 
twist" was the inevitable consequence of the economic and financial 
developments which forced the monetary authorities to recognize the
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limitations imposed upon their ability to pursue a countercyclical 
credit policy within the framework of confining open market operations 
exclusively to the short-term end of the government securities market. 
Criticism of the "bills only" policy grew as changes in both internal 
and external conditions dictated.^ "Operation twist" represented not 
only a basic change in System policy, but also led to alterations in 
the open market operating techniques employed by the System,
The economic environment of the late 1950's and early 1960's 
brought Federal Reserve officials face to face, once again, with the 
dilemma of monetary policy objectives which called for conflicting 
System actions. Although the 1960-1961 recession was a relatively mild 
one, it was especially disturbing to the monetary authorities because 
the economy had never fully recovered from the 1957-1958 recession.
Up until the F.O.M.G. meeting on March 1, i960, the System had pursued 
an open market policy, first adopted on May 26, 1959» which emphasized 
the restraint of inflationary credit expansion. The F.O.M.C, policy 
directive issued on January 26, i960, in Clause b, instructed the 
Account Manager to conduct open market operations with a view to
^or a brief survey of the vast literature critical of the 
"bills only" policy, see Joseph Aschheim, Techniques of Monetary 
Control (Baltimore! Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), pp.53-82; Deane 
Carson, "Recent Open Market Committee Policy and Technique," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. LXIX (August, 1955)» PP. 321-343; Dudley
G. Luckett, "’Bills Only'i A Critical Appraisal," Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. XLII (August, I960), pp. 301-306; U.S., Congress, 
Joint Economic Committee, Debt Management in the United States, by 
Warren L. Smith, Joint Economic Committee, Study Faper No. 19 
(Washington, D.C.a Government Printing Office, i960), pp. 118-134; 
and Sidney Weintraub, "The Theory of Open Market Operations! A Comment," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLI (August, 1959)* PP. 308- 
312.
kl
" . . .  restraining inflationary credit expansion in order to foster 
sustainable economic growth and expanding employment opportunities
2
. . . a policy consistent with the prevailing economic conditions. 
However, as the internal situation deteriorated, the System was forced 
to alter its policy.
As I960 progressed, aggregate demand, production, and employ­
ment fell. Simultaneously, both the level and rate of unemployment
increased, while the consumer and wholesale price indexes remained 
3
stable. In light of these classic recessionary developments. System 
officials recognized the need to rearrange the priority list of mone­
tary policy objectives. As time passed, the pursuit of the goals of 
full resource utilization and sustained economic growth supplanted the 
now-nonexistent inflationary problem as the chief concern of the 
System. These objectives clearly called for an easing of credit 
policy. However, another problem developed which complicated the task 
of the Federal Reserve,
The recession developed against a backdrop of a substantial 
balance of payments deficit. The deficit averaged over 3 billion 
dollars annually between 1958 and I960, a condition which was consid­
erably aggravated during i960 and 1961 by large outflows of short-term
2
Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Forty-Seventh 
Annual Report, i960 (Washington, D.C.i Federal Reserve System, i960), 
P. 35.
3
Clay J . Anderson, A Half-Century of Federal Reserve Policy­
making, 191^-1964 (Philadelphia! Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
1965)7 PP. 129-130.
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4capital. The authorities felt that the international differentials 
in short-term interest rates that developed during I960 were the major 
cause of the capital outflow. The high priority placed upon inter­
national considerations caused System officials to include improvement 
in the balance of payments as the third major goal of credit policy. 
This external objective called for a tightening in the stance of mone­
tary policy.
Thus, the economic conditions which developed in the early 
1960*s presented a major policy dilemma.^ In order to stimulate
4Ibid., p. 130.
^The extraordinary degree of importance attached to inter­
national considerations by System officials is well-illustrated by the 
following quotation1 "The hard facts of recent balance-of-payments 
developments( in the context of the international role of the dollar, 
have revised the basic framework for monetary policy in the United 
States. As an objective of monetary policy, the defense of the inter­
national value of the dollar has come to occupy a position alongside 
the goal of stable domestic growth." See Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, Annual Report, 1961, p. 7,
^Although outside the immediate concern of this analysis, the 
reader should be made aware of certain qualifications to the dilemma, 
as well as some alternative solutions which have been proposed to 
reconcile the conflict between internal and external goals.
First of all, a policy dilemma exists only if the value judg­
ment which ranks internal and external objectives as equally important 
is accepted. If, for example, System officials had held the goal of 
achieving balance of payments equilibrium in a position subordinate 
to the objective of maintaining full employment and stable growth, 
then no dilemma would have existed. Had this value judgment been ac­
cepted, the monetary authorities would have been required to pursue 
an expansive credit policy. On the other hand, a restrictive policy 
would have been implemented had System officials ranked internal goals 
below international considerations.
Secondly, a number of alternative reconciliations have been 
proposed by authors who accept the System's equal ranking of external 
and internal goals. The solutions are based upon an integration of a 
number of policies to be used in order to achieve the reconciliation 
of multiple objectives. Their proponents generally adhere to the 
premise that the successful achievement of multiple policy goals re­
quires the implementation of, at least, an equal number of policy
h3
internal recovery, the System was required to pursue an easy monetary 
policy to supply an ample amount of reserves to encourage credit ex­
pansion, The external deficit required, conversely, that the System 
maintain a tight credit policy to limit the availability of funds in 
order to obtain a realignment of international short-term interest 
rates. In order to cope with the economic conditions, the Federal 
Reserve System pursued three courses of action. These entailed alter­
ations in Clause b of the economic policy directive, changes in the 
operating techniques employed by the Desk and, finally, the curtail­
ment of the "bills only" policy guidelines.
The System made adaptations in its open market operations in 
the form of alternations in Clause b on seven separate occasions
n
between January 26, I960, and December 19, 1961. The rather
(continued) weapons. In contrast, it should be noted that 
"operation twist" involved the application of a single policy weapon, 
open market operations, to several policy goals. A survey of the 
relevant literature would briefly include, for example, J. E, Meade,
The Balance of Payments (Londont Oxford University Press, 1951)• 
pp. 157-162| Robert A. Mundell, "The Appropriate Use of Monetary and 
Fiscal Policy for Internal and External Stability," International 
Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. IX (March, 1962), pp. 70-79* Jan 
Tinbergen, The Theory of Economic Policy (Amsterdam* North-Holland 
Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 39-hOj and Leland B. Yeager, Inter­
national Monetary Relations* Theory, History, and Policy (New York* 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 19o6), pp. 87-113.
7
The changes that occurred in Clause b of the F.O.M.C, direc­
tive to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York reflect the change in the 
stance of monetary policy. Clause b essentially Instructs the Account 
Manager in the manner in which open market operations are to be carried 
out in light of external and internal economic conditions. During 
I960, Clause b was altered at the F.O.M.C. meetings held on March 1, 
March 2h, August 16, and October 2h. Clause b was reworded in 1961 at 
the meetings held on April 18, June 6, and August 22. See Federal 
Reserve System, Annual Report, I960, pp. hi, 61, and 67* and
Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1961, pp. 55# 62, and 73.
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restrictive monetary policy reflected in the previously quoted direc­
tive issued on January 26, I960, was substantially modified on March 
1, I960. The revision authorized on that date directed that open 
market operations should be conducted with a view to ", . . fostering 
sustainable growth in economic activity and employment, while guarding 
against excessive credit expansion . . a policy shift toward less
Q
restraint. This trend toward an increasingly expansive monetary 
policy was reinforced at the F.O.M.C, meetings held on March 24 and 
August 16, i960. The changes which occurred in Clause b up to this 
point had been authorized by the Committee in light of the deteriora­
tion in the internal economic conditions and the need for the System 
to pursue a policy to promote domestic recovery. At the F.O.M.C. 
meeting held on October 25, I960, the System officially mentioned the 
balance of payments problem. At that meeting, Clause b was revised to 
read that open market operations should be conducted with a view to 
". . . encouraging monetary expansion for the purpose of fostering
sustainable growth in economic activity and employment while taking
9
into consideration current international developments . . . ." 
Throughout the remainder of I960 and 1961, the directive, though 
altered in light of the gradual domestic recovery, continued to con­
tain explicit references to both internal and external policy targets. 
Thus, the System did adapt to changed circumstances by altering the 
stance of its policy. However, the major monetary experiment of the 
period, the inauguration of "operation twist," emerged as a result of
^Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, I960, p. 41.
9Ibld., p. 67.
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a series of pragmatic adjustments made in the open market operating 
techniques employed by the Desk,
The general form of the F.O.M.C. policy directive to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York remained essentially unchanged until 
a new format was adopted by the Committee on December 19, 1961. A 
typical directive prior to this date instructed the Bankj
(1) To make such purchases, sales, or exchanges 
(including replacement of maturity securities, and 
allowing maturities to run off without replacement) 
for the System Open Market Account in the open market 
or, in the case of maturing securities, by direct 
exchange with the Treasury, as may be necessary in
the light of current and prospective economic conditions 
and the general credit situation of the country, with 
a view (a) to relating the supply of funds in the mar­
ket to the needs of commerce and business, (b) to 
restraining inflationary credit expansion in order to 
foster sustainable economic growth and expanding 
employment opportunities, and (c) to the practical 
administration of the Account| provided that the 
aggregate amount of securities held in the System 
Account (including commitments for the purchase or 
sale of securities for the Account) at the close of 
this date, other than special short-term certificates 
of indebtedness purchased from time to time for the 
temporary accommodation of the Treasury, shall not be 
increased or decreased by more than $1 billion)
(2) To purchase direct from the Treasury for the
account of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (with
discretion, in cases where it seems desirable, to
issue participations to one or more Federal Reserve 
Banks) such amounts of special short-term certificates
of indebtedness as may be necessary from time to time
for the temporary accommodation of the Treasury; pro­
vided that the total amount of such certificates held 
at any one time by the Federal Reserve Banks shall
not exceed in the aggregate $500 million.10
The above directive, or one of essentially similar form, was reissued
at successive F.O.M.C. meetings up until December 19, 1961. During
10Ibid., p. 35
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this period, the economic policy directive was authorized in conjunc­
tion with the three "bills only" policy guidelines, which had been 
adopted by the F.O.M.C. at meetings held between March 4-5» 1953t and 
December 15, 1953.
These "bills only" guidelines emphasized that open market 
operations, except in the case of "disorderly conditions," should 
generally be confined to the short end of the market and that System 
intervention in the market was solely to effectuate the objective of 
monetary and credit policy, not to support any pattern of prices and 
yields in the government securities market. The "bills only" guide­
lines also entailed the prohibitions against swap transactions, as 
well as during Treasury financing periods prohibitions against pur­
chases of (l) maturing issues for which an exchange was being offered,
(2) "when-issued" securities, or (3) outstanding issues of comparable 
maturities to those being offered for exchange. Although the actual 
demise of the "bills only" policy directives did not take place until 
December 19» 1961, a gradual shift in operating techniques emerged in 
late I960.
Within the framework of the general form of the economic 
policy directive and the "bills only" guidelines, a number of important 
changes occurred. The System altered Clause b, as previously enumer­
ated, in order to adapt the stance of credit policy to the changed 
economic circumstances. In the latter part of i960, the Federal 
Reserve, aiming simultaneously at the dual objectives of achieving 
domestic recovery and external payments balance, undertook a series 
of departures which eventually led to the abandonment of the "bills
47
only" policy. It had become apparent that the F.O.M.C. had to adopt
and pursue some objectives, however limited, with respect to Interest
rates, an aim that had been scrupulously avoided during the "bills
only" period. Beginning in late I960, it had become an important
goal of the Committee to minimize further declines (or to foster some
rise) in short-term Interest rates, particularly the rate for 3-month
Treasury bills, which were widely held to be the major criteria of
international rate relationships.^
In October, i960, the F.O.M.C. faced a situation where seasonal
needs required that the System would have to supply a large amount of
reserves to maintain the desired degree of ease; however, at the same
time, the 3-month Treasury bill rates were considerably lower than 
12abroad. It was recognized by the authorities that one way to
minimize the downward pressure on short-term rates was to spread
System purchases of securities to supply reserves over a wider range
of maturities, rather than concentrating purchases in the very sector
13of the market where it was desired to keep rates up. J Accordingly, 
in the fall of I960, the System purchased short-term government secur­
ities other than Treasury bills for the first time since July and 
August, 1958. Specifically, coupon issues maturing within 15 months
^^Robert L. Cooper, "Techniques of the Federal Reserve Trading 
Desk in the 1960's Contrasted with the 'Bills Preferably' Period," a 
staff study of the Report, of the Joint Treasury-Federal Reserve Study 
of the U.S. Government Securities Market (Washington, D.C.t Federal 
Reserve System, 1969), p. 19.
12
Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 1914-1964, p. 131.
13Cooper, "Techniques of the Trading Desk," p. 19.
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were purchased along with Treasury bills, in order to provide reservesj
and very short-term coupon issues, equivalent to Treasury bills in
maturity, were sold on occasion in dealing with downward pressures on
14-rates in that area.
The F.O.M.C. departed further from the '’bills only" policy at 
its meeting on February 7» 1961. At that time, it authorized the 
Account Manager to purchase up to 500 million dollars of government 
securities with maturities of up to 10 years and to alter the maturity 
composition of the System’s portfolio by selling short-term and buying 
longer-term maturities. Swap transactions, it was felt, might be de­
sirable should sales of short-term securities be needed to affect 
short-term rates at a time when the System did not want to absorb 
reserves,^
The Committee agreed that it should make public its decision 
to depart, at least temporarily, from the long-standing policy of con­
fining operations to the short end of the market and refraining from 
engaging in swap transactions. Thus, on February 20, 1961, the date 
of the initial operations in longer maturities, the Chairman of the 
F.O.M.C. authorized the Account Manager to issue the following press 
release:
The System Open Market Account is purchasing in the 
open market U.S. Government notes and bonds of vary­
ing maturities, some of which will exceed 5 years.
Price quotations and offerings are being requested 
of all primary dealers in U.S. Government securities.
^Ibld., p. 19.
^Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 1914-1964, pp. 131-
132.
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Determination as to which offerings to purchase is 
being governed by the prices that appear most advan­
tageous, i.e., the lowest prices. Net amounts of 
all transactions for System Account will be shown 
as usual in the condition statements Issued every 
Thursday.
During recent years transactions for the System 
Account, except in correction of disorderly markets, 
have been made in short-term U.S. Government securi­
ties. Authority for transactions in securities of 
longer maturity has been granted by the Open Market 
Committee of the Federal Reserve System in the light 
of conditions that have developed in the domestic 
economy and in the U.S. balance of payments with 
other countries. 6
The plan was to make moderate purchases in the 1 to 5-1/2 
year maturity sector first and later in 5-1/2 and 10 year maturities. 
The System officials stressed that the purpose of conducting operations 
in coupon issues was not to maintain or peg any particular price-yield 
level on either short-term or long-term securities. Rather, supplying 
reserves ty purchases outside the short-term area would relieve the 
direct downward pressure on short-term rates, thus reducing or revers­
ing the outflow of short-term capital. In addition, to the extent that 
purchases outside the short-term end of the market softened intermedi­
ate or long-term rates or prevented them from rising as much as other­
wise, the flow of funds into the capital and mortgage markets would be 
17encouraged. '
Thus, the major objective of operations in coupon issues was 
not the maintenance of any pattern of rate levels, but, instead, the 
purpose of those operations was to influence the flow of funds in both
^Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1961, p. 43.
17Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 1914-1964, p. 132.
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the long and short ends of the market. This view of the purpose of 
coupon operations is summarized in the words of the Board of Governors, 
who statedt
. . , purchasing of securities in the intermediate- 
and longer-term areas, as contrasted with the short­
term area, offered the possibility of supplying re­
serves without creating direct pressure on short-term 
rates. Also, such purchases, by having a moderating 
influence on long-term Interest rates relative to 
short-term rates, might have the effect of facilitat­
ing the flow of funds through the capital and mortgage 
markets, thereby encouraging the progress of recovery. 
Accordingly, the combination of domestic and inter­
national circumstances confronting the Committee 
seemed to call for a high degree of flexibility in 
open market operations.
At the meeting held on March 28, 1961, the F.O.M.C. authorized 
the Account Manager to conduct operations in securities with maturities 
in excess of 10 years, in amounts not to exceed 500 million dollars.
One reason cited for this authorization was that the increased flexi­
bility in open market operations would afford the System a better op­
portunity to evaluate the effects of its operations in coupon issues.
This special authorization to operate in longer-term securities was
19renewed at each F.O.M.C. meeting until December.
Although the "bills only" policy had, for all practical pur­
poses, been dead since the initial operations in coupon issues on 
February 20, 1961, the F.O.M.C. did not vote to terminate the three 
continuing policy directives until December 19* 1961. The reasons for 
taking this step have been enumerated in the official record. In view
18
Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1961, p. 40,
19
Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 1914-1964, p. 133.
of the external deficit, the System felt that greater flexibility 
might be needed in the future to adapt operating techniques to chang­
ing economic conditions. This Has the primary reason given for the 
action. A second factor cited was that the "bills only" directives, 
which were designed to clarify the role of open market operations and 
thereby assist in the transformation from a pegged to a free market, 
had served their purpose. The transition had been successfully com­
pleted. Finally, when the three continuing directives had been 
adopted, the Executive Committee met only four times a year. After
the Executive Committee was abolished in mid-1955» the authorities
20felt that the continuing directives were now no longer necessary.
On December 19, 1961, the F.O.M.C. issued a new continuing 
authority directive to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to replace 
the three "bills only" guidelines. Since this date, the general 
format of the F.O.M.C.*s directive to the Account Manager has consisted 
of both the continuing authority directive and the current economic 
policy directive. The continuing authority directive, reviewed each 
March at the first meeting of the new F.O.M.C., is subject to revision 
by the F.O.M.C, at any time. It outlines the general policy guidelines 
which govern the conduct of open market operations. The continuing 
authority directive, first issued on December 19* 196l, has been re­
issued in substantially the same form ever since. It read as followst
1. The Federal Open Market Committee authorizes and 
directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to the 
extent necessary to carry out the current economic 
policy directive adopted at the most recent meeting 
of the Committeei
(a) To buy or sell U.S. Government securities
In the open market for the System Open Market Account 
at market prices and, for such Account, to exchange 
maturing U.S. Government seourlties with the Treasury 
or allow them to mature without replacementt provided 
that the aggregate amount of such securities held in 
such Account (including forward commitments, but not 
including such special short-term certificates of 
indebtedness as may be purchased from the Treasury 
under paragraph 2 hereof) shall not be increased or 
decreased by more than $1 billion during any period 
between meetings of the Committees
(b) To buy or sell prime bankers' acceptances 
in the open market for the account of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York at market discount rates; 
provided that the aggregate amount of bankers' ac­
ceptances held at any one time shall not exceed $75 
million or 10 per cent of the total of bankers' ac­
ceptances outstanding as shown in the most recent 
acceptance survey conducted by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York;
(c) To buy U.S. Government securities with 
maturities of 2h months or less at the time of pur­
chase, and prime bankers' acceptances, from non­
bank dealers for the account of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York under agreements for repurchase of 
such securities or acceptances in 15 calendar days 
or less, at rates not less than (a) the discount 
rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the 
time such agreement is entered into, or (b) the 
average issuing rate on the most recent issue of 
3-month Treasury bills, whichever is the lower.
2. The Federal Open Market Committee authorizes 
and directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
purchase directly from the Treasury for the account 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (with dis­
cretion, in cases where it seems desirable, to 
issue participations to one or more Federal Reserve 
Banks) such amounts of special short-term certifi­
cates of indebtedness as may be necessary from time 
to time for the temporary accommodation of the 
Treasury; provided that the total amount of such 
certificates held at any one time by the Federal 
Reserve Banks shall not exceed $500 million.21
21Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1961, pp. 89-
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The current economic policy directive is discussed in Appendix A, which 
also details the methodology employed in this analysis for identifying 
"even keel" directives.
Thus, it can be seen that "operation twist" emerged as a result 
of an evolution in operating techniques aimed at adapting open market 
operations to the changing economic environment of the early I960's. 
"Operation twist" was an official attempt at manipulation of the 
interest structure. System policy with respect to short-term rates 
was clear. The minimization of downward pressure on short-term inter­
est rates, but not the establishment of a particular floor, was con­
sidered appropriate. The short-term interest rate policy was designed 
to keep domestic rates competitive with those abroad in order to stem 
the outflow of short-term funds. Downward pressure on long-term rates,
at least relative to short-term rates, was sanctioned to promote
22domestic recovery.
The author's interpretation, that the major target of "opera­
tion twist" was to influence the flow of funds rather than to maintain 
any interest rate levels, is confirmed by the policy statement made by 
Chairman Martin in a speech given on April 11, 1961, to the Reserve 
City Bankers in Boca Raton, Florida. Noting the public's fixation with 
the rate aspects of the new policy, he said that the System's objective 
was actually to Influence flows of funds in international and domestic
22Thomas R. Beard, "Debt Management! Its Relationship to Mone­
tary Policy, 1951-1962," in Readings in Money, National Income, and 
Stabilization Policy, ed. by Warren L. Smith and Ronald L, Teigen 
(Homewood, Illinois! Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965)* P. ^24,
markets! , . in respect to short-term rates, whether the outflow 
of funds to foreign centers is being stemmedi and in respect to long­
term rates, whether the flow of capital into productive investment 
activities is being facilitated."^
The impact of "operation twist" on the interest rate structure 
falls outside the scope of this paper. However, it is important to 
understand the relationship between "even keel" policy and the philos­
ophy which governed open market operations during the 1960's. The 
demise of the "bills only" policy and the birth of "operation twist"
. is a reflection of the partial abandonment of the laissez-faire doc­
trine endorsed by the System during the March, 1953» to February,
I960, period. Even though the System now officially advocated opera­
tions outside the short end of the market, a review of the historical 
record clearly shows that it was not the intention of the monetary 
authorities to reinstate the inflexible policies which it employed 
prior to 1953. Conversely, "operation twist" was designed to impart 
a greater degree of flexibility to monetary policy. The inauguration 
of "operation twist" did not mark the return to a doctrine which 
espoused the strict regulation of the government securities market.
Although the initiation of System operations in both the inter­
mediate and long-term markets did represent an important innovation in 
monetary policy, "operation twist" cannot be interpreted as a complete 
abandonment of the laissez-faire doctrine. This view of "operation 
twist" is supported by an examination of the main objectives of the 
policy, as well as its implementation during the I960's. The purpose 
of this section is to review briefly a number of facets of "operation 
23cooper, "Techniques of the Trading Desk,” p. 21.
twist" in order to point out the significance of this policy with 
respect to open market operations during both the intervals between 
Treasury financing operations* as well as during periods when the 
Treasury was an active participant in the government securities mar­
ket.
"Operation twist" specifically altered open market operations 
in that it authorized the Trading Desk to conduct transactions out­
side the bill sector and to carry out swap transactions. However, 
the main objectives of such transactions during the interlude between 
Treasury operations did not entail the maintenance of a particular 
price-yield level. Operations in longer-term securities were under­
taken primarily to correct the balance of payments deficit. Net 
acquisitions of coupon issues were relatively larger in the early 
1960's, when the need to avoid downward pressure on short-term yields 
was greatest. In addition, operations in coupon issues were not de­
signed to take the place of operations in bills. Although the net 
purchases (purchase less sales) of coupon issues grew in relative 
importance during the 196I-I965 period as compared with the 1956-
1960 interval, still about 65 percent of total net purchases were
24carried out in the bill sector.
In addition to these major characteristics of "operation twist, 
a number of new operating techniques were developed which provide 
further evidence to support the interpretation that the new policy
24
Edward G, Ettin, "The Financial and Economic Environment of 
the 1960’s in Relation to the U.S. Government Securities Market," a 
staff study of the Report of the Joint Treasury-Federal Reserve Study 
of the U.S. Government Securities Market (Washington, D.C.i Federal 
Reserve System, 1969), pp. 20-26.
represented only a partial abandonment of the laissez-faire doctrine. 
The methods of approach to the market during the early stages of ex­
panding operations beyond Treasury bills were necessarily experimental 
and were limited by the inherent peculiarities of coupon issues as 
contrasted with Treasury bills. In general, it was found that the 
market for coupon issues was normally quite thin and frequently one­
sided, and that the prices of securities were much more responsive to 
official operations than were rates for Treasury bills. Accordingly, 
the Desk quickly abandoned the use of the "go-around" technique for 
the purchase of coupon issues. Instead, the Desk purchased the 
majority of intermediate and long-term securities by responding to 
offers made at the dealers' initiative. In addition, in buying coupon 
issues for the System, the Desk consistently tried to exert as little 
immediate influence on prices as possible and generally did not enter 
the market unless conditions would permit coupon purchases without 
undue price effects. In order to minimize direct price effects, the 
System confined purchases to those periods when there was a readily 
available supply of securities and rarely purchased securities for 
itself at rising prices. Finally, the Desk consciously attempted to 
leave some supply of securities in the market after its buying to
avoid preempting all of the securities available in the market at a 
25given time. v
In conclusion, during the interludes between Treasury financ­
ings, both the major objectives of "operation twist," as well as the 
operating techniques employed by the Desk in its implementation,
^Cooper, "Techniques of the Trading Desk," pp. 22-26.
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support the view that this policy represented only a partial abandon­
ment of the laissez-faire doctrine. System intervention in the long­
term market was undertaken on a limited basis in order to deal pri­
marily with the balance of payments problem. When operations in 
coupon issues were deemed appropriate, such operations were conducted 
with techniques designed to minimize the market impact of official 
transactions. Thus, operations in coupon issues were undertaken with 
a view to minimizing System intervention in the market between Treasury 
operations.
"Operation twist” did not represent a major alteration in 
System policy with respect to Treasury financing operations. The 
System authorized the Desk to purchase directly from the Treasury 
limited amounts of short-term certificates of indebtedness for the 
temporary accommodation of the Treasury, a practice which had been 
followed during the 1953-1960 period. Specifically, during periods 
of Treasury financings, the System followed essentially the same policy 
employed during the "bills only" period. The Desk continued to avoid 
any outright trading for the System in issues involved in Treasury 
financings or issues of comparable maturity. The System had no inten­
tion of supporting any particular pattern of prices and yields,
especially in the intermediate and long-term areas where new financing
26operations were being undertaken. The Federal Reserve System did not 
adopt "operation twist" in order to reinstate the System in the role of 
the ultimate underwriter of the Federal government debt. "Operation 
twist" did not entail any System commitment to support Treasury
26Ibld., pp. 21-22.
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refundings by purchases of "rights” to new issues( "when-issued”
securities, or issues of comparable maturity to those being offered 
27in exchange.
In retrospect, the major innovation in monetary policy during 
the 1960's did not substantially alter "even keel" policy as it was 
practiced under the "bills only” policy. The maintenance of an "even 
keel" policy during Treasury financing periods has never entailed 
direct System support of Treasury refundings. The remainder of this 
chapter attempts to clarify, in a somewhat more positive methodological 
approach, more precisely what the "even keel" strategy does entail.
27At this point, the reader should be reminded that the Trad­
ing Desk conducts its open market operations for either the System 
Account, Treasury Investment Accounts, or the Foreign Account. The 
latter need not detain us, but the others must.
Those operations undertaken by the Desk for the System Account 
constitute the majority of all transactions. The purpose of these open 
market operations is to influence reserve levels of member banks, in 
order to implement the credit policy deemed appropriate by the Federal 
Open Market Committee. The Desk avoided outright trading for the 
System Account in issues involved in Treasury financings or issues 
of comparable maturity under both the "bills only" and "operation 
twist" policies.
The Desk also conducts operations for the Treasury Investment 
Accounts. In conducting such open market operations, the Desk acts as 
an agent of the Treasury, carrying out those transactions desired by 
Treasury authorities. The Desk, in handling the buying orders for the 
Treasury Investment Accounts, quite often finds itself supporting 
Treasury financings. Much of the buying for this account was under­
taken in direct support of Treasury financings and frequently involved 
an attempt to exercise a constructive influence on the tone of the 
market, even to the extent of holding price levels temporarily. The 
Desk, in conducting operations for this account, often purchased both 
"rights" or "when-issued" securities. Although such purchases do 
entail direct support of Treasury operations, it should be clear that 
the support is provided by the Treasury, not by the central bank.
Such operations were undertaken both before and after the inauguration 
of "operation twist." See Cooper, "Techniques of the Trading Desk,"
PP. 15-18* 27-28.
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"Even Keel" Policy Defined
The rest of this chapter will discuss some alternative defini
tions found in the literature, in addition to reviewing the rationale
for an "even keel" directive and commenting briefly on the time span
of an "even keel" period. Later analysis will quantitatively test
these alternative definitions.
Although the literature specifically concerned with Federal
Reserve "even keel" policy is relatively scant, close inspection of
it reveals several interpretations of the meaning of the "even keel" 
28strategy. A representative sampling of definitions would include
the following*
(l) Federal Reserve Chairman Martin (1959)*
. . . during, immediately before, and immediately 
after dates when the Treasury is engaged in a debt
28The most complete and comprehensive treatments of the subject 
available to the author would include the following works. See, in 
particular, Stephen H. Axilrod, "An Empirical View of ’Even Keel,'"
(an unpublished manuscript, Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, 
April 22, 1969); Warren J. Gustus, "Monetary Policy, Debt Management, 
and Even Keel," Business Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia (January, 1969)* PP. l-^l Rudolph Thunberg, "'Even Keel'i 
The Reconciliation of Monetary Policy and Debt Management," (an un­
published manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of New York); William P.
Yohe and Louis C. Gasper, "The 'Even Keel' Decisions of the Federal 
Open Market Committee," Financial Analysts Journal (November- 
December, 1970), pp. 1-12* William P. Yohe and Louis C. Gasper, "The 
'Even Keel' Decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee," (an un­
published manuscript, Duke University, Durham, N.C., 1969).
Two other manuscripts exist, but could not be made available 
to the author for various legitimate reasons. These two manuscripts 
are, Stephen H. Axilrod and Joseph H. Bums, "The Behavior of Interest 
Rates, Bank Credit, and Marginal Reserve Measures During 'Even Keel,' 
1965 - mid-1967," (an unpublished confidential memorandum, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York)| and Norman N. Bowsher, "'Even Keel* as a 
Constraint on Monetary Action," (an unpublished manuscript, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 6, 1967).
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operation . , ,, overt System actions . . . have not 
been taken. Maintenance of an "even keel" . . . has 
helped to prevent any interference with Treasury 
financing as a result of changes in monetary condi­
tions. It has also contributed to market conditions 
that facilitated the pricing of new Treasury offer­
ings . 29
(2) Tilford C. Gaines (1962)?
. . . the Federal Reserve System pursues an "even 
keel" policy for a few weeks before and after each 
major Treasury financing in order not to alter either 
basic supply-demand relationships or investor expecta­
tions during the financing period,30
(3) First National City Bank of New York (1967)*
The "even keel" policy assumes that the marketing of 
a Treasury issue tends to raise market rates, unless 
offset by Federal Reserve purchases of securities or 
other reserve-supplying operations. "Even keeling" 
is supposed to perform a type of temporary underwriting 
functions The reserve base of the banking system is 
enlarged to enable the money markets to digest the 
Treasury offerings with a minimum disturbance to 
interest rates.3*
The vagueness of what it means for the Account Manager to 
maintain an "even keel" during a Treasury financing operation is ap­
parent in these statements. To add to the confusion, the term is also 
sometimes used to connote money market stabilizing operations during 
periods of year-end seasonal pressures, which will not be specifically
29U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Employment, Growth, 
and Price Levels, Hearings, before the Joint Economic Committee, 86th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1959 (Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office, 
1959), P. 1785.
30Tilford C. Gaines, Techniques of Treasury Debt Management 
(New Yorks The Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, and 
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 26U.
31Monthly Economic Letter, September, 1967* P. 99.
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32covered In this study. An evaluation of these definitions will be 
undertaken in order to raise some important questions, to be answered 
later, with respect to a more quantitative explanation of "even keel” 
policy,
A review of the various definitions of "even keel" policy 
indicates that two basically different schools of thought exist with 
respect to the appropriate relationship between the conduct of monetary 
policy and the financing operations of the Treasury. The first inter­
pretation to be discussed stresses the concept that "even keel" opera­
tions entail an open market operating strategy aimed at facilitating 
or aiding Treasury operations. The other school of thought interprets 
"even keel" policy as a conscious effort by the monetary authorities 
to implement monetary policy with a view to avoid hindering Treasury
operations. In the discussion which follows these two interpretations
33can be loosely labeled the "support" and "neutrality" schools.
The interpretations of "even keel" policy which the author 
places in the "support" school view the "even keel" strategy as a form 
of System aid for Treasury financings. The Trading Desk conducts its 
open market operations during Treasury financing periods with a view 
to facilitating the marketing of a new issue hy performing an underwriting
32Yohe and Gasper, "The *Even Keel' Decisions," p. 2,
33The reader should note immediately the inherent danger of 
these two labels. As will become clear, the specific definitions 
categorized under the "support" school do not define "even keel" policy 
as consisting of the type of direct System support purchases which 
characterized Federal Reserve policy prior to the Accord. Nor do those 
classified within the "neutrality" school view "even keel" operations 
as being conducted without regard to Treasury financings. The labels 
are employed as a convenient method of distinguishing between two 
separate interpretations of "even keel" policy, the difference between 
which should become clear as the analysis proceeds.
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function. This interpretation explains that "even keel" policy con­
sists of a form of temporary underwriting for Treasury operations. 
Specifically, the System through the use of open market operations 
would undertake reserve-supplying operations with the purpose of en­
larging the reserve base of the banking system to allow the money 
markets to digest the Treasury offerings with minimal interest rate 
disturbance. Such an interpretation basically views the "even keel"
strategy in terms of a one-way shift toward ease during Treasury 
34financings.
This definition can be empirically tested. It could be sup­
ported if, during "even keel" periods, the volume of repurchase agree­
ments or net purchases were significantly higher than during concur­
rent periods not characterized by an "even keel." In addition, 
further justification of this view could be attained if the behavior 
displayed by selected money market indicators showed that the degree 
of pressure in the money market eased during financing periods.
The majority of the different definitions encountered in the 
literature can be loosely classified within the "neutrality" school.
The appropriate relationship between monetary policy and debt manage­
ment operations espoused by this school is the maintenance of a limited 
degree of independence. That is, while Federal Reserve System policy 
is such that the authorities do not feel that their money-creating 
power should be employed to lend direct support to Treasury financings,
34For a closer look at this interpretation of "even keel" 
policy, see, for example, Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,'" 
p. 2; Monthly Economic Letter, p. 99* and Thunberg, "'Even Keel'* The 
Reconciliation," pp. 11-12.
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System officials do recognize that concurrent monetary policy may well 
affect Treasury operations. The money market is felt to be quite 
sensitive to Treasury offers due to the sheer magnitude of the financ­
ings, the involvement of the U.S. government’s credit, and the key
role played by government securities in the process of liquidity and
35portfolio adjustment. Bearing in mind that there exists a connec­
tion between the stance of monetary policy and the success of 
Treasury operations, most authors view "even keel" policy as, if not 
a form of central bank support or aid to financings then, at least a 
conscious effort on the part of the System to undertake no actions
that would contribute to a Treasury offer encountering poor acceptance
36in the government securities market. Two different interpretations 
of "even keel" policy, based upon this general "neutrality" concept, 
are discussed below.
One common definition of "even keel" policy which has been 
encountered frequently in the literature is that the maintenance of 
an "even keel" in the money market during a Treasury financing period
■^Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,'" p. 1.
36
The definition of a successful Treasury operation is an il­
lusive concept. As a general rule, a successful debt management 
operation must accomplish the financing of the deficit on terms (price, 
maturity, etc.) reasonable to both the Treasury authorities and in­
vestors. A quantitative measure of success in a time series analysis 
is limited by the changing financial and economic environment within 
which successive Treasury offerings take place. In addition, the 
quantitative measures employed vary with respect to the alternative 
types of financing techniques used by the Treasury. Some quantitative 
measures are explained and defended by the author in the following 
chapter and, should the reader feel the necessity of consulting that 
discussion, he should refer to Chapter IV.
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calls for the avoidance of any overt System policy actions. That is,
any overt policy action that might be interpreted by the money market
participants as indicative of a shift in the stance of credit policy
37is to be avoided during a Treasury financing period. This particu­
lar view is most commonly couched in terms of the necessity of not an­
nouncing new policy decisions (as contained in announcements from the 
Board of Governors or as specified in the second paragraph of the 
current economic policy directive of the F.O.M.C.) that would impede 
the orderly marketing of Treasury securities and significantly increase
risks of market disruption from sharp changes in market attitudes in
38the course of a financing. Specifically, "even keel" policy is felt 
to influence the timing of policy actions, confining the System to 
undertaking any overt policy action -during the intervals between 
Treasury financings. It is felt that any tightening of credit policy 
during the financing period would seriously impair the success of an
offering through altering basic supply and demand relationships, as
39well as the expectations of the money market participants.
This interpretation of "even keel" policy can be tested by 
reviewing the historical record. This definition would be supported 
37This view or interpretation of "even keel" policy appears in 
a number of works. See, for example, Axilrod, "Empirical View of 
'Even Keel,"' p. 1; Thunberg, "'Even Keel'j The Reconciliation," p. 1; 
and U.S., Congress, Employment, Growth, and Price Levels, Hearings,
P. 1785.
•^Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,'" p. 1.
39It should be noted that "even keel" policy might also be in­
terpreted as influencing the timing of not only tightening, but also 
easing actions. For example, a discount rate reduction in the middle 
of a Treasury financing period may be avoided because it might encour­
age undue speculative activity in the government securities market.
See Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,"' fn, 1, p. 1.
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if it were found that the majority of changes, especially increases, 
in both the discount rate and the required reserve ratio occurred 
during those intervals not designated as "even keel" periods. In ad­
dition, if by a review of the Record of Policy Action - the Federal 
Open Market Committee in the Annual Report it can be found that the 
necessity of maintaining an "even keel" policy has preempted shifts in 
monetary policy, then this interpretation would be further validated.
Finally, a second definition within the "neutrality" school
has been identified by the author. This particular interpretation has
been indirectly suggested by the work of others, as well as by the
40review of the current economic policy directives. This interpreta­
tion views "even keel" policy as an open market operating technique
40In a number of works, which were concerned with the imple­
mentation of the dynamic facets of short-run monetary policy as op­
posed to the "even keel" strategy per se, a number of authors suggested 
that the Federal Reserve System concentrated on a number of money 
market indicators as the primary targets at which open market opera­
tions were directed. For a discussion of the so-called intermediate 
targets of credit policy, see Leonall C. Andersen, "Money Market 
Conditions as a Guide for Monetary Management," in Monetary Economics 
Readings, ed. by Alan D. Entine (Belmont, Calif.t Wadsworth Publish- 
ing Company, Inc., 1968), pp. 226-245» Leonall C. Andersen and Jules 
M. Levine, "Implementation of Federal Reserve Open Market Policy in 
1964," Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (June, 1965),
PP. 2-5? Leonall C, Andersen and Jules M, Levine, "A Test of Money 
Market Conditions as a Means of Short-Run Monetary Management,"
National Banking Review, Vol. IV (September, 1966), pp. 41-51? Clay 
J. Anderson, "Money Market Indicators," in Monetary Economics Readings, 
ed. by Alan D. Entine (Belmont, Calif.t Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
1968), pp. 211-216? Paul Meek, Discount Policy and Open Market 
Operations? Fundamental Reappraisal of the Discount Mechanism 
(Washington, D.C.i Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, 1968)? 
and Robert R. Wyand, II, "Money Market Conditions— What Are They?" 
Monthly Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (September,
1965),pp. 1-4.
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used in the implementation of short-run monetary policy. The his­
torical record clearly shows that the operating instructions given to 
the Account Manager in the second paragraph of the P.O.M.G. current 
economic policy directive have been couched in terms of a desired 
degree of pressure in money market conditions or money market tone. 
During "even keel" periods, the Account Manager is invariably directed 
to maintain the existing degree of pressure in the money market.
Thus, this would indicate that the "even keel" strategy would 
call for open market operations directed at maintaining steady con­
ditions in the money market. This definition can be readily tested 
by an analysis of the behavior of a number of money market indicators 
during both "even keel" and alternate periods. The primary indicators 
to be studied would include net open market purchases, repurchase 
agreements, short-term interest rates, and marginal reserve measures. 
This definition would be supported if the behavior of these policy 
targets was such that one could conclude that the maintenance of an 
"even keel" entailed System operations aimed at stabilizing money mar­
ket indicators.
A more detailed discussion of these alternate definitions will 
follow. At the outset, it should be emphasized that these definitions 
of "even keel" policy are not mutually exclusive concepts. It is pos­
sible that a given "even keel" period may be characterized hy more 
than one definition with an equal degree of accuracy or, on the other 
hand, different "even keel" periods may best be described by the same 
definition. Before proceeding to the quantitative analysis of the 
alternative definitions of "even keel" policy offered here, an evalu­
ation of the rationale for an "even keel" directive must be presented.
The Rationale for "Even Keel"
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The rationale most commonly cited in defense of the central 
bank maintaining an "even keel" posture during Treasury financing 
periods ultimately rests on one major premise. This premise is that 
the implementation of credit control policy by the Federal Reserve 
System can have an important effect upon Treasury debt management 
operations. System officials recognize that monetary policy cannot 
be conducted without considering policy actions with respect to their 
effect on concurrent Treasury financing operations.
The rationale justifying the "even keel"tstrategy recognizes 
three basic facets of Treasury financing operations which must be taken 
into account by central bank officials in conducting monetary policy. 
They arei
(1) Treasury deficits must be financed and re­
funding operations completed.
(2) Such financings should be undertaken on terms 
that are acceptable to private investors1 that is, 
the Treasury must "meet the test of the market."
(3) Direct Federal Reserve support of Treasury 
financings should be avoided.^
The Federal Reserve System maintains an "even keel" position 
in order to sustain the orderly marketing of Treasury securities. 
Because of the massive size of most Treasury financing operations and
the sensitivity of the money market to Treasury activity and the policy
actions of the monetary authorities, it is felt that reasonably stable 
conditions must be maintained in the money and credit markets if the 
financings are to be successful. Therefore, it is the policy of the
Thunberg, "'Even Keel'i The Reconciliation," pp. 1-2.
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System to avoid those policy actions which tend to create uncertain­
ly
ties or upset the money market during Treasury financing periods.
The "even keel” strategy is aimed at smoothing the process of market­
ing large Treasury issues.
The purpose of maintaining orderly money market conditions 
during the financing period is to avoid upsetting the expectations of 
the government securities dealers. The government securities dealers 
operate on a slender equity to funds ratio. The "even keel" strategy 
aims at enhancing the ability of the dealers to "make a market" in the 
new Treasury offerings by minimizing the degree of uncertainty faced 
by the market participants. It provides the underwriters with a short 
period of time during which basic market supply and demand forces 
rather than monetary policy are the main factors affecting investor 
expectations. "Even keel" policy allows the securities dealers suf­
ficient time to contact customers, with no more than a normal market
1*3
risk upon their temporary holdings. Thus, the major rationale 
underlying "even keel" policy is that the conduct of monetary policy 
during Treasury financings must be such that it sustains the orderly 
marketing of Treasury securities. The rationale for "even keel" policy 
can be further clarified by an examination of the time span of the 
"even keel" period.
The Time Span of "Even Keel"
The time span covered by a specific "even keel" directive is 
difficult to identify with precision. The length of an "even keel"
*Ibid., p. 2.
1*3
Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,*" p. 2.
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period in calendar days varies somewhat due to a number of factors.
The type of financing technique employed by the Treasury, whether a 
rights or cash financing, alters the duration of the "even keel" 
period. In addition to the type of financing technique, both the 
volume of a particular offer and the types of securities offered in a 
financing operation are factors taken into consideration by the Ac­
count Manager in the implementation of an "even keel" strategy. As 
a general rule, cash financings, large volume offers, and Treasury 
operations involving long-term securities call forth an extension of 
the time span during which an "even keel" policy is maintained. Other 
factors, such as the reception the financing encounters in the money 
market and changing economic conditions necessitating shifts in the 
stance of credit policy, may also alter the time span of an "even 
keel" period.
The "even keel" period, with few exceptions, encompasses the 
entire Treasury financing period. The interval encompassed by the
A rights financing would include both exchange offers and 
advance refundings. An exchange offer entails an optional right grant­
ed to holders of specified outstanding issues to exchange those securi­
ties on the maturity date at face value for the new issues being of­
fered. An advanced refunding operation entails an optional offer to 
the holders of specified outstanding issues to exchange those securi­
ties prior to the maturity date for the new issues being offered by 
the Treasury. A cash financing Includes both cash offers and cash 
refundings. A cash offer consists of the offer of a new security by 
the Treasury with payments to be made in cash with no rights involved. 
The Treasury also sells new issues through cash refundings or cash and 
exchange offers. This method or financing technique entails the offer 
of a new issue with payment to be made in either cash or maturing out­
standing issues. A more thorough discussion of these financing tech­
niques will be presented in the next chapter.
^The length of the Treasury financing period varies with 
respect to the method of financing employed. The Treasury financing 
period for a rights financing may be defined as the time span extend­
ing from the day after the announcement of the offer to the day the 
books are closed. A cash financing involves a longer Treasury
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••even keel" period usually extends from a few days before the public 
announcement of the terms of a financing operation to around approxi­
mately the settlement or payment date— a span, generally, of about
46three weeks in length. Various empirical studies have employed
different basic "even keel" periods, but all agree that the "even
4?keel" period does encompass the Treasury financing period, A de­
tailed account of the methodology utilized in this analysis for dating 
"even keel" periods is elaborated in the next chapter.
The "even keel" period, which encompasses the Treasury financ­
ing period, can conceptually be subdivided into three distinct inter­
vals. Each interval or subperiod gives rise to separate and distinct 
reasons which call for the maintenance of an "even keel." A discussion 
of these intervals should clarify further the overall rationale which 
justifies the "even keel" strategy.
The first interval covers the period which extends from a few 
days prior to the announcement until the day of the announcement of
^(continued) financing period which extends from the day 
after the announcement to the settlement or payment date. This date 
usually follows the closing of the books by about one week. See, for 
a thorough discussion of Treasury financing periods, Louise Freeman 
Aheam, "Government Securities Market Performance in the Wake of Of­
ficial Operations in Coupon Issues Day-to-Day Performance," a staff 
study of the Report of the Joint Treasury-Federal Reserve Study of the 
U.S. Government Securities Market (Washington, D.C.i Federal Reserve 
Syst em, 1969).
46Thunberg, "'Even Keel'i The Reconciliation," p. 1.
47The basic unit of time employed in dating "even keel" periods 
has varied between three days to one week prior to the announcement of 
terras until three days to one week after the settlement date. See, 
for example, Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,'" p. 4t and 
Gustus, "Monetary Policy, Debt Management, and Even Keel," p. 8,
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the specific terms of the financing to the public. This preannounce­
ment interval brings together Treasury and System officials, as well 
as money market participants, in discussion aimed at canvassing the 
market. Suggestions of both System officials and market participants 
in the determination of the terms (volume, price, and maturity, etc.) 
of the new issue. The Treasury seeks those terms that will best meet 
the financing requirements of the Treasury, as well as the "test of 
the market." The maintenance of an "even keel" during this period is 
necessary to permit the Treasury officials to adequately gauge the 
market as a prerequisite.of composing the terms of the financing. Any 
abrupt changes in monetary policy during this period would cause money 
market repercussions, altering investor expectations, and thus compli­
cating the task of gauging the market. The result would probably be 
terms that were either too easy from the Treasury's viewpoint, i.e., 
those that might increase the cost of the financing or shorten the
composition of the public debt or, on the other hand, terms too severe
48to meet the "test of the market."
The second interval encompasses the interlude between the 
public announcement of the specific terms and the date the subscription 
books are closed. This particular period is most critical in the 
determination of the degree of acceptance the offering will encounter 
in the money market. It is during this time that both bank and non­
bank government securities dealers canvass customers to gauge the 
market's appetite to determine their underwriting subscriptions for a 
cash financing. In a rights financing, the underwriters must locate
48
Thunberg, "'Even Keel'i The Reconciliation," p. 2.
the holders of rights and purchase the rights of those investors who 
do not wish to exercise their exchange option. Essentially during 
this period, the investor must deolde whether or not to accept the 
terms offered by the Treasury. Obviously, any central bank actions 
which could be interpreted as a tightening of credit policy would 
seriously hinder the success of the financing operation.
The final interval of the "even keel" period encompasses the 
time period starting on the day after the closing of the books and 
extending a few days beyond the settlement or payment dates. The 
maintenance of the "even keel" strategy during this subperiod is 
necessary to allow the underwriters sufficient time to distribute 
their allotment of the new issue to the ultimate investors. The pur­
suit of an "even keel" during this period is crucial with respect to 
the success of future Treasury financings. Any shift in monetary 
policy, reflected in an increase in interest rates (a reduction in 
price) on the securities involved in the financing, would cause the 
bank and non-bank securities dealers to suffer severe capital losses. 
The large capital losses would probably lead the dealers to reduce 
their propensity to participate in future Treasury financings. Other 
things equal, a reduction in the willingness of the securities dealers 
to make a market for future issues would force the Treasury to compose 




This chapter has attempted to provide the reader with a 
general understanding of the "even keel” strategy during the 1960's. 
This analysis has concentrated upon the relationship between "even 
keel" policy and the major innovations in monetary policy, as well as 
presenting a number of different interpretations of "even keel" policy. 
In summarizing, a number of points should be reviewed.
First, the replacement of the "bills only" guidelines with 
the "operation twist" policy did not alter the basic character of the 
"even keel" strategy. The operations in coupon issues authorized by 
"operation twist" were not aimed at maintaining price-yield levels in 
the government securities market. The Trading Desk, during the 1960*s, 
continued its policy of eschewing the purchase of "rights" to new 
issues, securities on a "when-issued” basis, and issues of comparable 
maturity to those securities being offered during Treasury financing 
periods.
The discussion of the alternative definitions of "even keel" 
policy resulted in the classification of those definitions within 
either the "support" or "neutrality" schools. This classification will 
facilitate the empirical evaluation of "even keel" policy which follows. 
Finally, the discussion of the rationale and time span of "even keel" 
policy has established that the primary purpose of this policy is to 
smooth the marketing process of Treasury financings. What this means, 
in terms of the behavior of selected money market variables, will be 
examined later.
APPENDIX A
THE IDENTIFICATION OF "EVEN KEEL" DIRECTIVES 
AND THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC POLICY DIRECTIVE 
OF THE FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE
The purpose of this Appendix is twofold, The primary objective 
is to detail the methodology employed by the author in identifying the 
"even keel" directives of the F.O.M.C. during the January 1, i960 - 
August 28, 1968, period. In conjunction with this aim, it is necessary 
to familiarize the reader with the nature of the current economic 
policy directives which, during the December 19, 1961 - August 28,
1968, interval, formed the immediate guidelines for the conduct of 
open market operations.
The Identification of "Even Keel" Directives
Monetary policy had been Implemented during the entire January 
1, i960 - August 28, 1968, period through a series of economic direc­
tives issued by the F.O.M.C. to the Account Manager at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York. However, within this period the F.O.M.C. 
employed two general formats of instructions to the Account Manager. 
Although basically similar in substance, the two formats necessitated 




The format of the instructions issued to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York during the January 1, I960 - December 5» 1961, period 
consisted of two distinct parts. These two facets entailed instruc­
tions for the conduct of open market operations on two separate levels. 
The continuing authority directive, which throughout the entire period 
consisted of the three "bills only" guidelines, enumerated the general 
operating policies which the Desk was to employ in conducting trans­
actions for the System Account. The specific level of operating in­
structions was embodied in the policy directive of the F.O.M.C. This 
policy directive, which was reviewed at each meeting of the F.O.M.C., 
as opposed to the continuing authority directive which came under re­
view only on an annual basis, provided the major tool employed in 
identifying "even keel" directives.
The policy directive appears in the Record of Policy Actions - 
the Federal Open Market Committee in the Annual Report of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, along with a brief summary of 
the discussion leading to the directive. The policy directive consist­
ed of two paragraphs, the first of which contained Clause b, instruct­
ing the Account Manager as to the appropriate targets to which open 
market operations should be directed.
The identification of "even keel" directives during this period 
was a fairly simple matter. In such a directive it was found that 
Clause b of the policy directive contained reference to either an actual 
or forthcoming Treasury financing as a factor to be taken into account 
in the conduct of open market operations. An "even keel" directive 
could also be readily identified from the summary of the discussion
leading to the policy directive. In this case, the summary usually 
denoted the desirability of maintaining an "even keel" in light of a 
Treasury financing operation. The "even keel" directives identified 
by this process are listed in Table 1.
The format of the instructions issued by the F.O.M.C. to the 
Account Manager during the December 19, 1961 - August 28, 1968, inter­
val was slightly different. The instructions again consisted of two 
distinct parts. The continuing authority directive which replaced the 
"bills only" guidelines was reissued in substantially the same form 
throughout the entire period. The continuing policy directive which 
underwent annual review instructs the Account Manager as to the general 
guidelines to be employed in conducting open market operations. The 
specific operating instructions are embodied in the current economic 
policy directives.
Since December 19* 1961, dynamic short-run monetary policy has 
been implemented through the current economic policy directives of the 
F.O.M.C. This directive is reviewed and revised, usually at three- 
week Intervals between F.O.M.C. meetings, in accord with the develop­
ment in both internal and external economic conditions. During the 
December 19, 1961 - August 28, 1968, interval, scrutiny of the current 
economic policy directive provided the primary basis for identifying 
"even keel" directives.
The directive consists of two paragraphsi the first being a 
statement of the broad economic goals to be achieved and an outline of 
the economic conditions reviewed by the F.O.M.C. in determining the 
tone of the directive, and the second, an enumeration of the intermedi­
ate objectives to be attained by open market operations. The
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TABLE 1
"EVEN KEEL" DIRECTIVES, 
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968
Year Dates of Directives^
I960 January 26, March 22, July 6, July 26, 
September 13, October 4
1961 June 6, July 11, September 12, October 3# 
October 24
1962 January 9, January 23, February 13, April 17, 
July 31, August 21, September 11, October 23
1963 January 8, January 29, February 12, March 5, 
March 26, April 16, August 20, September 10, 
October 22
1964 January 7» January 28, March 24, April 14, May 5» 
June 17, July 7» July 28, October 20, November 
10, December 15
1965 January 12, April 13* May 11, July 13, August 10, 
September 28, October 12, November 2, December l4
1966 January 11, February 8, April 12, May 10, 
July 26, October 4, November 1
1967 January 10, February 7» May 2, June 20, July 18, 
August 15# October 3s October 24
1968 February 6, April 30, July 16
T'he dates cited refer to the date of the F.O.M.C. meeting at which 
the "even keel" directive was authorized. These dates do not indicate 
the initial day of the "even keel" period.
These dates concur closely with the findings of others. See 
Warren J. Gustus, "Monetary Policy, Debt Management, and Even Keel," 
Business Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
(January, 1969). pp. 1-4; and William P. Yohe and Louis C. Gasper,
"The 'Even Keel' Decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee"
(an unpublished manuscript, Duke University, Durham, N.C., 1969), 
Appendix A, p. al),
SOURCEj Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1960-1968.
intermediate objectives are stated in terras of the desired movements 
in such variables as member bank reserves, bank credit, the money 
supply, and interest rates. The current economic policy directive and 
a rather detailed summary of the discussion leading to it appear in 
the Record of Policy Actions - the Federal Open Market Committee in 
the Annual Report.
The identification of "even keel" directives was again rather 
simple. The summary of the discussion, coupled with the current 
economic policy directive, provided sufficient material to determine 
whether or not the System was maintaining an "even keel" policy.
These two sources contained either specific references to maintaining 
an "even keel" per se or to conducting open market operations in light 
of an imminent or forthcoming Treasury financing operation. Those 
"even keel" directives which were identified since December 19, 1961, 
are also listed in Table 1.
The Current Economic Policy Directive
As previously detailed, dynamic short-run monetary policy 
since December 19, 1961, has been implemented through the current 
economic policy directive. This directive gives specific operating 
instructions to the Account Manager in qualitative terms. These in­
structions compose the dynamic facet of Federal Reserve policy and in­
dicate the guidelines to be followed by the Trading Desk in the day-to- 
day conduct of open market operations. The first paragraph enumerates 
the economic conditions reviewed by the F.O.M.C. The second paragraph 
contains the operating instructions.
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The operating Instructions are usually stated In terms of a 
desired degree of pressure in the money market to be achieved by the 
operations of the Trading Desk. The degree of pressure desired by the 
F.O.M.C. is specified in terms of either maintaining the existing de­
gree of pressure or achieving either a firmer or easier degree of 
money market pressure. The choice is dependent upon whether the 
F.O.M.C. feels that the economic environment justifies a shift in the 
stance of monetary policy. In addition to specifying the tone to be 
maintained in the money market, the directive often refers to desired 
movements in certain money market indicators such as aggregate or mar­
ginal bank reserves, Treasury bill rates, bank credit as measured by 
the bank credit proxy variable, and occasionally references to unsettled 
conditions in the securities and foreign exchange markets.
In order to familiarize the reader with the form and content 
of the current economic policy directive, a number of typical direc­
tives are presented below. A few words of explanation accompany the 
directives to provide not only an interpretation of the meaning of the 
directive in terms of the stance of monetary policy, but also to show 
the ease with which an "even keel" directive can be identified.
The first directive to be discussed was Issued at the F.O.M.C. 
meeting held on February 13, 1962. It stated*
It continues to be the current policy of the 
Committee to permit further bank credit and monetary 
expansion so as to promote fuller utilization of the 
economy's resources, together with monetary conditions 
consistent with the needs of an expanding domestic 
economy, taking into account this country's adverse 
balance of payments as well as a possible Treasury 
financing.
To implement this policy, operations for the 
System Open Market Account during the next 3 weeks
shall be conducted with a view to maintaining a 
supply of reserves adequate for further credit 
expansion, while minimizing downward pressures on 
short-term interest rates. In view of the possi­
bility of a Treasury financing, emphasis shall be 
placed on maintaining a steady money market.^ -
The first paragraph indicates that the System continued unchanged, a 
moderately expansive monetary policy. Both the directive and the sum­
mary of the discussion leading to it emphasized three major considera­
tions that were reviewed by the F.O.M.C. in the unanimous decision to 
continue monetary policy unchanged for the next three weeks. It was 
felt that the slight pause in domestic recovery was not serious enough 
to call forth a shift toward greater ease. However, the possibility of 
a move toward lesser ease which external considerations might have 
called for was militated against because of the pause in the domestic 
recovery process. The possibility of a Treasury advance refunding also 
was a factor cited in favor of holding the posture of monetary policy 
unchanged.
This current economic policy directive is a typical "even keel" 
directive. Note that both paragraphs mention the possibility of an 
imminent Treasury financing operation. The operation referred to was 
an advance refunding operation which the Treasury announced on February 
15, 1962. The second paragraph emphasized, in light of possible 
Treasury activity, the need to maintain a steady money market. In 
addition, it specified the F.O.M.C.'s desires with respect to the ap­
propriate behavior of both aggregate reserves and short-term interest 
rates.
^Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Forty-Ninth Annual
Report, 1962 (Washington, D.C.i Federal Reserve System, 19&2), p. 5^ .
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The second directive cited was Issued at the F.O.M.C. meeting 
held on October 20, 1964. It reads as follows*
It is the Federal Open Market Committee's current 
policy to accommodate moderate growth in the reserve 
base, bank credit, and the money supply for the purpose 
of facilitating continued expansion of the economy, 
while fostering improvement in the capital account of 
U.S. international payments, and seeking to avoid the 
emergence of inflationary pressures. This policy takes 
into account the further expansion in economic activity, 
tempered by a work stoppage at a major automobile 
companyj relative stability in broad community price 
averages* even though additional price increases have 
occurred in some materials markets; and indications 
that the vigorous money supply expansion of recent 
months continued in the first half of October. It 
also gives consideration to current estimates that the 
deficit in the U.S. balance of payments in the third 
quarter continued at a high rate, although not quite 
as high as in the preceding quarter.
To implement this policy, and taking into account 
the forthcoming Treasury financing, System open market 
operations shall be conducted with a view to maintain­
ing about the same conditions in the money market as 
have prevailed in recent weeks, while accommodating 
moderate expansion in aggregate bank reserves.^
The first paragraph and the summary of the discussion leading to the 
directive indicated that the System continued unchanged its moderately 
expansionary monetary policy. The F.O.M.C. was concerned with facili­
tating continued expansion on the domestic scene* however, increased 
fears of inflationary developments were cited. Although some disagree­
ment existed within the Committee, they unanimously voted to continue 
unchanged the present stance of monetary policy with the majority of 
the Committee citing imminent Treasury activity as the deciding factor.
Again, the directive clearly calls for the maintenance of an 
"even keel" in the money market. The second paragraph specifically
^Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1964, pp. 108-109.
82
mentions a forthcoming Treasury financing, referring specifically to 
a 9.250 "billion dollar cash offer of an 18-month, h percent Treasury 
note which the Treasury announced on October 28, 196^. In addition 
to emphasizing the need to maintain about the same conditions in the 
money market, the directive also called for a moderate expansion in 
aggregate bank reserves, as well as minimizing the downward pressure 
on short-term interest rates.
The detailed directive issued by the F.O.M.C. at a meeting 
held on July 26, 1966, is rather unique in a number of its facets. It 
reads as follows1
The economic and financial developments reviewed 
at this meeting indicate that over-all domestic 
economic activity appears to be expanding somewhat 
more rapidly than in the second quarter despite 
weakness in residential construction, with indus­
trial prices rising further. Total credit demands 
continue strong and financial markets, particularly 
for mortgages, remain tight. Despite the statistical 
improvement resulting largely from special transactions, 
the balance of payments situation continues to reflect 
a sizable underlying deficit. In this situation, it 
is the Federal Open Market Committee's policy to resist 
inflationary pressures and to strengthen efforts to 
restore reasonable equilibrium in the country's balance 
of payments, by restricting the growth in the reserve 
base, bank credit, and the money supply.
To implement this policy, while taking into account 
the forthcoming Treasury financing, System open market 
operations until the next meeting of the Committee shall 
be conducted with a view to maintaining about the cur­
rent state of net reserve availability and related 
money market conditions! provided, however, that if 
required reserves expand more rapidly than expected 
and if conditions associated with the Treasury financ­
ing permit, operations shall be conducted with a view 
to attaining some further gradual reduction in net 
reserve availability and firming of money market con­
ditions. 3
Reserve System, Annual Report, 1966, pp. 167-168,
83
The first paragraph emphasizes the consternation of the authorities 
over inflationary pressures. The Committee agreed to continue un­
changed the moderate contractionary stance monetary policy had assumed. 
The objectives sought were the resistance of Inflationary pressure and 
the restoration of reasonable external equilibrium. It Is the opinion 
of the author that these considerations would normally have led the 
authorities to pursue a more restrictive policy had not the necessity 
of maintaining an "even keel" intervened.
This particular directive has been designated by the author as 
an example of an "even keel" strategy pre-empting a shift in monetary 
policy. The summary of the discussion leading to the directive showed 
a general desire within the Committee to keep a tight rein on bank 
credit expansion. There was recognition, however, that the imminent 
Treasury financing constituted an important reason for continuing 
about the current state of net reserve availability and money market 
conditions in accordance with the customary practice of maintaining an 
"even keel" during Treasury financings. Some members, citing infla­
tionary movements in a number of indicators, expressed the view that a 
good case could be made for gradual tightening at this time. The 
Treasury operation seems to have been a deciding factor in the decision 
of the authorities not to tighten monetary policy.
The directive was designated as calling for an "even keel." 
Mention of an imminent Treasury operation appears in the second para­
graph. The reference was to a 1^,893 billion dollar multiple exchange 
offer involving a Treasury certificate of indebtedness and a Treasury 
note. The Treasury publicly announced the financing on July 27, 1966.
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The "even keel" directive called for the maintenance of about the 
same level of net reserve availability and related money market con­
ditions. The directive is unique in that it is one of the earlier 
uses of the proviso clause. The proviso clause gives specific operat­
ing instructions to the Account Manager to govern his conduct during 
the interim period between F.O.M.C. meetings. In this particular 
case, the F.O.M.C. authorized the Account Manager to reduce net re­
serves and firm money market conditions provided required reserves 
expand more rapidly than expected. It should be emphasized that the 
authorization to tighten was conditional upon not only excessive re­
quired reserve expansion, but was limited by the degree of the 
Treasury’s financing success. The Account Manager could tighten up 
only if the success of the Treasury financing was assured.
The final directive discussed was issued on April 2, 1968. It
read:
The Information reviewed at this meeting indicates 
that over-all economic activity has expanded at a very 
rapid pace in early 1968, with prices rising substan­
tially, and that prospects are for a continuing rapid 
advance in activity and persisting inflationary pres­
sures in the period ahead. Since late fall, growth 
rates of bank credit, the money supply, and time and 
savings accounts at financial institutions have moderated 
considerably. Speculative activity in gold and foreign 
exchange markets which was intense in early March, 
abated after the midmonth agreement on gold policy by 
gold pool members and appears to have slackened further 
following the Stockholm agreement regarding Special 
Drawing Rights. The foreign trade surplus, however, 
has remained at a sharply reduced level in recent 
months and the imbalance in U.S. International payments 
continues to be a matter of serious concern. Most 
market interest rates have fluctuated widely, although 
rising on balance, in reaction to international financial 
developments, the firming of monetary policy, and un­
certainties regarding military and fiscal prospects.
In this situation, it is the policy of the Federal Open
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Market Committee to foster financial conditions con­
ducive to resistance of inflationary pressures and 
attainment of reasonable equilibrium in the country's 
balance of payments.
To implement this policy, System open market 
operations until the next meeting of the Committee 
shall be conducted with a view to attaining slightly 
firmer conditions in the money market; provided, how­
ever, that operations shall be modified if bank credit 
appears to be deviating significantly from current 
projections or if unusual liquidity pressures should 
develop,^
The magnitude of inflationary pressure, the balance of payments deficit, 
and the impending possibility of restrictive fiscal legislation were 
the major factors taken into account by the Committee in the unanimous 
adoption of a shift in policy. The Committee voted to instruct the 
Account Manager to increase the degree of pressure in the money market. 
The lack of any Treasury operation is significant in that it was one 
factor which permitted the shift toward a more restrictive credit 
policy. This directive was Included in order to contrast it with the 
previous "even keel" directives. Clearly, from both the directive and 
summary of the discussion leading to it, this directive did not call 
for an "even keel." No mention was made of any Treasury financing, nor 
did any Treasury activity occur at this time.
I
Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1968, p. 141.
CHAPTER IV
"EVEN KEEL" POLICY IN RELATION 
TO TREASURY OPERATIONSi 1960-1968
The purpose of this section of the analysis is to review and 
evaluate in detail a number of aspects of “oven keel" policy with 
respect to Treasury financing operations during the 1960-1968 inter­
val.^ Special emphasis is given to the relationship between "even 
keel" directives and the type and volume of Treasury financings. The 
chapter also analyzes both the frequency and the seasonal pattern 
exhibited by "even keel" operations and offers an explanation in terras 
of both Treasury activity and money market conditions. Finally, this 
section discusses some of the major problems encountered in dating 
"even keel" periods and presents the solutions adopted by the author.
The specific interval covered in the analysis extends from 
January 1, i960, through August 28, 1968, January 1, I960, was chosen 
as the point to initiate the study for two reasons. First of all, by 
that time the "even keel" strategy had become a well-established oper­
ating procedure, as evidenced by the preceding historical analysis.
The primary factor in designating this date as a starting point was 
concerned with the availability of data. The weekly statistics on the 
Federal Funds rate were not available prior to this date, mainly be­
cause the Federal Funds market had not developed sufficiently to the 
point where a market interest rate could be Identified. It should also 
be noted that the December, 1959, Treasury financing operation which 
involved the exchange offer of a Treasury note was taken into consider­
ation by the author as it called forth an "even keel" directive which 
spanned the January 1 to January 12, i960, period. Finally, August 
28, 1968, was designated as the terminal point in the study because the 
statistical definition of free reserves, one of the primary money mar­
ket indicators analyzed, was changed on September 1*4-, 1968.
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"Even Keel" Policy and Treasury Operations
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Although the Treasury is an active participant in the govern­
ment securities market each month during the year, the Federal Reserve 
System pursues an "even keel" strategy for only a fraction of all 
Treasury financing operations. Both the financing technique employed, 
as well as the volume of a particular offer, are major determinants 
of System policy, that is, whether the Trading Desk does or does not 
maintain an "even keel" posture. In addition,, other factors such as 
the general condition of the money market as gauged by System officials 
are taken into consideration in determining the policy of the central 
bank. The financing operations of the Treasury during the 1960-1968 
period have been carefully reviewed and categorized on the basis of 
the financing technique employed. The four major classifications in­
clude advance refundings, regular refundings, cash refundings, and 
cash offers. After an analysis of the empirical data available, a 
rather clear behavior pattern emerges with respect to both the tech­
nique and volume of Treasury financings and the actions of the Federal 
Reserve System.
A . Advance Refundings
The advance refunding technique is a rather recent innovation
2in Treasury financing, first utilized in June, i960. An advance 
2
The first advance refunding was announced to the public on 
June 6, i960. The operation, a junior type, consisted of the limited 
offer of a note and bond to be exchanged for a 2-1/2 percent bond 
maturing on ll/l5/6l. Of the 11.177 billion dollars outstanding, the 
exchange was limited to 4.500 billion dollars of which 4.215 billion 
dollars were allotted. The first senior advanced refunding operation 
was announced by the Treasury on September 9, I960. This financing
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refunding entails the offer of an optional right to the holders of
specified outstanding issues; the right to exchange their holdings for
3
new securities of longer maturity. The primary rationale for employ­
ing this new financing technique was the desire on the part of 
Treasury officials to lengthen the maturity structure of the debt. It 
was felt if an exchange was offered before the outstanding securities 
had come to serve a liquidity function in investors* portfolios, the 
difficulty of floating a new long-term security would be minimized. 
Specifically, it was reasoned that the maturing securities were held 
mainly by short-term investors who were not interested in purchasing 
long-term bonds. Those investors who did wish to exchange for the new 
long-term bonds would be required to purchase "rights" to the new is­
sues or "when-issued" securities from dealers. This transfer of own­
ership involves a considerable amount of market churning. The senior
advance refunding technique minimizes the changes in ownership and the
4amount of new cash funds required to purchase the long-term bonds.
2
(continued) Involved the offer of three new bonds which were 
eligible to be exchanged for four issues of 2-1/2 percent bonds matur­
ing between 6/15/67 and 12/15/69. Out of the 12.473 billion dollars 
outstanding eligible for exchange, 3.976 billion dollars were allotted.
3
Advance refundings are of three distinct types, depending on 
the length of time to maturity of the outstanding issues involved in 
the operation. Senior advance refundings involve securities with over 
5 years left to maturity. The Treasury has also conducted junior and 
pre-refunding operations. Junior advance refundings include outstand­
ing Issues with 1-5 years to maturity and pre-refundings involve securi­
ties maturing in less than 1 year. However, a particular advance re­
funding may actually be a combination of any two of these types.
4
Thomas R. Beard, "Debt Management* Its Relationship to Monetary 
Policy, 1951-1962," in Readings in Money, National Income, and Stabili­
zation Policy, ed. by Warren L. Smith and Ronald L. Teigen (Homewood, 
Illinois* Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), p. 426.
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The advance refunding technique was adopted in i960 as a means to 
minimize the immediate market impact of a long-term debt operation.^ 
During the 1960-1968 period, the Treasury undertook a total 
of 15 advance refunding operations. Of these, 10 operations consisted 
of a single type; there being 2 senior refundings, 2 junior refundings, 
and 6 pre-refundings. The other 5 advance refundings involved a com­
bination of components, consisting of 1 junior-senior refunding and b 
junior-pre-refunding operations. In addition, 4 of the 15 advance 
refundings consisted of limited offers. Reference to Table 2 provides 
a concise chronological summary of these operations denoting the an­
nouncement dates, the type of operation and securities offered, the 
volume outstanding and exchanged, and the exchange ratio as well as 
indicating the presence or absence of an "even keel" directive.
Examination of the table reveals that System policy has normally 
called for the maintenance of an "even keel" policy during Treasury 
advance refundings. During the period, 12 of 15 advance refundings 
were accompanied by an "even keel" directive. The 3 advance refundings 
that were not "even keeled" include 2 limited junior refundings and 1
A brief summary of the literature concerned with the advance 
refunding technique would include the following articles! Thomas R. 
Beard, U.S. Treasury Advance Refunding, June 1960-July 196*1- 
(Washington, D.C.i Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, 1965), 
Commission on Money and Credit, Report of the Commission, Money and 
Credit! Their Influence on Jobs, Prices, and Growth (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.i Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), pp. 111-11**-1 David I. Fand, "An 
Analysis of Advance Refunding," (paper presented to the meeting of the 
Econometric Society, Cleveland, Ohio, September 5» 1965J Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, "Advance Refunding! A Technique of Debt 
Management," Monthly Review (December, 1962), pp. l69-175l Federal 
Reserve Bank of Mchmond, "The Longer She Stands the Shorter She Grows," 
Monthly Review (April, l$>6l), pp. 7-12* and the U.S. Treasury Depart­
ment, "Debt Management and Advance Refunding," September, I960.
TABLE 2
- SUMMARY - 
TREASURY ADVANCE REFUNDINGS, 
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968
Date of Type of Volume Volume Issued
Public Type of Securities Outstanding
(billions)
in Exchange Per Cent Even Keel
Announcement Operation-*- Offered (billions) Exchange Directive
6/06/60 Junior (Limited) Note, Bond $ 11.177 $ 4.215 y ? M No
9/09/60 Senior Bonds 12.473 3.979 31.Z6 Yes
3/15/61 Junior (Limited) Bonds 19.436 6.044 31.1$ No
9/07/61 Senior 7.616 3.758 49.4$ Yes
2/15/62 Junior-Senior Bonds 18.739 5.198 27.8$ Yes
9/05/62 Pre-refunding Note, Bond 26,619 7.860 29 .6$ Yes
(Limited)





Bonds 32.139 6,740 2X,Q$ Yes




Bonds 41.746 9.2?4 22,2$ Yes
12/30/64 Pre-refunding Bonds 33.077 9.74? 29.3?& Yes
1/26/66 Pre-refunding Notes 28.758 9.806 34.3# Yes
7/27/66 Pre-refunding Certificate,
Note
14.893 10.138 68,4$ Yes
4/26/67 Pre-refunding Notes 22.142 11.758 53.¥ Yes
1/31/68 Pre-refunding Note 24.331 5.145 21.2$ No
lln a limited offer, the Treasury reserves the right to set a specified limit on the volume of sub- 
scriptions it Hill accept in exchange on a given outstanding issue.
SOURCE: U.S. Treasury Department, Monthly Bulletin, January i960 - August 1968.
91
pre-refunding. Perusal of the table shows that the Federal Reserve 
System makes little distinction between the various types of opera­
tions or securities offered or the size of the operations as measured 
by the volume of securities outstanding.
The System has usually "even keeled" these Treasury financing 
operations whether consisting of senior, junior, or pre-refunding 
components, or a combination of them. The central bank has also pur­
sued an "even keel" whether the securities eligible for exchange were 
certificates of indebtedness, notes, or bonds, or some combination of 
the above. The Trading Desk has not made any distinction with respect 
to the amount of eligible securities. The System has "even keeled" 
operations as large as 41.746 billion dollars and as small as 7.6l6 
billion dollars, whereas the System did not "even keel" an offer in­
volving an amount eligible for exchange as large as 24,331 billion 
dollars. In addition, the presence or absence of an "even keel" 
directive does not seem to influence the exchange ratio.^ Those 
operations which were not accompanied by an "even keel" had exchange
The percentage of outstanding securities that are exchanged 
for new securities can, with extensive qualification, be used to 
measure the success of the financing. Those outstanding issues not 
exchanged will at maturity have to be redeemed by the Treasury, How­
ever, the Treasury is not forced to make an immediate payment as the 
maturity date occurs some time after the advance refunding operation 
is concluded. Thus the Treasury is not immediately forced to raise 
cash as it would be In a regular refunding operation. Thus the 
exchange ratio is not the reverse of the percent of attrition in a 
regular refunding. In addition, the terms set by the Treasury in an 
advance refunding are not necessarily aimed at achieving a 100 percent 
exchange ratio. Treasury officials might clearly be aiming at dif­
ferent exchange ratios in different advance refunding operations. This 
implies that In two different operations, officials might equally well 
be pleased with different exchange ratios.
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ratios of 3?. 8 percent, 31.1 percent, and 21.2 percent, well within 
the average range of 35.3 percent for the "even keeled" advance re­
fundings.
In conclusion, it can be expected that the Trading Desk will 
pursue an "even keel" strategy during Treasury advance refundings.
The sole determinant of the "even keel" directive seems to be the 
technique of financing, i.e., advance refunding. The System clearly 
deems as appropriate an "even keel" strategy during an advance refund­
ing.
B, Regular Refundings
A regular refunding operation or exchange offer is a financing
technique where the holders of outstanding issues are offered the
option of exchanging these securities at maturity for a like face
7
amount of a new issue. In a regular refunding, as in an advance re­
funding, no cash is involved, with payment for the new securities 
being made in a like face amount of the maturing issue. During the 
1960-1968 period the exchange financing was the most common technique 
utilized by the Treasury to refund maturing coupon issues. A total of 
20 such operations were undertaken by the Treasury.
A summary of the regular refundings appears in Table 3. It 
can be seen that the Federal Reserve System has usually "even keeled"
7
In addition to exchange offers, the Treasury has conducted 
optional exchange offers. In an optional exchange operation, holders 
of the maturing issue are given an exchange option between more than 
one new security. While this financing technique reduces cash-ins of 
maturing issues, it is subject to the disadvantage of partially trans­
ferring control over the maturity structure of the debt to the public.
TABLE 3
REGULAR REFUNDINGS - EXCHANGE OR OPTIONAL EXCHANGE OFFERS 


















1/28/60 Certificate, Note $ II.561 $ 11.099 4.00$ Yes
4/28/60 Certificate, Note 6.413 5.786 .98$ No
10/27/60 Note, Bond 10.844 10.313 4.90$ No
11/18/60 Bond .750 .144 80.00$ No
7/13/61 Notes, Bond 12.536 11.804 6.34$ Yes
11/02/61 Note, Bonds 6.963 6,542 5.93$ Yes
11/17/61 Bond .970 .316 6?.40$ No
2/01/62 Certificate, Note 11.731 11.312 3.58/* Yes
4/26/62 Certificate, Note, Bond 11.683 11.003 5.83/ Yes
10/25/62 Certificate, Note, Bond 10.980 10.494 4.46$ Yes
11/15/62 Bonds .458 .0?4 83,8(3$ No
1/30/63 Certificate, Bond 9.465 9.230 2,48$ Yes
4/24/63 Certificate, Note 9.495 8, v66 5=58$ Yes
7/24/63 Note 6.600 6.399 3.0*i$ No
1/30/64 Notes 8.373 8.013 4,3Wo Yes
4/29/64 Note, Bond 10.614 10.085 4,99$ Yes
4/28/65 Note, Bond 8.436 7.976 5.63$ Yes
7/28/65 Note, Bond 7.268 7.035 3.21$ Yes
4/27/66 Note 9.317 8.135 12,70$ Yes
5/01/68 Note 8.047 6.749 16.30$
_ m i .  . _. _.
Yes
“Attrition is the accepted measure of the market*s reception of an exchange offer. The percentage rate
is a ratio of the volume of the market securities which were not exchanged for the new issue over the 
total volume of mature securities which were eligible for exchange,
SOURCEt U.S. Treasury Department, Monthly Bulletin, January i960 - August 1968,
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these operations. In 1^ of 20 cases, the Treasury refunding operation 
was accompanied by an "even keel" directive. Of the 6 operations not 
"even keeled," 3 consisted of extremely small exchanges involving the 
conversion of F and G series savings bonds, the volume of outstanding 
securities eligible for exchange being respectively, .750, .970, and 
.^ •58 billion dollars. Thus, eliminating these 3 small operations, 
the System "even keeled" 1^ of 17 refundings.
There is some evidence that the volume of a given operation 
had some influence upon the central bank's decision to maintain an 
"even keel" stance. Specifically, in those operations involving an 
offer consisting of Treasury certificates of indebtedness and either 
notes or bonds, 6 of 7 operations coincided with an "even keel" direc­
tive. The average volume of those operations that were "even keeled" 
was 10.819 billion dollars compared to 6,^13 billion dollars for the 
other. Closer scrutiny of these 7 financings reveals a consistently 
critical volume of 9.000 billion dollars above which called forth an 
"even keel" and below which did not. In addition, the average rates 
of attrition, the generally accepted measure of success in an exchange 
financing, were *4-. 32 percent for the 6 "even keeled" operations and 
.98 percent for the financings which were not "even keeled."
In those operations which involved only notes and bonds, there 
were a total of 13 financings. Of these, 8 were "even keeled." 
However, upon elimination of the 3 small bond offers in I960, 1961, 
and 1962 involving exchanges for F and G series savings bonds, it was 
found that 8 of 10 operations can be designated as having called forth 
an "even keel" directive. No critical volume was discerned, as for
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example, one offer of 6.963 billion dollars was "even keeled" and 
another of 10.844 billion dollars was not. The average rate of attri­
tion on the "even keel" group was 7.4-5 percent; whereas, on the other 
group which consisted of two offers, it was 3.97 percent.
The conclusions reached with respect to the relationship be­
tween "even keel" policy and the 17 regular refundings (excluding the 
3 offers involving the F and G series savings bonds) during the 1960- 
1968 period were as follows. For those operations involving certifi­
cates of indebtedness, a critical volume of 9.000 billion dollars was 
identified, but no critical volume was found for operations involving 
just notes and bonds. For both groups, contrary to expectation, the 
rate of attrition was noticeably higher when the Federal Reserve 
maintained an "even keel" posture. In addition, the rate of attrition 
was found to be substantially higher after 1966, a result partially 
explained by the rising level of interest rates during this subperiod. 
Finally, there seems to be no distinction between the probability of 
an "even keel" directive occurring and the particular type of security 
(certificate, note, or bond) involved in the financing.
It would probably be expected that the System would be more 
apt to pursue an "even keel" strategy the longer the maturity of the 
new issue. It also might be expected that the attrition ratio would 
be lower when an "even keel" accompanied a refunding operation. The 
fact that neither of these phenomena were observed might be explained 
by the actual marketing process utilized in regular refunding opera­
tions. During the discussions that take place between Treasury 
authorities, System officials, and other participants in the government 
securities market prior to the public announcement of the terms of the
financing, the Federal Reserve authorities come to a judgment as to 
the degree of receptivity that the tentative financing will receive 
in the money market. Should the market be judged to be in a recep­
tive mood, Treasury officials might tend to sell longer-term issues.
At the same time, Federal Reserve officials might be less apt to pur­
sue an "even keel" because money market conditions were such that the 
financing would not be expected to encounter poor acceptance by in­
vestors. Thus, the lower rate of attrition observed during "non­
even keel" periods would reflect the System’s expertise in gauging 
the money market. It must be emphasized, however, that even if the 
purpose of the "even keel" strategy is to support or facilitate 
Treasury operations and the rate of attrition is higher during "even 
keel" periods, it cannot be concluded that the "even keel" policy has 
been a failure. In order to reach this conclusion, it would have to 
be assumed that the rate of attrition on a particular financing would 
have been lower had the System maintained an "even keel." There ap­
pears to be no quantitative method available to test such a hypothesis.
In conclusion, it seems apparent that the majority of all 
advance and regular refundings have called forth "even keel" direc­
tives during the 1960-1968 period. There is further evidence that the 
larger the volume of a regular refunding, the more likely is the 
System to pursue an "even keel" strategy. There is no evidence that 
either an advance or regular refunding operation will be received 
more readily by money market participants when the central bank main­
tains an "even keel" policy. Finally, no relationship can be found 
between "even keel" policy and the type of security offered to the 
public in either an advance refunding or exchange offer. It now seems
97
appropriate to examine the relationship between central bank policy 
and Treasury financing operations which involve payment in cash.
C. Cash Refundings
The Treasury has consistently utilized the cash refunding or 
cash and exchange financing technique throughout the I96O-I968 inter­
val for the purpose of refunding maturing debt or raising new cash.
In a cash and exchange financing, payment for the accepted tenders 
must be completed on a specified date, in either cash or immediately 
available funds or in a like face amount of securities maturing on 
that date. In analyzing the probability of an "even keel" during cash 
refunding operations, two major classifications with respect to the 
type of securities offered by the Treasury were distinguished. These 
two categories consisted of cash refundings involving bills and coupon 
issues. ■ ■ -.. *'W ’ ” ”* - ........ . . .
The subcategory of cash and exchange offers of bills included 
the old series of one-year Treasury bills issued on a cash and exchange 
basis during the 1960-1968 period. The new cycle of 9-month and one- 
year Treasury bills jointly offered since September-October of 1966 
are included in the same group. Finally included in this bill cate­
gory were tax anticipation bills (TAB). The TAB'S mature in less than 
one year, just prior to the quarterly tax dates providing cash to 
investors for tax obligations. Prior to April, 1966, at which time 
the Treasury specified that all Treasury bills, including TAB's, were 
subject to payment in cash, immediately available funds or in a like 
face amount of mature Treasury bills, two TAB's were offered on a cash
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payment basis. The offers have been included in the cash refunding 
category for convenience.
System policy with respect to the pursuit of an "even keel" 
strategy during a cash refunding involving bills is quite clear. As 
is evident from the summary of such operations in Table 4, the Federal 
Reserve System has rarely issued an "even keel" directive, except in 
those financings involving TAB’s.
The System has generally not "even keeled" those operations 
entailing the regular bill roll-over financings of the Treasury.
None of the 24 financings involving the new cycle of 9-month and one- 
year Treasury bill offers were "even keeled." Similarly, only 5 of 
the 39 operations involving the older series of one-year bills coin­
cided with an "even keel” directive. Each of these 5 operations has 
been designated as being "even keeled" on one of two bases. Either 
specific mention was made of the bill operation in the F.O.M.C. cur­
rent economic policy directive or the summary of the discussion lead­
ing to it or the financing period of the bill offer closely coincided 
with another financing operation which was specifically designated as 
being responsible for an "even keel" directive. It seems safe to 
conclude that the central bank seldom maintains an "even keel" for 
Treasury bill cash refundings.
Table 4 reveals that the System is more likely to "even keel" 
TAB offers, especially as the volume of the financing increases.
During the 1960-1968 period, the Treasury carried out 31 cash refund­
ings involving TAB's, Of these, 17 out of 31 were "even keeled" by 
the central bank. Apparently, a critical volume was quite consistently 
employed by the System in determining "erven keel” policy. If the
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TABLE k
- SUMMARY - 
CASH REFUNDINGS - CASH AND EXCHANGE OFFERS 
INVOLVING TREASURY BILLS 
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968
Type of Security Number of 'Average Volume of Average
Offered Offers Offer (billions) Acceptance Ratio-
Denoted as Even Keeled
One-year Treasury
Bill - old series 5 $ 1.500 2.09
Nine-month Treasury
Bill - new series 0
One-year Treasury
Bill - new series 0
Tax Anticipation^
Bills 17 1.880 2.3k
Denoted as, Not Even Keeled
One-year Treasury
Bill - old series 3^ $ 1.500 2.15
Nine-month Treasury




Bill - new series 2k .960 1.99
Tax Anticipation
Bills Ik 1.78 1.9^
^The acceptance ratio is a erode measure of market reception of an 
offer. It was computed as the ratio of the volume of tenders received 
over the volume of tenders accepted.
The figures exclude two offers where the volume of tenders received 
were not available in computation of the average acceptance ratio. 
The average volume of offer was computed by combining as one, offers 
of multiple issues,
SOURCEj U.S. Treasury Department, Monthly Bulletin, January i960 - 
August 1968.
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offer was equal to or larger than 2.500 billion dollars, the System 
pursued an "even keel" strategyt whereas, if the volume of the TAB 
offer was less than 2.500 billion dollars, then no "even keel" oc­
curred. In both the new and old Treasury bill series, as well as 
the TAB offer, there was little difference in the acceptance ratios 
with respect to the presence or absence of an "even keel" directive.
A number of cash refundings were undertaken which involved 
coupon issues, including offers of certificates of indebtedness, 
notes, and bonds, or various combinations of the above. Table 5 re­
veals that the Federal Reserve System has in 10 of 13 such cash re­
fundings pursued an "even keel" policy. Those financings that were 
"even keeled" ranged in size from 3.000 billion dollars to 12,200 
billion dollars in volume, with the majority of operations ranging 
within the 7.000 billion dollars to 10,000 billion dollars range.
The 3 offers which were not designated as "even keels" were 7.750, 
6.900, and 2.170 billion dollars in volume. Thus, little credibility 
can be placed on selecting some critical volume as a determinant of 
"even keel" directives. Neither can any relationship be conclusively 
established with respect to an "even keel" directive influencing the 
money market's reception of a given cash refunding.
The only tenable conclusions advanced are that the System has 
usually maintained an "even keel" posture during cash refunding opera­
tions which involved certificates of indebtedness, notes, or bonds. 
The System has not considered the "even keel" policy as appropriate 
during regular roll-over operations which involved 9-month and one- 
year Treasury bills. Finally, the central bank has frequently "even 
keeled" financings involving TAB's, especially when the volume of the
TABLE 5
- SUMMARY - 
CASH REFUNDINGS - CASH AND EXCHANGE OFFERS 
INVOLVING COUPON ISSUES 
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968 .
Date of Type of Volume Volume of Total Volume of Accepted
Public Securities Outstanding Subscriptions Subscriptions Acceptance Even Keel
Announcement Offered (billions) (billions) (billions) Ratio1 Directive
7/2&/60 Certificate $ 7.750 $ 17.389 $ 7.S29 2.22 Yes
2/02/61
Note 1,000 5.183 1.070 4,84
Note 6.900 19.000 7.324 2.59 No
4/27/61 Certificate 5.250 26.7002 5.510 No
7/26/62
Note 2.500 2.750
Certificate 6.500 20.155 6.852 2.94
Bond 1.500 6.743 1.743 3.86 Yes
10/23/63
Bond .750 .315 .315 1.00
Note 7.600 20.690 7.977 2.59 Yes
7/29/64 Note 4.000 14.850 4.040 3.67 Yes
10/28/64 Note 9.250 21.900 9.519 2,38 Yes
1/27/65 Note 2.170 10.636 2»254 4.72 No
10/27/65 Note 9.700 12.067 9.748 1.24 Yes
10/27/66 Note 2.500 5.860 2.635 2,21 Yes
1/25/67
Note .600 14.029 1.734 8,10
Note 5.500 19.915 5.586 3.57 Yes
7/26/67
Note 2.000 22.135 2,006 11.00
Note 9.600 15.660 9.913 1.58 Yes
10/25/67 Note 10.700 15.645 10.738 1.46 Yes
Note 3.000 10.285 3.366 3.02
Note 5.100 23.569 5.474 4.30
■^ The acceptance ratio was computed as the ratio of the volume of subscriptions tendered over the volume of 
subscriptions accepted, 2A separate breakdown of the volume of subscriptions received was not available 
in this operation.
SOURCE* U.S. Treasury Department, Monthly Bulletin, January i960 - August 1968.
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offering exceeded the critical value of 2,500 billion dollars. Thus, 
an "even keel" strategy can be expected in a cash refunding involving 
either coupon issues or a large TAB offer,
D, Cash Offers
The final type of Treasury financing technique to be examined 
is the cash offer. A cash financing involves the offer of a new 
security with payment for that security to be made on a specified 
date in either cash or immediately available funds. This technique, 
other factors equal, is usually considered to be the most disruptive 
to the government securities market, that is, the Immediate market 
impact entails the greatest degree of market churning as investors 
are required to raise new cash in the market. Although the cash 
financing technique eliminates the problem of attrition inherent in 
a regular refunding operation, there is the possibility that some in­
vestors who might have been induced to roll-over their holdings in an 
exchange refunding may leave the market because of the difficulty of 
raising cash for payment. During the 1960-1968 period, a wide range 
of securities has been sold by this method to raise new cash.
Before analysing the cash financings of the Treasury in detail, 
it might be expected that the Federal Reserve System would be more 
likely to pursue an "even keel" policy during a cash financing as op­
posed to the alternative financing techniques previously discussed.
In addition, it would also be expected that the larger the volume of 
a cash offer, as well as the longer the maturity of the securities 
offered, the greater would be the probability of an "even keel"
103
directive. The findings encountered In the following analysis gen­
erally agree with these predictions.
The Treasury has employed the cash financing technique in a 
number of operations involving Treasury bills. There were 12 opera­
tions involving cash offers of one-year Treasury bills. None of 
these operations, all of which consisted of a 1.000 billion dollar 
magnitude, were "even keeled." There were also 6 operations involv­
ing bill strip offers. Of these, only 1 operation, involving a large
g
offer of 1.800 billion dollars, was accompanied by an "even keel."
The average size of the bill strip offers was large when accompanied 
by an "even keel" directive (1,800 billion dollars vs, 1,000 billion 
dollars). However, because of the small sample size, it is difficult 
to say that the volume of the offer was a major determinant of central 
bank policy.
During the 1960-1968 period, 11 cash operations involving 
coupon issues were undertaken by the Treasury, As is revealed in 
Table 6, 8 of the 11 operations were accompanied by an "even keel"
Q
Great difficulty was encountered with respect to determining 
whether two "even keel" directives were the result of two bill strip 
offers. The "even keel" directive issued on June 6, 1961, by the 
F.O.M.C. was identified as being directly attributed to the 1,800 
billion dollar strip offer of that month. Specific mention was made 
of this bill strip offer in the summary of the discussion leading to 
the directive and no other Treasury activity was noted in the securi­
ties market at this time. Thus, it was concluded that the System pur­
sued an "even keel" for this particular bill strip offer.
The "even keel" directive of October 24, 1961, was judged not 
to be related to the .800 billion dollar bill strip offer of November. 
Although the summary of the discussion made no mention of the bill 
strip offer, it did refer to a 6.963 billion dollar exchange offer.
The financing period of these two offers coincided closely. However, 
it is the opinion of the author that the "even keel" directive was at­
tributable solely to the exchange offer rather than the bill strip 
offer.
TABLE 6
- SUMMARY - 
GASH OFFERS OF COUPON ISSUES 




















3/31/60 Bond $ .500 $ .470 $ .470 1.00 Yes
Bond 2.000 2.211 2.211 3.00
9/07/61 Note 2.000 5.684 2.276 2.49 Yes
1/03/62 Bond 1.250 1.718 1.114 1.5** Yes
4/05/62 Bond 1.000 6.827 1.258 5.44 No
12/20/62 Bond (Syndicate) .250 .250 .250 1.00 Yes
3/20/63 Bond (Syndicate) .300 .300 .300 1.00 Yes
6/06/63 Bond 1.250 16.300 1.900 8.58 No
3/26/64 Note 1.000 10.227 1,066 10,20 Yes
1/05/66 Certificate 1.500 10.133 1.652 6,12 Yes
8/17/67 Note 2.500 6.004 2.509 2.40 Yes
2/08/68 Note 4.000 9.874 4.2?8 2.30 No
^The acceptance ratio was computed as a ratio of the volume of total subscription over the volume of 
subscriptions allotted.
SOURCE: U.S. Treasury Department, Monthly Bulletin, January i960 - August 1968.
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directive. The variance between the size of the offerings reveals no 
consistent relationship between volume and the probability of an 
"even keel." As evidenced by the acceptance ratio, "even keel" 
policy seems to have little noticeable impact on the market's recep­
tivity of a cash offer.
In review, it can be concluded that the probability of an 
"even keel" directive in a cash offer is determined primarily by the 
type of security issued in the financing. An "even keel" can con­
sistently be expected to occur in a cash financing when the security 
offered is either a certificate of indebtedness, note, or bond. Con­
versely, it is quite rare for a cash offer of a one-year Treasury bill 
or bill strip offer to be accompanied by an "even keel."
The Frequency and Seasonal Patterns 
of "Even Keel" Directives
The methodology employed in this analysis in identifying "even 
keel" directives is relatively simple and has already been discussed 
in detail in Appendix A in the preceding chapter. To review briefly, 
the primary source consulted by the author was the Record of Policy 
Actions - the Federal Open Market Committee in the Annual Report of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Specifically, 
scrutiny of either Clause b of the policy directive or the second 
paragraph of the current economic policy directive, in conjunction 
with the summary of the discussion leading to the directives, usually 
proved sufficient to identify an "even keel" directive. A typical 
"even keel" directive reads
106
To Implement this policy, and in view of the forth­
coming Treasury financing, System open market opera­
tions during the next 2 weeks shall be conducted with 
a view to maintaining about the same degree of firm­
ness in the money market that has prevailed in recent 
weeks and to offsetting downward pressures on short-term 
interest rates, while providing for continued moderate 
reserve expansion,°
During the 1960-1968 period, 66 of 151 F.O.M.C. directives 
were designated by the author as calling for an "even keel" policy. 
This constitutes approximately *4-5.7 percent of all such directives.^ 
Thus, it should be recognized immediately that almost half of the 
directives given to the Account Manager are couched in terms of main­
taining an "even keel." During the 1960-1968 period, an evaluation 
of both the monthly and yearly patterns of "even keel" directives 
yields some informative results.
Perusal of Table 7 shows that the frequent "even keel" years 
fall within the interval encompassing 1962-1967, inclusively. During 
this six-year period, 52 of 103 or 50.5 percent of all F.O.M.C, direc­
tives entailed an "even keel." In each year during this time span in 
excess of *4-0.0 percent of the direbtives were "even keel" directives,
9
Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Fiftieth Annual 
Report, 1963 (Washington, D.C.i Federal Reserve System, 19<>3)» P. 63,
^This figure is closely comparable to the findings of other 
authors. For example, Bosher finds *»8 percent of the F.O.M.C. direc­
tives during the 1962-1968 period called for "even keels." During 
the same period, Yohe and Gasper identified *4-2 of 86 directives or
*4-8,8 percent as "even keels." This author’s analysis designated *4-3 
of 89 directives as being "even keels." See, William P. Yohe and 
Louis C. Gasper, "The 'Even Keel' Decisions of the Federal Open Market 
Committee," Financial Analysts Journal (November-December, 1970), p.
3 and fn. 13, p. 11,
TABLE 7
"EVEN KEEL" DIRECTIVES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL F.O.M.C. DIRECTIVES,
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968
I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Monthly Total
January 1/2 0/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 1/1 1/1 1/1 0/1 10/14 71.4#
February 0/1 0/1 1/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 5/9 55.5#
March 1/2 0/2 0/2 2/2 1/2 0/2 0/2 0/1 0/2 4/17 23.5#
April 0/1 0/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 0/1 1/3 6/11 54.5#
May 0/2 0/1 0/2 0/2 1/2 1/2 1/1 1/2 o/l 4/15 26.6%
June 0/1 1/2 0/2 0/1 1/1 0/1 0/2 1/1 0/1 3/12 25.C#
July 2/2 1/1 1/2 0/2 2/2 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 10/13 76.9#
August 0/1 0/2 1/1 1/1 0/1 1/2 0/1 1/1 0/2 4/12 25.0#
September 1/1 1/1 1/1 l/l 0/2 1/2 0/1 0/1 5/10 50. c#
October 1/2 2/2 1/2 1/2 1/1 1/1 1/1 2/2 10/13 76.9#
November 0/2 0/1 0/1 0/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 0/2 3/13 23.1#






















SOURCEj Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, I96O-I968.
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with 1964 exhibiting 11 of 19 identified as such. Conversely, the 
infrequent "even keel" years were 1961, with 27.8 percent, and 1968, 
with 25.0 percent. This pattern is largely attributable to the in- 
act iveness of the Treasury in floating long-term securieties during 
these years. Economic conditions, especially the tightening of mone­
tary policy, and rising short-term interest rates probably accounted 
for the lack of Treasury activity in the first half of 1968, and thus 
little necessity for the System to pursue an "even keel" strategy.
A symmetrical pattern emerges with respect to the monthly 
distribution of "even keel" directives. The frequent "even keel" 
months include January, 7 1 . percent} April, 5^.5 percent} July,
76,9 percent} and October, 76.9 percent, those months being character­
ized as normally representing the low points in Treasury operating 
balances. On the other hand, the infrequent "even keel" months in­
clude March, 23.5 percent; June, 25.0 percent; August, 25.0 percent; 
November, 23.1 percent; and December, 16.7 percent. This pattern is 
explained largely by the fact that March, June, and December, along 
with September, are the quarterly tax receipt months, and thus account 
for high Treasury operating balances.
Of much greater difficulty and analytical significance is the 
methodology and the results obtained from the technique employed in 
dating "even keel" periods as compared to identifying "even keel" 
directives. The basic "even keel" unit or period employed in this 
study was the interval beginning three days prior to the Treasury's 
announcement of the specific terms of the relevant financing operation 
and ending three days after the payment or settlement date. This basic 
"even keel" unit was varied from time to time in accord with a number
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of alternative factors. The primary sources consulted were the 
Record of Policy Actions - the Federal Open Market Committee in the 
Annual Report and the Treasury Financing Operations in the Treasury 
Bulletin. The first was employed primarily to identify an "even keel" 
strategy and the second, to determine the dates of the Treasury 
financing period.
The basic "even keel" period was altered due to a number of 
variables, including the type and size of the Treasury operations, 
shifts in the stance of monetary policy, and the dates of the F.O.M.C. 
meetings. Both the method of financing, as well as the volume of a 
given Treasury operation, have an effect on the length of an "even 
keel" period. First of all, the financing technique directly in­
fluences the length of the Treasury financing period. Rights financ­
ings terminate on the settlement date, whereas cash financings end 
on the payment date. As a general rule, the "even keel" period was 
extended three days beyond either the settlement or payment date. 
However, when either advance refundings or exchange offers were large 
(in excess of 18 or 20 billion dollars) or when a particular financing 
operation was specifically mentioned as receiving a poor market recep­
tion, then the "even keel" period was often extended to a point five 
days beyond the settlement date. In both cash refundings and cash 
offers, little difference in volume was encountered and thus the basic 
"even keel" unit was not altered.
The actual dates of F.O.M.C. meetings influenced the dating 
of "even keel" periods in two ways. First, in the case of consecu­
tive "even keel" directives, the "even keel" period had to be adjusted 
to avoid the problem of overlapping. For example, assume the F.O.M.C.
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Issued an "even keel" directive at successive meetings held on October 
1 and October 23, with the summary of the discussion leading to the 
directives referring to two Treasury exchange financings whose respec­
tive announcements and settlement dates were October to October 24 
and October 20 to November 15. In this case, the two "even keel" 
periods would be designated as October 1 to October 22 and October 
23 to November 18. It was necessary to use the dates of the F.O.M.C. 
meetings as the cut-off dates of the "even keel" period in order to 
eliminate any overlapping which would have exaggerated the true number 
of "even keel" days. Secondly, assume an "even keel" directive was 
issued on July 1 to assist in an advance refunding which was announced 
to the public on June 30, with the settlement date specified as July 
25. Normally, the "erven keel" period would be identified as stretch­
ing from June 27 to July 28. However, if an F.O.M.C. meeting was held 
on July 23 and at that meeting the instructions called for a change in 
the stance of monetary policy, while either no mention was made of the 
advance refunding or it was noted that the financing was being well- 
received by the public, then the "even keel" period would be dated as 
June 27 to July 23. Thus, both the dates of the F.O.M.C. meeting, as 
well as shifts in policy, called for some adjustments to be made in 
the basic "even keel” unit.
It should be noted, however., that the dates of the meetings 
did not take precedence over the actual Treasury financing periods in 
determining the length of an "even keel" period. If an F.O.M.C. 
meeting on April 12 called for the maintenance of an "even keel" 
strategy with reference to a cash offer announced on April 8 with pay­
ment to be consummated on April 26, then the "even keel" period would
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run from April 5 to April 29. The Treasury financing period was con­
sidered the primary determinant of the length of an "even keel" 
period, as the Account Manager has a significant amount of discretion­
ary power to act in accord with the dictates of day-to-day money mar­
ket conditions in between the specific instructions issued to him by 
the F.O.M.C.
In conclusion, then, it Is the Treasury financing period as 
enumerated in the Treasury Bulletin which usually determines the dates 
of an "even keel" period. Using the basic 3-day "even keel" unit, 
adjusted when necessary as described, above, it was found that the 
average "even keel" period extended ov8r a time span of approximately 
22 days, with the longest one covering 31 days and the shortest, 8 
days. Most "even keel" directives are in force for the 3-week inter­
lude between F.O.M.C. meetings, an interval which, as a rule, coin­
cides closely with Treasury financing periods.
The frequency and seasonal distribution of "even keel"
11business days is depicted in Table 8. The table clearly shows how 
frequently the System pursues an "even keel" policy. During the 1960- 
1968 period, 999 of 2262 or *)4.2 percent of all business days were 
identified as "even keel" days. The general pattern which emerges 
with respect to both the yearly and monthly distributions is similar 
to the results depicted in Table 7, but some subtle differences should 
be noted.
■^^Business days are defined as days the Federal Reserve Banks 
are open. This includes all Mondays through Fridays, with the excep­
tion of Christmas. There are between 260 and 262 business days in 
each year and between 20 and 23 in each month.
TABLE 8
"EVEN KEEL" BUSINESS DATS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUSINESS DAYS,
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968
I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Monthly Total
January 13/211 0.22 17/23 20/23 19/23 19/21 21/21 9/22 3/23 121/199 ■ 60.856
February 8/21 0.20 20/20 20/20 13/20 0/20 11/20 10/20 11/21 93/182 - 51.336
March 6/23 0/23 4/22 21/21 6/22 0/23 0/23 0/23 0/21 37/201 - 18.^6
April 14/21 0/20 16/21 22/22 22/22 9/22 4/21 4/20 2/22 93/191 - 48.756
May 0/22 0/23 6/23 11/23 14/21 17/21 13/22 12/23 14/23 87/201 - 43.7$
June 1/22 10/22 0/21 0/20 10/22 0/22 0/22 4/22 0/20 25/193 - 12.956
July 18/21 16/21 5/22 0/23 23/23 8/22 4/21 19/21 1/23 94/197 = 4?.?£
August 12/23 1/23 23/23 9/22 14/21 13/22 14/23 23/23 14/22 123/202 - 60.956
September 15/22 17/21 20/20 21/21 0/22 7/22 0/22 4/21 84/l?l - 49,136
October 17/21 19/22 11/23 10/23 9/22 21/21 18/21 22/22 127/175 “ 72.5#
November 0/22 11/23 5/22 14/21 17/21 18/22 12/22 15/22 92/175 - 52.52
December 0/22 0/21 1/21 0/22 13/23 9/23 0/22 0/21 23/175 = 13.136
Yearly 104/261 74/261 128/261 148/261 160/262 121/261 97/260 122/260 45/175 999/2262 - 44.2$
Total 39.8$ 31.258 49.1$ 56,6$ 61.]^ 46.38 37.3$ 46.8$ 25.1%
-^ -Includes December, 1959, "Even Keel" encompassing January 1-12.
SOURCE* Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1960-1968; and U.S., Treasury Department, Monthly 
Bulletin, January i960 - August 1968.
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First of all, the frequent "even keel" years Include the in­
terval from 1962 to 1965 and 1967* inclusively. In each of these 
years, "even keels" were in force during more than 4-5.0 percent of 
the total number of business days. Again, 1964-, with 160 of 262 days 
or 6l.l percent of all business days being identified as "even keels," 
is the year exhibiting the most frequent use of this strategy. The 
infrequent "even keel" years are, again, 1961, with 31.2 percent, and 
1968, with 25.7 percent. This yearly pattern is largely attributable 
to the variable degree of market activity by the Treasury. During 
the frequent "even keel" years, the Treasury undertook a greater 
number of financing operations; whereas, in the infrequent "even 
keel" years, especially in 1968, the debt management operations of 
the Treasury were curtailed. Rising Interest rates and more restric­
tive monetary policy, coupled with the interest rate ceiling on bonds, 
made it difficult for the Treasury to meet the "test of the market."
Although the yearly patterns of "even keel" directives and 
"even keel" business days are similar, the monthly distribution is 
slightly different. The monthly pattern that emerges can be explained 
in terms of both the volume of Treasury operating balances and major 
Treasury refunding operations. Table 9 summarizes these two factors, 
both of which seem to explain the majority of the author's observa­
tions. As before, January, 60.8 percent; April, 4-8.7 percent; July, 
4-7.7 percentj and October, 72.5 percent, are designated as frequent 
"even keel" months. These particular months coincide closely with 
low points in Treasury operating balances. In addition, February,
51.1 percent; May, 4-3.7 percent; August, 60,9 percent; and November, 
52.5 percent, must also be categorized as frequent "even keel" months.
TABLE 9
MAJOR TREASURY REFUNDINGS1 AND LOW POINTS IN 
ADJUSTED TREASURY OPERATING BALANCES82 
JANUARY, I960 - AUGUST, 1968
I960 1961 1962 1963 196^ 1965 1966 196? 1968
January L L L AL AL L L
February R R R R R R R R
March A A A
April L L L
May R R R R R R R R RL
June A R
July L A L
August R R R R R R RL RL RL
September A A A
October AL L L L L L L L
November R R R R R RL RL RL
December L
■^ -Maturing coupon issues in excess of 3 "billion dollars (R) and advance refundings (A).
2
End-of-month operating balances minus net cash borrowing that totals to less than 3.9 billion dollars (L).
SOURCES* Yohe and Gasper, "The ’Even Keel' Decisions," p. 5» Table 4; Beard, U.S. Treasury Advance Re­




This can be explained primarily by the maturing coupon issues falling 
within these months. Finally, September with 72.5 percent is explain­
ed by both the overlapping of August refunding operations, as well 
as the September advance refundings during I96I-I963. The infrequent 
"even keel" months are March, 18.4 percent? June, 12.9 percent? and 
December, 13.1 percent, these being, along with September, the 
quarterly tax payment dates.
Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with one major facet of "even keel"' 
policy, the intimate relationship between this System strategy and 
the financing operations of the Treasury. This subject has been 
analyzed in two partsi the first dealing with the relationship between 
"even keel" policy and the type of Treasury financing, and the second, 
with the frequency and seasonal pattern of "even keel" directives.
Some important conclusions must be reviewed.
During advance and regular refunding operations, the System 
has generally maintained an "even keel" in the money market regard­
less of the type of securities involved in the financing or the volume 
of the operation as measured lay the amount of securities eligible for 
exchange. There was some evidence that the volume of regular refund­
ings, involving certificates of indebtedness, had some influence on 
whether the central bank issued an "even keel" directive. During 
Treasury financings involving both cash refundings and cash offers, 
the System normally "even keeled" those operations involving coupon 
issues regardless of the volume of the financing. Although regular 
bill roll-overs were seldom accompanied by an "even keel" directive,
cash refundings of TAB's were "even keeled" when the volume of the 
operation exceeded 2.500 billion dollars. Thus, the "even keel" 
policy can be most commonly expected to be implemented during most 
advance and regular refunding operations and during cash refundings 
and cash offers involving coupon issues.
The frequency and seasonal pattern of "even keel" directives 
can most readily be explained by Treasury operating balances. The 
frequent "even keel" months usually concur with low points in 
Treasury operating balances, while infrequent "even keel" months 
coincide with quarterly tax dates. The yearly pattern can usually 
be explained by the activity of the Treasury and conditions in the 
money market.
CHAPTER V
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF "EVEN KEEL" POLICYj 
JANUARY 6, I960 - AUGUST 28, 1968
The purpose of this section of the study is to empirically 
test the alternative definitions of "even keel" policy which have 
appeared in the literature. First, an explanation of the statistical 
testing procedures employed in the analysis is presented. After 
this, three alternative definitions of "even keel" policy are reviewed 
and empirically tested.. Finally, the chapter concludes with a synthe­
sis of the results, leading to a more precise definition of "even 
keel" policy.
Statistical Procedure
The primary statistical test utilized in the evaluation of 
the various definitions of the "even keel" strategy was an analysis 
of variance for one-way design. The program employed (BMD 0 IV) com­
putes an analysis of variance table for one variable of classification, 
with unequal group sample sizes.'*' A brief description of the analysis
^Health Sciences Computing Facility, School of Medicine, 
U.C.L.A., Biomedical Computer Programs (Los Angeles, Calif.t U.C.L.A., 
1965), pp. U&6-k9b. For additional references on the analysis of 
variance technique, consult Roger L, Burford, Statistlcsi A Computer 
Approach (Columbus, Ohiot Charles N. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968), 
pp. 257-265j Wilfrid J. Dixon and Frank J, Massey, Jr., Introduction 
to Statistical Analysis (2nd ed. 1 New York* McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1957), pp. 1^5-152; and Taro Yamane, Statistics! An Introductory 
Analysis (New Yorkt Harper and Row Publishers, 196?)» PP. 66^-667.
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of variance test is necessary to understanding the results and con­
clusions concerning the appropriate interpretation of the "even keel" 
strategy.
The purpose of the one-way analysis of variance is to test
the null hypothesis about the equality of means of several universes.
** ^  is computed as the ratio of the
between mean square to the within mean square. The formula for the
k _ 2
F-ratio isi S n (X - X) / k-1 0
f . — :_________ - 12
v S (X . - X ) /N-k 
1=1 j=l i 3 i
where the equality t "/TF holds only when the total sum of squares
is divided into two, and only two, parts.
This statistical procedure readily adapts itself to the evalu­
ation of the various interpretations of "even keel" policy. By exam­
ining the behavior patterns displayed by a number of money market
variables over the 1960-1968 period, it was possible to determine
more precisely what the "even keel" strategy entailed. The purpose 
of the one-way analysis of variance test was to determine whether 
selected money market variables behaved differently during "even keel" 
periods as opposed to other times when such "even keel" directives were 
not in force. By comparing the mean of a variable during "even keel" 
weeks with the mean of that same variable during "non-even keel" weeks, 
it was possible to quantitatively analyze the Federal Reserve's "even 
keel" policy.
The selection of the appropriate money market indicators to be 
examined was based upon the alternative definitions of "even keel" 
policy tested, as well as theories concerning the implementation of
The F-ratio tor H i  K
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short-run monetary policy. The primary variables analyzed Included 
repurchase agreements, net open market purchases, marginal reserve 
measures, and short-term interest rates.
The analysis of variance program was run on both original 
data and first difference data. Analysis of the original data reveal­
ed differences in the behavior patterns of the magnitude or level of 
the variable. First difference data was computed on the basis of the 
formula
xt-i - xt “ I DXtI
where X = original value of the data and DX => the first difference 
value of the variable. Thus, the analysis of variance of first dif­
ference data identified variations in the degree of fluctuations of 
the variable during "even keel" and "non-even keel" weeks. The data 
input, original or first difference, was determined in accord with the 
definition being tested.
Finally, the program was run on each money market variable 
over a number of different time series. It was felt that an analysis 
of only the January 6, 1960-August 28, 1968, time period ignored the 
possibility of various behavior patterns being displayed as a result 
of differences in the stance of monetary policy. The entire ^52-week 
period was broken down into 6 subperiods as shown in Table 10, based 
on the annual growth rate of the money supply. The growth rate of the 
money supply was used as a proxy variable for the stance of monetary 
policy, i.e., whether it was neutral, expansive, or restrictive. The 
examination of the data within the subperiods allows us to deal with 
possible differences in the implementation of "even keel" policy during 
tight and easy money periods.
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TABLE 10
GROWTH OF THE MONEY SUPPLY1 
COMPOUNDED ANNUAL RATES OF CHANGE 
(SEASONALLY ADJUSTED)
Periods of No 
Marked and 
Sustained Change 







1/6 /6 0 - 5/25/60 21 - 2.3#
6/1/60 - 12/27 /61 83 + z M
1/3/62 - 8/29/62 35 + 0.%
9/5/62 - 3/30/66 I87 + d,5#




"The money supply is defined as private demand deposits plus currency 
held by the public.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "Money Supply and Time
Deposits, 191^-69," Review (March, 1970), p. 7.
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The Implementation of "Even Keel" Policy
In attempting to quantitatively define "even keel" policy, as 
a prelude to the comparison of the alternative interpretations, it is 
necessary to determine how the Federal Reserve System implements this 
strategy. The operating techniques available to the Trading Desk must 
be scrutinized to see which of these techniques is used to implement 
the "even keel" strategy. Both the "support" and "neutrality" schools' 
interpretations of "even keel" policy, analyzed later, are concerned 
with the degree of reserve-supplying operations undertaken by the 
Trading Desk during Treasury financing periods, An examination of the 
techniques employed by the System in supplying reserves is the first 
step in the empirical analysis of "even keel" policy.
Two primary methods of imparting marginal ease in the money 
market are available to the Trading Desk, First, the System may 
undertake outright purchases of government securities. This method, 
assuming all other reserve factors are unchanged, creates a permanent 
addition to the reserve base of the banking system that can only be 
extinguished by future open market sales of government securities.
The Trading Desk also has the option of supplying reserves on a tem­
porary basis by entering into repurchase agreements with non-bank
2government securities dealers," Both of these reserve-supplying tools 
can be implemented at the initiative of the Trading Desk. An examina­
tion of the behavior of net open market purchases and repurchase
Ira 0. Scott, Jr., Government Securities Market (New Yorkj 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19o5}a pp0 105-106.
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agreements reveals the method by which the "even keel" strategy is 
carried out.
The System has the option of making reserve injections 
through outright purchases of government securities. If the "even 
keel" strategy is implemented through outright open market trans­
actions, it would be expected that the level of net open market pur­
chases (purchases minus sales) would be found to be substantially 
higher during "even keel" weeks than during "non-even keel" weeks. 
However, as Table 11 clearly shows, the System did not consistently 
employ this technique to supply reserves during "even keel" periods.
The null hypothesis, that the mean levels of net open market purchases 
were identical during both "even keel" and "non-even keel" periods, 
cannot be rejected in light of the extremely low F-ratios computed 
for all of the periods tested. It can be concluded that the "even 
keel" strategy does not entail reserve injections through the medium 
of outright open market transactions.
The System probably avoided recourse to outright transactions 
because of the possibility that market participants might interpret 
open market purchases of government securities as indicative of a shift 
in monetary policy. As will be seen later, the System shies away from 
overt policy actions indicative of a shift in monetary policy during 
"even keel" periods. The behavior of net open market purchases may 
well have been influenced by a. number of other factors considered more 
important than Treasury operations, thus explaining the fact that net 
open market purchases were not significantly higher during "even keel" 
weeks. There is no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that
TABLE 11
VARIABLEi NET OPEN MARKET PURCHASES1 
ORIGINAL DATA INPUT

















































































^he data consists of the averages of daily figures in million dollars 
for the week ending on Wednesday.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January,
1960-August, 19685 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March, 
1970), pp. 6-10,
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the "even keel" strategy entails reserve injections through the
medium of outright open market transactions.
The behavior of Federal Reserve repurchase agreements was a
key variable to be examined in analyzing how the "even keel" strategy
is implemented. The repurchase agreement is a contract between the
System and non-bank government securities dealers that involves a sale
of securities by dealers to the System, and a simultaneous promise by
the dealers to repurchase those same securities at a later date. The
instrument is callable by both parties for a period of up to 15 days,
the maximum legal length of the contract. The difference in the price
at which the two transactions are completed, or rates of discount in
the case of repurchase agreements involving Treasury bills, provides
a contractual return to the System for the interval between the sale
and repurchase dates. This return to the System or cost to the dealer
3
is usually equal to or slightly below the discount rate.
The repurchase agreement has contributed an additional degree
of flexibility to money market management. This instrument has become
heavily relied upon by the Trading Desk during Treasury financing 
4periods. This method of supplying reserves is especially appropriate
3
Normand Bernard, "Views of the U.S. Government Securities 
Dealers," a staff study of the Report of the Joint Treasury-Federal 
Reserve Study of the U.S. Government Securities Market (Washington, 
D.G.s Federal Reserve System, 1969)V P« 13.
4For a- comprehensive discussion of the techniques employed by 
the Trading Desk in making repurchase agreements with non-bank govern­
ment securities dealers, see, in particular, Robert L. Cooper, "Tech­
niques of the Federal Reserve Trading Desk in the 1960's Contrasted 
with the 'Bills Preferably’ Period," a staff study of the Report of 
the Joint Treasury-Federal Reserve Study of the U.S. Government 
Securities Market (Washington, D.C.s Federal Reserve System, 1969),
PP. 33-37.
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for a number of reasons. First, reserves are provided only on a tem­
porary basis, the reserves being automatically recaptured upon termi­
nation of the contract. This is of particular importance when the 
Account Manager feels that the stance of monetary policy does not 
call for additional expansion of the reserve base. Secondly, the use 
of repurchase agreements lends some precision to the allocation of 
new funds. Dealers under the heaviest pressure (i.e., those encounter­
ing the most difficulty in obtaining funds from alternative sources) 
may be given direct assistance through selective repurchase agreements, 
whereas the utilization of outright purchases would involve the allo- 
cation of new funds indiscriminantly to all dealers.
The behavior of this money market variable was tested by the 
analysis of variance program. If "even keel" policy is implemented 
through the use of repurchase agreements as the tool for supplying 
reserves to the money market during Treasury financings, then it would 
be expected that the levels of repurchase agreements would be signifi­
cantly higher during "even keel" weeks. The one-way analysis of 
variance program run on the original data indicates differences in the 
volume of repurchase agreements during "even keel" and "non-even keel" 
periods. The results of this test are shown in Table 12.
This test supports, with some qualifications, the hypothesis 
that the Federal Reserve System supplies reserves to the money market 
during "even keel" periods through the repurchase agreement instrument. 
First, viewing the entire 1/6/60-8/28/68 interval, the null hypothesis 
of equal means can be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance
^Scott, Government Securities Market8 p. 106.
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TABLE 12
VARIABLE; REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS1 
ORIGINAL DATA INPUT

















































































^he data consists of the averages of daily figures in million dollars 
for the week ending on Wednesday.
2
A single asterisk * indicates that the actual computed F-ratio exceeded 
the critical value at the 10 percent level, and a double asterisk ** at 
the 5 percent level.
SOURCE; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January, 
1960-August, 19685 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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with a computed F-ratio of 4.5964. The mean level or volume of re­
purchase agreements during "even keel" weeks, as would be expected, 
was larger than during "non-even keel" weeks (123.5584 vs. 96.6863 
million dollars). The only other period where the null hypothesis 
could be rejected at the 10 percent level was the 1/4/67-8/28/68 
period. The same behavior pattern, with the mean level of repurchase 
agreements during "even keel" weeks exceeding the mean level during 
"non-even keel" weeks (175.8378 vs. 113.9400 million dollars), was 
observed. Thus, for the entire 452-week period, as well as the 87- 
week subperiod, the behavior of repurchase agreements supports the 
hypothesis.
Although during only one of six subperiods was it possible to 
reject the null hypothesis of equal means at the 10 percent level, it 
should be noted that during the 313-week interval encompassing 
9/5/62-8/28/68 the mean level of repurchase agreements was larger dur­
ing "even keel" weeks. Thus, although some of the subperiods did not 
display F-ratios high enough to reject the null hypothesis at the 10 
percent level the magnitude of repurchase agreements conforms to the 
hypothesis.^
In conclusion, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis 
that the "even keel" strategy has been implemented through the
^Two additional tests seem to support the hypothesis that "even 
keel" policy has been implemented through repurchase agreements. Simple 
graphical time series observations reveal that the level of repurchase 
agreements are related to "even keel" directives. The magnitude of 
this variable was found to be substantially higher during "even keel" 
weeks than during alternative periods. In addition, an analysis of the 
deviations from a 9-week running average also supports this hypothesis. 
During the 255 weeks not designated as "even keel" weeks, it was found 
that 167 observations fell below the 9-week average. Conversely, of 
the 197 "even keel" weeks, 99 observations exceeded the 9-week average.
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extensive use of repurchase agreements. Generally, the level of re­
purchase agreements has been higher during "even keel" weeks as op­
posed to those weeks when such directives were not in force. There 
is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the "even keel" policy 
has been implemented via outright open market purchases. Thus, the 
Trading Desk, during the major Treasury financing periods, imparts 
marginal ease to the money market by extending the volume of repurchase 
agreements to non-bank government securities dealers.
An Empirical Evaluation of Alternative 
Definitions of "Even Keel" Policy
Three major interpretations of "even keel" policy appear in 
the literature. Two of these definitions grouped within the so-called 
"support" and "neutrality" schools differ primarily in terms of the 
magnitude of the reserve injections associated with the implementation 
of "even keel" policy. The "support" school interpretation views 
"even keel" policy as entailing reserve-supplying operations sufficient 
in volume to ease money market conditions. One "neutrality" school 
definition envisions the "even keel" strategy as consisting of reserve 
injections aimed at offsetting any tendency for a tightening in the 
degree of pressure in the money market during Treasury financings.
This interpretation may be carried to the point where "even keel" 
policy is viewed as an attempt to stabilize money market conditions 
via reserve-supplying operations. Thus, the primary difference in 
these two definitions is the purpose for which reserve injections are 
undertaken.
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The third definition, also classified within the "neutrality" 
school, is somewhat independent of the behavior of open market trans­
actions. This interpretation views the "even keel" policy as entail­
ing the avoidance of any overt monetary policy actions during 
Treasury financing periods. That is, "even keel" policy simply con­
sists of refraining from any shift in central bank policy during 
Treasury financings. The empirical evidence which follows lends the 
greatest degree of support to the "neutrality" school definition that 
"even keel" policy entails the avoidance of overt policy actions.
The "Support" School
The first interpretation of the "even keel” strategy to be 
discussed stresses the concept that the "even keel" policy entails 
an open market operating strategy aimed at facilitating or aiding 
Treasury operations. This view of "even keel" policy explains that 
policy in terms of temporary underwriting for Treasury financings. 
Specifically, the Trading Desk conducts its open market operations 
during Treasury financing periods with a view to facilitating the 
marketing of a new issue by performing an underwriting function. 
Although this interpretation does not imply the utilization of direct 
support purchases, it does imply that the System would undertake 
reserve-supplying operations explicitly for the purpose of enlarging 
the reserve base of the banking system to allow the money markets to 
digest the Treasury offering with minimal interest rate disturbance.
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Such an Interpretation views the "even keel" strategy in terms of a
7
one-way shift toward ease during Treasury financings.
This particular interpretation of "even keel" policy lends 
itself readily to a number of empirical tests. An analysis of the 
behavior of a number of money market variables was undertaken in order 
to test the veracity of this definition of "even keel" policy. The 
results of these tests detailed below lend little support to this in­
terpretation.
The "support" school interpretation of "even keel" policy can 
be broken down into two components. The first implication is that the 
"even keel" strategy consists of reserve-supplying operations during 
Treasury financings. Reference to Tables 11 and 12 indicate that the 
Trading Desk does inject reserves into the money market during Treasury 
operations, primarily through the use of repurchase agreements. The 
question then arises, If the "even keel" policy does entail reserve 
injections, are these operations of sufficient magnitude to effect the 
levels of marginal reserve measures and short-term interest rates? If 
the "support" school definition is correct, then a one-way shift toward 
ease in the money market should be reflected in the behavior of free 
reserves, member bank borrowings, and the Federal Funds and Treasury 
bill rates.
7
This particular interpretation has appeared within the works 
of a number of authors. See, for example, Stephen H, Axilrod, "An 
Empirical View of 'Even Keel,’" (an unpublished manuscript, Board of 
Governors, Federal Reserve System, April 22, 1969)* P. 2? Monthly 
Economic Letter, September, 196?, p. 99? and Rudolph Thunberg, "'Even 
Keel's The Reconciliation of Monetary Policy and Debt Management,"
(an unpublished manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of New York), pp. 11- 
12.
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The behavior of the level of free reserves was an important
8variable to be considered in testing the "support" school hypothesis. 
If the interpretation of "even keel" policy in terms of a one-way
shift toward ease is correct, then the level of free reserves should 
be found to be significantly higher during "even keel" weeks than al­
ternative periods when an "even keel" directive was not in force.
The evidence on free reserves, as shown in Table 13, is somewhat 
ambiguous when this variable is treated as an independent, short-run 
monetary policy target.
It was found for the entire 452-week period spanning 1/6/60- 
8/28/68 that the null hypothesis of the equality of mean levels of 
free reserves could not be rejected with an extremely low F-ratio of 
0.2988. Though free reserve levels were higher during "even keel"
The literature surrounding the so-called free reserve doctrine 
is quite extensive. The level of free reserves is treated as serving 
two functions, both as an indicator of money market tone as well as a 
policy target of System actions. No matter what the shortcomings of 
free reserves as either indicator or target, it is appropriate for 
those attempting to evaluate Federal Reserve policy to pay close at­
tention to this variable simply because the System does seem to employ 
free reserves in its decision making process. For a brief survey of 
the literature dealing with free reserves, see Karl Brunner and Allan 
H. Meltzer, "Genesis and Development of the Free Reserve Conception of 
Monetary Processes," in Readings in Money, National Income, and Stabil­
ization Policy, ed. by Warren L. Smith and Ronald L, Teigen (Homewood, 
Illinois} Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), pp. 197-210$ William G.
Devrald, "Free Reserves, Total Reserves, and Monetary Control," Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. LXXI (April, 19&3), PP« 141-153I Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, "The Significance and Limitations of Free
Reserves," Monthly Review (November, 1958), pp. 162-16?? Milton
Friedman, "Vault Cash and Free Reserves," Joumal of Political Economy, 
Vol. LXIX (April, 1961), pp. 181-182? A. J. Meigs, Free Reserves and 
the Money Supply (Chicago} University of Chicago Press, 1962); and 
Warren L. Smith, "The Instruments of General Monetary Control," in 
Readings in Money, National Income, and Stabilization Policy, ed. by
Warren L. Smith and Ronald L. Teigen.(Homewood, Illinois} Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1965), pp. 210-237.
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TABLE 13
VARIABLE! FREE RESERVES1 
ORIGINAL DATA INPUT

















































































^he data consists of the averages of daily figures in million dollars 
for the week ending on Wednesday,
2
A single asterisk * indicates that the actual computed F-ratio exceeded 
the critical value at the 10 percent level, and a double asterisk ** at 
the 5 percent level.
SOURCEi Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January, 
1960-August, 1968j and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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weeks, the difference was not significant. Thus, for the entire 
period the behavior of free reserves does not lend any credibility to 
the "support" school definition of "even keel" policy.
Looking at the six subperiods, the evidence on free reserve 
behavior is contradictory. During the rather short interval 1/6/60- 
5/25/6 0, the null hypothesis of equal means could be rejected at the 
5 percent level of significance with a computed F-ratio of 5.1825. 
During this interval, contrary to the "support" school interpretation, 
the level of free reserves was actually lower during "even keel" weeks 
(-318.8887 vs. -190.000 million dollars). Instead of a one-way shift 
toward ease, money market condition as reflected in free reserve levels 
actually tightened during Treasury financing operations. Conversely, 
the null hypothesis of the equality of means could be rejected at the 
10 percent level during both the 9/5/62-3/30/66 and 1/4/67-8/28/68 
intervals. In each of these cases, spanning a combined period of 274 
weeks, the mean level of free reserves during "even keel" weeks was 
higher than the mean during alternative weeks (108.9588 vs. 61.1222 
million dollars and 90.5946 vs. -6.8000 million dollars). During 
these subperiods, the behavior of free reserves reflected an easing 
of money market conditions during "even keel" periods, a finding con­
sistent with the "support" school. A number of possible resolutions 
of these contradictory results are possible.
The first resolution involves the integration of "even keel" 
policy with the stance of monetary policy. During the 1/6/60-5/25/60 
interval the annual growth rate of the money supply was -2.3 percent. 
The historical record shows that the System chose to follow a restric­
tive monetary policy with the F.O.M.C. directives consistently calling
13**
for "restraint of excessive Inflationary credit expansion" throughout 
most of the period. The Trading Desk seems to have pursued a restric­
tive policy during both "even keel" and "non-even keel" weeks, giving 
priority to stemming inflation over facilitating Treasury financings. 
Reference to Tables 11 and 12 shows that both net open market pur­
chases (-65.1111 vs. -40.2500 million dollars) and repurchase agree­
ments (61.1111 vs. 75.5833 million dollars) were lower during "even 
keel" weeks than alternative periods. This would seem to indicate 
that the Trading Desk, within the framework of pursuing a restrictive 
monetary policy, went to great lengths during Treasury financing opera­
tions to avoid the appearance of any shift toward ease in the stance 
of monetary policy. This was accomplished by avoiding the outright
purchase of government securities and minimizing the level of repur-
9
chase agreements during "even keel" periods. Thus, the System in 
pursuing a restrictive monetary policy erred on the side of tightness 
with respect to the free reserve target during "even keel" periods to 
avoid any action which might be interpreted as a shift toward an eas­
ing in monetary policy.
During the 9/5/62-3/30/66 and 1/4/67-8/28/68 intervals, the 
annual growth rate in the money supply was 4.5 percent and 7.3 per­
cent, respectively. During both of these intervals the Trading Desk 
erred on the side of ease with respect to the free reserve target dur­
ing Treasury financings. During the 9/5/62-3/30/66 period the
9
A much simpler but equally valid explanation might be offered 
i.o explain the lower levels of free reserves during "even keel" weeks 
found In the 1/6/60-5/25/60 period. This 21-week period is so short 
that the results might be statistically invalid.
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historical record shows that the System was quite concerned with pro­
moting a reduction in long-term interest rates to promote domestic 
recovery and expansion of employment. The System concentrated pri­
marily on a long-term interest rate target allowing free reserve 
levels (indeed, if any attention was given this target) to increase 
in order to avoid the appearance of any tightening of monetary policy.
During the major portion of the 1/^/67-8/28/68 period, the
Federal Reserve System pursued an expansionary credit policy, infla­
tionary pressures not being recognized until late 1967. During this 
same interval, the mean level of repurchase agreements during "even 
keel" weeks was significantly higher (175.8378 vs, 113.9^00 million 
dollars) than during alternative periods. Noting that the majority of 
"even keel" weeks during this period fell within 1967 when the stance 
of monetary policy was expansive, the System again seems to have erred
on the side of ease with respect to the free reserve target in order
to promote full employment. Here, the System used repurchase agree­
ments to facilitate Treasury operations and avoid any appearance of a 
move to tighten credit policy.
Thus, generally, the evidence does not support the hypothesis 
that "even keel" policy entails reserve injections which result in in­
creases in the level of free reserves. For the entire period, no 
statistical evidence can be found to support this hypothesis. Although 
the levels of free reserves were significantly different during some 
subperiods, the evidence seems to indicate the general stance of mone­
tary policy takes precedence over the need to facilitate Treasury 
operations. With respect to the free reserve target, it was found that 
during periods of restrictive credit policy the Desk erred on the side
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of tightness and during intervals of expansive monetary policy, the 
System erred on the side of ease. The "support" school interpretation 
would have suggested that the Federal Reserve System, during "even 
keel" periods, would consistently inject reserves to increase the level 
of free reserves. This interpretation is not supported by the observed 
behavior of free reserves.
In conclusion, the different behavior of free reserves during 
tight and easy money periods can be resolved by a single rule. The 
general stance of monetary policy, as dictated by the ultimate targets 
of full employment and price stability, is the major determinant of 
the observed behavior of free reserves. During tight money periods 
free reserve levels are substantially lower during "even keel" weeks. 
Thus, the price stability target was given precedence over any desire 
to facilitate Treasury financings. During easy money periods, the 
level of free reserves was significantly higher during "even keel" 
weeks. Here, the necessity of promoting full employment augmented any 
increase in free reserve levels that may have been desirable in order 
to promote a Treasury financing. Thus, the "even keel" policy cannot 
be interpreted, in light of the behavior of free reserves, as a one-way 
shift toward ease.
The "support" school definition of "even keel" policy can also 
be tested by analyzing the behavior of member bank borrowings. The 
hypothesis tested would state that during an "even keel" period the 
Trading Desk would supply reserves in an amount sufficient to ease 
money market conditions. Treating member bank borrowings as an inde­
pendent, short-run policy target, it would be expected that the mean
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level of member bank borrowings would be lower during "even keel" 
weeks than weeks in which such a directive was not in force.
The evidence on member bank borrowing as shown in Table 14 
tends to refute the "support" school definition. During the 1/6/60- 
8/28/68 period the null hypothesis of the equality of means could not 
be rejected even at the 10 percent level. The same was the case in 5 
of the 6 subperiods examined covering a total of 265 weeks. In 
general, it can be concluded that the level of member bank borrowings 
is not significantly lower during "even keel" weeks as opposed to 
"non-even keel" weeks.
During the 9/5/62-3/30/66 subperiod, the null hypothesis was 
rejected at the 5 percent level, with a computed F-ratio of 5.2342.
In this subperiod, the level of member bank borrowings behaved as the 
"support" school would have predicted. The level of borrowings was 
significantly lower during "even keel" weeks (301.5464 vs. 354.5999 
million dollars). It should be noted that during this period the 
Federal Reserve System was pursuing an expansive monetary policy con­
centrating upon an Interest rate target. Thus, any easing in money 
market conditions during "even keel" periods as reflected in lower 
levels of member bank borrowing was consistent with the general stance 
of monetary policy.
It can be concluded from the above evidence that "even keel" 
policy does not entail reserve Injections of sufficient magnitude to 
lower the level of member bank borrowings during Treasury financing 
periods. The empirical observations show that the behavior of marginal 
reserves, both free reserves and member bank borrowings, when treated 
as independent monetary policy targets do not conform to the behavior
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TABLE IN­
VARIABLE! MEMBER BANK BORROWING1 
ORIGINAL DATA INPUT
Optional Listing Analysis of Variance
Time Sample Degrees
Period Group Standard of 2






































































^he data consists of the averages of daily figures in million dollars 
for the week ending on Wednesday.
2
A double asterisk ** indicates that the actual computed F-ratio exceed­
ed the critical value at the 5 percent level,
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January,
1960-August, 1968> and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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patterns that would be required to verify the "support" school inter­
pretation of "even keel" policy.
Finally, in evaluating the "support" school hypothesis which 
interprets "even keel" policy as a one-way shift toward ease, it was 
necessary to examine the behavior of short-term interest rates. The 
hypothesis tested would state that during an "even keel" period, the 
Trading Desk would undertake reserve Injections in a volume sufficient 
to ease money market conditions. Treating both the Federal Funds rate 
and the Treasury bill rate (3-month) as independent, short-run policy 
targets, it would be expected that the mean level of these short-term 
interest rates would be significantly lower during "even keel" weeks 
than alternative weeks when such a directive was not in force.
The evidence on short-term interest rate behavior, as shown in 
Tables 15 and 16, does not lend any credibility to the "support" 
school interpretation of "even keel" policy. First, in examining the 
Federal Funds rate it was found that the null hypothesis of equal 
means could not be rejected even at the 10 percent level in either the 
entire 452-week period or any of the 6 subperiods. It must be con­
cluded that the mean level of the Federal Funds rate was not signifi­
cantly different during "even keel" weeks, Implying that the reserve- 
supplying operations of the System were not large enough to lower the 
levels of this short-term interest rate during Treasury financings.
The behavior of the Treasury bill rate coincided closely with 
that of the Federal Funds rate. During the entire 1/6/60-8/28/68 inter­
val and 5 of 6 subperiods, the null hypothesis of equal means could not 
be rejected at the 10 percent level. Only during the 6/1/60-12/27/61
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TABLE 15
VARIABLE! FEDERAL FUNDS RATE1 
ORIGINAL DATA INPUT

















































































■The data consists of the averages of daily figures In percent per annum 
for the week ending on Wednesday,
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January,
1960-August, 19681 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,




VARIABLE! TREASURY BILL RATE, 3-MONTH1 
ORIGINAL BATA INPUT

















































































4he data consists of market yields in percent per annum computed from 
daily closing bid prices. Bills are quoted on bank discount rate 
basis.
2
A single asterisk * indicates that the actual computed F-ratio exceeded 
the critical value at the 10 percent level,
SOURCEi Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January, 
1960-August, 19681 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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period, exhibiting a computed F-ratio of 3.2233, could the null hy­
pothesis be rejected at the 10 percent level. The mean level of the 
Treasury bill rate was lower during "even keel" weeks than "non-even 
keel weeks (2.31?8 percent vs. 2.3762 percent). Although during this 
83-week subperiod, the Treasury bill rate did behave as the "support" 
school would have predicted, in light of the overall behavior exhib­
ited by short-term interest rates, this observation is not interpreted 
as sufficient evidence on which to verify the "support" school defini­
tion. The behavior of short-term interest rates does not conform to 
the predictions of the "support" school.
The definition of "even keel" policy in terms of a one-way 
shift toward ease cannot be supported by the behavior of either mar­
ginal reserve measures of short-term interest rates. Although strong 
evidence exists that the "even keel" strategy is implemented through 
the extension of repurchase agreements to non-bank government securi­
ties dealers, there is little empirical evidence to show that these 
reserve injections result in an easing of money market conditions 
during "even keel" periods. The behavior of the major money market 
variables examined does not consistently conform to the behavior pat­
tern that would be predicted by the "support" school. Therefore, as 
a creditable explanation of the "even keel" strategy, the "support" 
school definition must be rejected.
The "Neutrality" School
A number of the different interpretations of "even keel" policy 
can be classified as belonging to the "neutrality" school. The
appropriate relationship between monetary policy and debt management 
expounded by this school is the maintenance of limited degree of in­
dependence between central bank and Treasury policy actions. That is, 
while System policy is such that the authorities do not feel that 
their money-creating power should be employed to lend direct support 
to Treasury financings, System officials do recognize that concurrent 
monetary policy may well affect Treasury operations. The money mar­
ket is felt to be quite sensitive to Treasury offers due to the sheer 
magnitude of the financings, the involvement of the U.S. Government's 
credit, and the key role played by government securities in the 
process of liquidity and portfolio adjustment."^ Bearing in mind that 
there does exist a connection between monetary policy and the market's 
reception of Treasury financings, many view "even keel" policy as, if 
not a form of central bank support or aid to financings, at least a 
conscious effort on the part of the System to undertake no actions 
that would contribute to a Treasury offer encountering poor acceptance 
in the government securities market. Two rather distinct interpreta­
tions of "even keel" policy, based upon this "neutrality" concept can 
be identified. Each are discussed and evaluated in the following 
pages.
A. The Money Market Condition or Stabilization Hypothesis
The first "neutrality" school interpretation of "even keel" 
policy to be empirically examined has been labeled the money market 
condition or stabilization hypothesis definition. This particular
^Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,'" p. 1.
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Interpretation is the result of a synthesis of a number of works in
conjunction with the historical review of the current economic policy 
11directives. This interpretation views "even keel" policy as an 
open market operating technique used in the implementation of short- 
run monetary policy during Treasury financing periods. The review of 
the historical record clearly shows that the operating instructions 
given to the Account Manager in the second paragraph of the F.O.M.C. 
current economic policy directive are couched in terms of a desired 
degree of pressure in money market conditions or simply money market 
tone. During "even keel" periods, the Trading Desk is invariably in­
structed to maintain the existing degree of pressure in the money mar­
ket.
The chain reaction of monetary policy in one official view of 
the Federal Reserve System is as followst
In a number of works which were concerned with the implemen­
tation of the dynamic aspects of short-run monetary policy as opposed 
to the "even keel" strategy per se, various authors suggested that the 
Trading Desk concentrated on a number of money market indicators as 
the primary targets at which open market operations were directed.
For a discussion of the so-called intermediate targets of credit 
policy, see Leonall G. Andersen, "Money Market Conditions as a Guide 
for Monetary Management," in Monetary Economics Readings, ed. by Alan 
D, Entine (Belmont, Calif.t Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1968), 
pp. 226-245? Leonall C, Andersen and Jules M. Levine, "Implementation 
of Federal Reserve Open Market Policy in 1964," Review of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (June, 1965)* PP. 2-5? Leonall C. Andersen 
and Jules M, Levine, "A Test of Money Market Conditions as a Means of 
Short-Run Monetary Management," National Banking Review, Vol. IV 
(September, 1966), pp. 41-51? Clay J, Anderson, "Money Market Indi­
cators," in Monetary Economics Readings, ed. by Alan D. Entine (Belmonti 
Calif.i Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1968), pp. 211-216? Paul 
Meek, Discount Policy and Open Market Operationsi Fundamental Reap­
praisal of the Discount Mechanism (Washington, D.C.i Board of Govern­
ors, Federal Reserve System, 1968)? and Robert R. Wyand, II, "Money 
Market Conditions— What Are They?" Monthly Review of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta (September, 1965)* PP. 1-^.
Changes in the availability and cost of reserves 
are reflected immediately in money market conditions.
Their influence spreads to bank credit and money, to 
interest rates in markets for longer-term debts, and 
to the entire range of spending financed by borrowed 
funds. In the end, the ultimate target of policy 
actions— total income and spending, total output and 
employment, the general level of prices and inter- ^
national trade and capital flows— come to be influenced.
This view has loosely been labeled as the money market condition theory 
of monetary management. It is not a fully developed theory. Instead, 
it is a method of viewing ex post changes in individual money market 
time series as indicators of changes in money market tone. To be ac­
cepted as a theory, even on the basis of a partial equilibrium analy­
sis, some tenable set of relationships must be established between the 
links composing the chain.
Although a complete analysis of the money market condition 
theory of monetary management is outside the scope of this study, a 
brief review of this theory is essential to the evaluation of this 
particular interpretation of "even keel" policy. Specifically, part 
of this chain reaction of monetary policy postulated by these theorists 
must be examined.
First, the Federal Reserve System, at its own initiative, can 
manipulate a set of variables which can alter the cost and avail­
ability of reserves to member banks. These variables include the 
familiar quantitative tools of monetary policy— open market operations, 
the discount rate, and the required reserve ratio. System manipulation 
of these quantitative tools, especially open market operations, are
12
Peter M. Keir, "The Open Market Policy Process," The Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, Vol. XLIX (October, 1963)* P. 1359.
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reflected in the behavior of a set of variables referred to as the 
money market indicators. These include the marginal reserve measures, 
especially free reserves and member bank borrowings, as well as short­
term interest rates, specifically the Federal Funds and Treasury bill 
rates.
The theoretical relationship between the degree of money mar­
ket pressure, as measured by the above money market indicators, and 
changes in the intermediate variables, which include the rate of
growth of bank credit and the money supply and long-term interest
13rates, has been questioned by a number of authors. This relation­
ship is the key link in the chain, the link upon which the money mar-
14ket condition theory of monetary management rests. Finally, changes 
in the intermediate guides influence the ultimate targets of credit 
control policy, the levels of income, employment, and prices.
The hypothesis tested in this analysis deals with one defini­
tion of the "even keel" strategy which centers around the first link
13The works of a number of authors seem to disprove the exis­
tence of this link which postulates that increased (decreased) pres­
sure in the money market, other factors equal, indicates a set of 
events which tends to decrease (increase) the rate of growth of bank 
credit and money and to increase (decrease) long-term interest rates. 
See in particular, Richard G, Davis, "Open Market Operations, Interest 
Rates, and Deposit Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXIX 
(August, 1965), pp. 431-454j and A. J. Meigs, Free Reserves and the 
Money Supply (Chicago* University of Chicago Press, 1962).
14
This link in the chain is explained by the money market con­
dition theorists by a combination of interest arbitrage operations, 
securities dealers* inventory adjustments, and adjustment of the 
liquidity positions of banks and financial institutions. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to test the existence of this link. Rather, 
this analysis is concerned with establishing and verifying the exis­
tence of the link between the manipulation of the quantitative tools 
and variations in selected money market indicators.
14?
in the chain postulated by the money market condition theory. The 
historical record reveals that during the 1960-1968 period, "even 
keel" directives have consistently called for ”. . .  the conduct of 
open market operations during the next three weeks, with a view to 
maintaining about the existing degree of pressure in the money market." 
Quite simply, then, the question is— does the "even keel" policy en­
tail an open market operating strategy whose purpose is to maintain 
stable conditions in the money market during Treasury financings?
Referring again to Tables 11 and 12, it was concluded that the 
"even keel" strategy was implemented primarily through repurchase 
agreements with non-bank government securities dealers. Previous 
analysis has rejected the "support" school hypothesis that System 
reserve injections during financing periods resulted in easing in 
money market conditions. What now must be tested is whether System 
reserve-supplying operations were undertaken in order to stabilize 
money market conditions during "even keel" periods. Has the utiliza­
tion of repurchase agreements led to the stabilization of money market 
conditions as measured by marginal reserves and short-term interest 
rates?
The testing procedure again employed was the analysis of 
variance program previously discussed. To test for the degree of 
stability exhibited by marginal reserves and short-term interest rates 
first difference data expressed in absolute values was employed. The 
analysis tests the degree of fluctuation displayed by selected money 
market variables during "even keel" weeks in comparison with periods 
when such directives were not in force.
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The money market condition or stabilization hypothesis views 
"even keel" policy as an attempt to stabilize money market conditions 
during Treasury financing periods. This hypothesis would predict that 
the degree of fluctuations displayed by money market indicators, as 
measured by the mean levels of the absolute first differences, would 
be less during "even keel" weeks than alternative periods. The 
evidence lends little credibility to the stabilization hypothesis.
Table 17 summarizes the behavior of free reserves during the 
1960-1968 period. Treating free reserves as an independent short-run 
policy target, there is little evidence that the System has succeeded 
in stabilizing this indicator during "even keel" periods. During the 
entire 1/6/60-8/28/68 period, as well as 5 of 6 subperiods, the null 
hypothesis of equal means could not be rejected at the 10 percent 
level with extremely low computed F-ratlos. Only during the relative­
ly short 1/6/60-5/25/60 period could the null hypothesis be rejected 
at the 10 percent level with an F-ratio of 4.1831. Although during 
this 21-week Interval the volume of fluctuation was significantly 
lower during "even keel" weeks (61.4444 vs. 119.5833 million dollars), 
as the stabilization hypothesis would predict, this fact is not inter­
preted as strong evidence to support this definition of "even keel" 
policy.
The overall behavior of free reserves during the 1960-1968 
period shows no significant difference in the degree of fluctuation 
displayed by this variable during "even keel" and "non-even keel" weeks. 
The reserve injections undertaken by the Trading Desk did not result 
in the stabilization of free reserve levels during Treasury financing
TABLE 17
VARIABLE* FREE RESERVES1
FIRST DIFFERENCE DATA INPUT

















































































"'‘The data consists of an average of daily figures in million dollars 
for the week ending on Wednesday.
2
A single asterisk * indicates that the actual computed F-ratio exceeded 
the critical value at the 10 percent level.
SOURCEi Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January, 
1960-August, 19681 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March,
1970), pp. 6-10.
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periods. It may be concluded that the manipulation of repurchase 
agreements by the Trading Desk during "even keel" weeks was either 
not aimed at stabilizing free reserves or, if stabilization was the 
target, the System was not successful in achieving that goal.
Another key variable to be examined in testing the stabiliza­
tion hypothesis of the "even keel" strategy was member bank borrow­
ings. Treating this variable as an independent target of short-run 
monetary policy, the stabilization hypothesis would postulate that 
the System would minimize the degree of fluctuation in member bank 
borrowing during "even keel" weeks.
Looking at Table 18, the behavior of this variable again lends 
little support to the money market condition or stabilization hypothe­
sis. During the entire 1/6/60-8/28/68 period, the extremely low com­
puted F-ratio of 0.0077 indicates that the amount of fluctuation in 
this variable was no different during "even keel" weeks than alterna­
tive periods. During both the 1/3/62-8/29/62 and 4/6/66-12/28/66 sub­
periods the null hypothesis of equal means could be rejected at the 5 
percent level with F-ratios of 4.8039 and 5*1461, respectively. The 
degree of fluctuation in member bank borrowings in each instance was 
significantly lower during "even keel" weeks (24.5625 vs. 61.3684 and 
62.7273 vs. 112.9286 million dollars, respectively). Thus, during both 
of these intervals covering a period of 74 weeks, this variable dis­
played behavior consistent with the stabilization hypothesis. Con­
sidering the relatively short time period involved in conjunction with 
the overall behavior of member bank borrowings, little credence for the 
stabilization hypothesis can be found.
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TABLE 18
VARIABLE! MEMBER BANK BORROWING1
FIRST DIFFERENCE DATA INPUT


































































■The first difference data in absolute values is computed from the 
averages of daily figures in million dollars for the week ending 
Wednesday.
2
A double asterisk ** indicates that the actual computed F-ratio ex­
ceeded the critical value at the 5 percent level.
SOURCEi Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January, 
1960-August, 19681 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March, 
1970), pp. 6-10.
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The behavior of marginal reserve measures, both free reserves 
and member bank borrowings, during the 1960-1968 period, cannot be 
Interpreted as strong evidence on which to verify the stabilization 
hypothesis. With the exception of 3 relatively short subperiods, no 
significantly greater degree of stability is displayed by these mar­
ginal reserve measures during "even keel" weeks in comparison with 
periods when such directives were not in force. Thus, the stabiliza­
tion hypothesis which views the "even keel" policy as entailing the 
stabilization of marginal reserves must be rejected.
Finally, the behavior of short-term interest rates was 
examined. Treating both the Federal Funds and Treasury bill rates as 
independent targets of short-run policy, the stabilization hypothesis 
would predict a smaller degree of week-to-week fluctuation during 
Treasury financing periods. The behavior of short-term interest rates 
lends virtually no support to the stabilization hypothesis.
Perusal of Tables 19 and 20 clearly shows that short-term 
interest rates were not stabilized during "even keel" weeks. In only 
one subperiod, 1/4/67-8/28/68, could the null hypothesis of equal 
means be rejected at the 5 percent level with a computed F-ratio of 
4.1338 for the behavior of the Federal Funds rate. In this instance, 
the behavior of the Federal Funds rate was contrary to the predictions 
of the stabilization hypothesis, with the amount of fluctuation larger, 
not smaller, during the "even keel" weeks (0.2262 percent vs. 0.1450 
percent). Generally, it was found that short-term interest rates be­
haved no differently during "even keel" weeks than alternative periods 
when such directives were not in force.
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TABLE 19
VARIABLE! FEDERAL FUNDS RATE1
FIRST DIFFERENCE DATA INPUT
Optional Listing Analysis of Variance
Time Sample Degrees
Period Group Standard of 2




































































xhe first difference data in absolute values is computed from a seven- 
day average in percent per annum for the week ending on Wednesday.
2
A double asterisk ** indicates that the actual computed F-ratio ex­
ceeded the critical value at the 5 percent level.
SOURCEi Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January, 
1960-August, 19681 and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 




VARIABLEi TREASURY BILL RATE, 3-MONTH1
FIRST DIFFERENCE DATA INPUT
Optional Listing Analysis of Variance
Time Sample Degrees
Period Group Standard of






































































^?he first difference data in absolute values of market yields in per­
cent per annum is computed from daily closing bid prices. Bills are 
quoted on bond discount rate basis.
SOURCE* Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, January, 
1960-August, 1968j and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
"Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69," Review (March, 
1970), pp. 6-10.
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In conclusion, the money market condition or stabilization 
hypothesis definition of ’’even keel" cannot be supported by the facts. 
This oarticular view of the "neutrality" school which interprets 
"even keel" policy as an open market strategy consisting of reserve 
injections aimed at the stabilizing marginal reserves and short-term 
interest rates during financing periods must be rejected. The over­
whelming evidence indicates that the major money market indicators 
behave no differently in terms of the magnitude of fluctuation dis­
played during "even keel" periods.
The evidence supporting the stabilization hypothesis is quite 
weak. Although the behavior of repurchase agreements might indicate 
that the Federal Reserve System is attempting to stabilize money mar­
ket conditions, the actual behavior of marginal reserves and short­
term interest rates does not indicate that the Trading Desk enjoys any 
success in achieving that goal. This conclusion must be qualified 
somewhat. The fact that the empirical evidence does not show that 
money market indicators were stabilized during "even keel" periods 
does not answer the question of whether these variables would have 
fluctuated more in the absence of Trading Desk operations during "even 
keel" periods. The possibility that the use of repurchase agreements 
was instrumental in preventing a greater degree of fluctuation in mar­
ginal reserves and short-term interest rates from being observed 
during "even keel" weeks must be recognized. However, no empirical 
test would seem to exist for analyzing this possibility. Thus, within 
the framework of what behavior can be tested, the stabilization hypoth­
esis must be rejected.
B. The Avoidance of Policy Changes
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The final interpretation of "even keel" policy to be examined 
in the analysis can also be classified as falling within the "neu­
trality" school. This definition of the "even keel" strategy which 
has frequently appeared in the literature is that the maintenance of 
an "even keel" posture in the money market during a Treasury financ­
ing period calls for the avoidance of any overt System policy actions. 
That is, any overt policy action that might be interpreted by money 
market participants as indicative of a shift in the stance of credit 
policy is to be avoided during Treasury financing periods.^ This 
view is usually couched in terms of the necessity of not announcing 
new policy decisions (as contained in announcements from the Board of 
Governors or as specified in the second paragraph of the current 
economic policy directive of the F.O.M.C.) that would impede the 
orderly marketing of Treasury securities and significantly increase 
risks of market disruption from sharp changes in market attitudes 
during the course of the financing period. Specifically, "even
%his particular view or interpretation of the "even keel" 
strategy appears in a number of works. See in particular, Axilrod, 
"Empirical View of ’Even Keel,"' p. lj Rudolph Thunberg, "'Even Keel'* 
The Reconciliation of Monetary Policy and Debt Management," (an un­
published manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of New York), p. 1; and 
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Employment, Growth, and Price 
Levels, Hearings, before the Joint Economic Committee, 86th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1959 (Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office, 1959)1 
P. 1785.
^Discussion of "even keel" policy has usually been focused on 
its relation to tightening actions. But in practice, the policy may 
also influence the timing of easing actions. For example, it might 
be argued that a discount rate reduction in the middle of a Treasury 
financing period may be avoided by the System because it might encour­
age undue speculative activity in the government securities market.
See Axilrod, "Empirical View of 'Even Keel,'" p. 1.
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keel" policy is felt to Influence the timing of central bank policy
actions, the System being confined to undertaking any overt policy
action during those intervals between Treasury financings. It is
felt that any tightening of credit policy during the financing period
would seriously jeopardize the success of an offering through alter-
17ing basic supply and demand relationships or investor expectations.
This interpretation of the "even keel" policy was tested by 
careful review of the historical record. The author examined the 
major changes in credit control policy during the 1960-1968 period 
to determine if the timing of overt policy actions was influenced by 
"even keel" directives. Special emphasis was placed on changes in 
both the discount rate and the required reserve ratio, the quantita­
tive tools which are usually designated as having a large psychologi­
cal market impact. In addition, the author scrutinized the Record of 
Policy Actions - the Federal Open Market Committee in the Annual 
Report in order to determine if the maintenance of an "even keel" 
policy has been a major factor or consideration which has preempted 
shifts in the stance of monetary policy. The results of this analysis 
strongly support this particular definition of "even keel" policy.
Table 21 summarizes the 9 changes in the discount rate which 
the System made during the 1960-1968 period. In only one Instance did 
a discount rate change occur during an "even keel" period. The dis­
count rate reduction made effective on 8/12/60 fell within the "even
17Tilford C. Gaines, Techniques of Treasury Debt Management 
(New Yorki The Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, and 
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 265.
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TABLE 21






Net Change of 
Discount Rate
9/11/59 4.0$6
6/10/60 3.5 - 0.5%
8/12/60* 3.0 - 0.5
7/17/63 3.5 + 0.5
11/24/64 4.0 + 0.5
12/06/65 ^.5 + 0.5
V07/67 4.0 - 0.5
11/20/67 4,5 + 0.5
3/22/68 5.0 + 0.5
4/19/68 5.5 + 0.5
^he discount rate quoted applies to the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York only.
2
The asterisk * indicates an effective date which falls within an "even 
keel" period.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve System, Bulletin, January I960 - August 1968.
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keel" period spanning the 7/26/6O-8/15/6O interval. The "even keel" 
directive was implemented during an 8,750 "billion dollar cash financ­
ing involving a note and certificate of indebtedness. The financing 
was announced on 7/28/60 with the subscription books open during 
8/I/6O-8/2/6O with the payment or settlement date designated as 
8/15/60. The F.O.M.C. meeting held on July 26, i960, called for the 
maintenance of an "even keel" in the money market. Three overt policy 
actions were undertaken just after the July 26th meeting; these in­
cluded a .5 percent reduction in the discount rate, a reduction in the 
required reserve ratio of central reserve city banks from 18 percent 
to 17.5 percent effective on 9/l/60, and a reduction in the margin 
requirement from 90 percent to 70 percent on 7/28/60. These overt 
policy actions were aimed, as stated at the F.O.M.C. meeting held on 
August 16, i960, at "encouraging monetary expansion for the purpose
18of fostering sustainable growth in economic activity and employment.
Thus, although the change did take place during an "even keel" 
period, it should be noted that the overt policy action came at the 
tail end of the financing period and represented an easing in the 
stance of monetary policy. Therefore, it may be concluded that "even 
keel" policy does entail the avoidance of overt policy actions, the 
only exception occurring in the final phase of a Treasury financing 
period.
Table 22 summarizes the changes in the reserve requirement 
ratio which have occurred during the 1960-1968 period. A total of 8
Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Forty-Seventh 




RESERVE REQUIREMENTS OP MEMBER BANKS 
(PERCENT OP DEPOSITS)
JANUARY 1, I960 - JULY 13, 1966
Net Demand Deposits Time Deposits
Effective Central Reserve Reserve Country (all classes
Date *■* 2 City Banks City Banks Banks of banks)
4/24/58 18.0* 16.9* 11% 5%
9/01/60 17.5 t • • ■ 1* • •
11/24/60 • • • » • • • • 12 •
12/01/60 16.5 • • • • • • •
10/25/62,* • • • • • t • t • • •
11/01/62
JULY 14, 1966 •- AUGUST 28, 1968
Net Demand Deposits Time Deposits 
(all classes
Reserve City Bank Country Banks of banks)
Under Over Under Over Savings
$5 million $5 million $5 million $5 million Deposits
3/02/67 16.5* 16.5* 12* 12.0* 3.5%
3/16/67 • • • • • • 3.0
1/11/68, .... 
1/18/68
17.0 • • 12.5
"when two dates are shown, the first applies to the change at central 
reserve or reserve city banks and the second, to the change at country 
banks.
2
The asterisk * indicates an effective date which falls within an "even 
keel" period.
SOURCE* Federal Reserve System, Bulletin, January I960 - August 1968.
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alterations were made In the various ratios applicable to different 
banks and deposits. In only one case, the 1 percent reduction in the 
reserve requirement ratio made effective on 10/25/62 and ll/l/62, was 
an overt policy action undertaken during an "even keel" period. This 
particular action occurred under somewhat unusual circumstances.
The "even keel" period extended from 10/22/62-ll/l7/62. It 
encompassed the Treasury financing period for a regular refunding 
which was announced on 10/25/62 with the settlement date on II/15/62. 
In addition to the 11,000 billion dollar exchange offer, the Cuban 
missile crisis was another factor taken into consideration in imple­
menting an "even keel" strategy. The announcement by the B.O.G. of 
the reduction in the reserve requirement ratio was made at the B.O.G. 
meeting held on October 18, 1962. Thus, the announcement of the overt 
policy action preceded the F.O.M.C. "even keel" directive, although 
the reserve requirement ratio change was to be made effective during 
the "even keel" period. Thus, it may be concluded that the "even 
keel" strategy clearly entails the avoidance of both changes in the 
discount rate and reserve requirement ratio during Treasury financing 
periods. The only two exceptions Involved shifts toward an easier 
credit policy.
Finally, it must be determined whether or not the "even keel" 
policy consistently influences the timing of shifts in the stance of 
monetary policy. It seems safe to conclude that the timing of adjust­
ments in both the discount and the reserve requirement ratio are 
influenced by "even keel" policy. The F.O.M.C. can also change credit 
policy through the use of open market transactions. The Record of
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Policy Action - the Federal Open Market Committee in the Annual Report 
was carefully scrutinized to see if the maintenance of an "even keel" 
preempted shifts in monetary policy.
The 66 "even keel" directives which were issued during the 
1960-1968 period have been classified into five groups. These Include 
directives designated as preempting either any shift in policy, a 
shift toward ease, or a shift toward tightness. In addition, a small 
number of "even keel" directives were identified as coinciding with 
policy changes while a larger number of "even keel" directives were 
issued at times when the F.O.M.C. was not considering any shift in 
credit control policy. Table 23 summarizes the results of this 
analysis.
It can be seen that a total of 39 of 66 "even keel" direc­
tives were designated as having preempted policy changes. The 
majority of these, 29, preempted, as would be expected, shifts toward 
tightening monetary policy. A typical example which clearly indicates 
that the "even keel" strategy has influenced the timing of policy
changes is shown in the summary of the discussion leading to the cur-
19rent economic policy directive of April 16, 1963#
Thus, in approximately 59 percent of the cases, the mainte­
nance of an "even keel" policy has been a major factor which has been 
considered by the F.O.M.C. in ruling out changes in the stance of
19".. .  some members who otherwise might have preferred to 
move toward a slightly lesser degree of ease felt that such action 
would be undesirable at this time because of the aftermath of the 
Treasury bond auction and impending large refunding operations." See 
Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1963, pp. 76-77.
TABLE 23





















i960 3/22/60 1/26/60, 7/26/60 7/6/60, 9/13/60, 
10/4/60
1961 9/12/61, 10/3/61, 
10/24/61
6/6/61 7/11/61
1962 1/23/62, 4/17/62 7/31/62 1/9/62, 2/13/62, 
8/21/62, 9/11/62, 
10/23/62
1963 1/29/63, 2/12/63, 3/26/63, 4/16/63, 
3/5/63 8/20/63, 9/10/63
1/8/63, 10/22/63











1966 10/4/66 2/8/66, 4/12/66, 5/10/66, 
7/26/66, II/1/66
1/11/66










SOURCE: Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1960-1968.
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monetary policy. The "even keel" policy has usually mitigated against 
a shift toward tightness. In only two cases did an "even keel" direc­
tive coincide with an actual shift in F.O.M.C. credit control policy.
Summary and Conclusion
In summarizing the empirical analysis of "even keel" policy, 
a number of important conclusions stand out. During the 1960-1968 
interval, the "even keel" strategy has generally been implemented by 
the extensive use of repurchase agreements with non-bank government 
securities dealers. These reserve injections have not been of suf­
ficient magnitude to significantly affect the behavior of the major 
money market indicators.
The "support" school interpretation of "even keel" policy has 
been rejected because the empirical evidence does not reveal a con­
sistent easing in money market conditions during "even keel" periods. 
The "neutrality" school definition of "even keel" policy is partially 
supported by the evidence. The view that the "even keel" strategy 
entails the stabilization of marginal reserves and short-term Interest 
rates cannot be verified. However, the definition that the maintenance 
of an "even keel" posture in the money market during a Treasury financ­
ing period calls for the avoidance of any overt System policy actions 
can be supported. In addition, strong evidence exists to indicate 
that the "even keel" policy has preempted shifts in the stance of 
monetary policy.
The picture of the "even keel" policy which emerges from the 
examination of the 1960-1968 period is as follows. The "even keel"
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policy entails the avoidance of any policy action during major 
Treasury financings, which might be Interpreted as indicative of a 
shift in the stance of credit policy. Though there is some evidence 
that the System does employ repurchase agreements to supply reserves 
to the money market during "even keel" periods, there is little evi­
dence to support the hypothesis that the "even keel" strategy is 
aimed at easing or stabilizing money market conditions. Finally, the 
necessity of maintaining an "even keel" posture during Treasury 
financings has been one factor cited as influencing the timing of 
monetary policy actions. Thus, Federal Reserve "even keel" policy 
cannot be viewed as a strategy employing explicit support operations 
aimed at easing or stabilizing money market conditions. Rather, the 
"even keel" policy must be interpreted in terms of an Implicit support 




The literature dealing with the relationship between debt 
management and monetary policy since the Treasury-Federal Reserve Ac­
cord has been extensive. One aspect of this topic, the policy pursued 
by the central bank during major Treasury financing operations, has 
been largely ignored. Accordingly, this study attempts to clarify a 
number of facets of the so-called "even keel" policy, the central bank 
operating strategy which has come to be considered the appropriate 
policy to be employed by the System during Treasury financing opera­
tions. The historical and empirical analysis undertaken has revealed 
a number of important findings which can now be summarized.
The Emergence and Evolution of 
"Even Keel" Policy
The "even keel" policy of the Federal Reserve System has been 
a pragmatic and gradual evolution of an open market operating tech­
nique, a refinement emerging from an atmosphere of changing views as 
to the proper integration of monetary theory and debt management 
policy. During the period preceding the Accord, the central bank was 
committed to a policy of maintaining a fixed price-yield pattern on 
government securities. This program, implemented through an open
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market policy of direct support purchases, came under an increasing 
degree of criticism as inflationary pressures grew.
The authorities, realizing the inconsistency of a program of 
direct support purchases coupled with the need for a credit control 
policy able to combat inflation, reached the now-famous Treasury- 
Federal Reserve Accord on March 4, 1951. The Accord marked a major 
change in the relationship between the Treasury and the central bank, 
a change which gradually, during the period of the transition to free 
markets, resulted in the curtailment of support purchases.
The proposals of the Graft Subcommittee were partially adopted 
by the System at the F.O.M.C. meeting held on March 4-5, 1953. At 
this meeting, which marked the inauguration of the "bills only" policy, 
the System adopted the guidelines for an open market policy committed 
to intervention in the government securities market solely to effectu­
ate the objectives of monetary and credit policy, including the cor­
rection of disorderly markets as opposed to the previous policy of 
maintaining a fixed price-yield pattern in the government securities 
market.
At this same meeting, the F.O.M.C. adopted specific operating 
guidelines to be followed by the Trading Desk during Treasury financ­
ing periods. The Trading Desk was instructed to refrain from purchas­
ing any maturing issues for which an exchange is being offered, "when- 
issued" securities, and any outstanding issues of comparable maturity 
to those being offered for exchange. The adoption of these specific 
operating instructions, governing the conduct of open market operations 
during Treasury financing periods, marked the birth of the "even keel"
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strategy. Although not christened until December 12, 1957* the 
historical analysis concludes that the "even keel" strategy had been 
established as an operational concept by March 4-5* 1953.
This conclusion can be defended on a number of grounds.
First, by that date direct support purchases during Treasury financ­
ings had been terminated. Secondly, the practice of extending repur­
chase agreements to non-bank government securities dealers in order 
to smooth the money market impact of Treasury operations had become 
an established Trading Desk operating procedure. Finally, by that 
date the System had come to practice the policy of avoiding overt 
shifts in monetary policy during Treasury financing periods. Thus, 
by March 4-5, 1953* those general policies and specific operating 
techniques which in subsequent years have come to be associated with 
the "even keel" strategy were already employed by the System,
The economic conditions which developed in the early 1960's 
presented a major policy dilemma. The monetary authorities were 
faced with the dual problems of promoting internal recovery, while 
correcting the external balance of payments deficit. To cope with 
this dilemma, at the F.O.M.C. meeting held on February 20, 1961, the 
System adopted "operation twist" to replace the "bills only" policy. 
"Operation twist" authorized the Trading Desk to conduct open market 
operations in coupon issues, not to maintain any particular rate 
level, but rather to influence the flow of funds in both the long and 
short ends of the market. "Operation twist" represented only a partial 
abandonment of the laissez-faire doctrine associated with the "bills 
only” policy.
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"Operation twist” did not represent a major innovation in 
System open market policy during Treasury financing periods. The 
policy did not entail any System commitment to support Treasury 
financings. Under "operation twist,” the Trading Desk continued its 
policy of refraining from the purchase of "rights” to new issues, 
"when-issued" securities, and issues of comparable maturity to those 
being offered for exchange. In retrospect, the initiation of "opera­
tion twist" did not substantially alter the "even keel" strategy as 
it was practiced under the "bills only" guidelines.
"Even Keel" Policy and Treasury Operations
Although the Treasury is an active participant in the govern­
ment securities market each month during the year, the Federal Reserve 
System pursues an "even keel" strategy for only a fraction of all 
Treasury financing operations. Both the financing technique employed, 
as well as the type of securities involved in the operation, were 
found to be the primary determinants of System policy, that is, 
whether the F.O.M.C. does or does not issue an "even keel" directive. 
It has been found that the System has generally pursued an 
"even keel" policy during Treasury advance refundings. This strategy 
has accompanied 12 of 15 such operations. Neither the volume of the 
offer nor the type of operation (senior, junior, or pre-refunding) 
seem to influence central bank policy. The System has also normally 
issued "even keel" directives during regular refundings. Of the 17 
major regular refunding operations undertaken by the Treasury, 1^ 
called forth an "even keel" directive. Thus, for both advance
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refunding and regular refunding operations, the System has usually 
maintained an "even keel" posture.
The primary determinant of central bank policy during Treasury 
operations involving cash can be identified as the type of security 
involved in the operation. During cash refundings involving coupon 
issues, the System has issued an "even keel" directive in 10 of 13 
instances. Conversely, cash refundings involving bills were seldom 
"even keeled." Only offers involving TAB'S were accompanied by an 
"even keel" and then only when the size of the offer equaled or ex­
ceeded 2.500 billion dollars. Cash offers of Treasury bills were very 
seldom "even keeled" while such offers involving coupon issues, in 8 
of 11 instances, called for "even keel" directives. Thus, for both 
cash refundings and cash offers Involving coupon issues, the Federal 
Reserve can be expected to implement its "even keel" policy.
The yearly frequency pattern of "even keel" policy during the 
1960-1968 period is best explained by the influence of money market 
conditions on Treasury financing activity. The infrequent "even keel" 
years were identified as 1961 and 1968 and were characterized as 
periods of stringent money market conditions. The rising level of 
interest rates, coupled with the interest rate ceiling on coupon is­
sues, forced the Treasury to curtail its activity.
The monthly pattern of "even keel" directives can most readily 
be explained by the cash operating balances of the Treasury. The 
frequent "even keel" months were designated as January, April, July, 
and October, these particular months coinciding with the normal annual 
low points in Treasury operating balances. March, June, and December
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were identified as the infrequent "even keel" months, a finding ex­
plained by the fact that these months, along with September, are 
quarterly tax receipts dates. The fact that September was found to 
be a frequent "even keel" month can be explained primarily by the 
overlapping of August refundings and the three September advance 
refundings during the I96I-I963 interval.
The Empirical Tests of "Even Keel" Definitions
Three distinct interpretations of "even keel" policy were 
identified in the literature. Though not truly mutually exclusive 
definitions, they were deemed as sufficiently different to be catego­
rized within either the "support" or "neutrality" schools. The em­
pirical evidence strongly supported only one of these interpretations.
Before reviewing the evidence on these definitions, the 
analysis of the implementation of "even keel" policy must be mentioned. 
Primarily through the one-way analysis of variance procedure, it was 
found that the Trading Desk used repurchase agreements with non-bank 
dealers as the instrument for maintaining an "even keel" posture.
The level of repurchase agreements was found to be significantly 
higher during "even keel" weeks than those weeks when such a directive 
was not in force. Thus, during Treasury financing periods, the System 
normally injected reserves through the extension of repurchase agree­
ments to non-bank government securities dealers.
The first definition of "even keel" policy tested, the "sup­
port" school interpretation, views "even keel" policy as a one-way 
shift toward ease during financing periods. The results of the
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one-way analysis of variance program run on the original data does 
not support this Interpretation. The level of both marginal reserves 
and short-term interest rates did not display any significant shift 
toward easing during financing periods. Thus, the "support" school 
interpretation of "even keel" strategy was rejected.
The second definition tested was classified within the 
"neutrality" school. The money market condition or stabilization 
hypothesis viewed the "even keel" strategy as consisting of the main­
tenance of stable money market conditions during Treasury financing 
periods. Again, the behavior of both marginal reserves and short­
term interest rates did not support the stabilization hypothesis.
The results of the one-way analysis of variance test on first differ­
ence data did not reveal any significant difference between the degree 
of fluctuation displayed by money market indicators during "even keel" 
and "non-even keel" weeks. The stabilization hypothesis could not be 
supported.
The final definition of "even keel" policy, also classified 
within the "neutrality" school, was verified by the evidence. This 
interpretation viewed the "even keel" strategy as entailing the 
avoidance of overt System policy actions during financing periods.
It was found that changes in both the discount rate and the required 
reserve ratio were only very rarely undertaken during "even keel" 
periods. The only occasions where such policy actions were undertaken 
by the System during financing periods, it was found that the shift in 
credit control policy was consistently toward ease. Finally, there 
was additional evidence that the necessity of maintaining an "even
173
keel" posture during Treasury operations mitigated against a shift in 
monetary policy. In 39 of 66 "even keel" directives, the necessity 
of maintaining steady money market conditions in light of Treasury 
financing activity, was one factor cited as having precluded a shift 
in credit control policy which might have been deemed appropriate in 
view of internal or external economic conditions. Thus, the evidence 
supports the view that the "even keel" policy entails the avoidance 
of overt policy actions during Treasury financing periods.
The Implication of "Even Keel"
Strategy for Monetary Policy
It has been shown during the 1960-1968 period that the Federal 
Reserve's "even keel" policy has been implemented in terms of holding 
the posture or stance of monetary policy constant during Treasury 
financing periods. The "even keel" strategy has consisted primarily 
of the avoidance of overt policy actions during financing periods. The 
System has limited the implementation of its discretionary policy 
actions to the intervals between Treasury financings.
Bearing in mind that approximately ^3.7 percent of all the 
F.O.M.C. current economic policy directives called for the maintenance 
of an "even keel" in the money market, the major implication of the 
"even keel" strategy is that it limits the degree of flexibility of 
credit control policy. During "even keel" periods, the central bank 
authorities have avoided changes in the stance of monetary policy. In 
some cases, shifts in credit policy deemed appropriate in light of 
other economic conditions have been delayed until the end of the
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Treasury financing period. Thus, the maintenance of an "even keel" 
policy in some cases has lengthened the inside lag of monetary policy.
Before concluding that the "even keel" strategy imposes a 
serious constraint on the flexibility of monetary policy, two facts 
must be considered. First, during most of the periods when "even 
keel" directives were in force, the necessity of maintaining an "even 
keel” was only one of many factors cited which preempted shifts in 
credit policy. In many of these cases, it is doubtful, even in the 
absence of Treasury activity, whether the members would have reached 
a consensus resulting in a shift in policy. Secondly, recognizing the 
fact that the stance of monetary policy can affect the outcome of a 
Treasury financing, the constraint upon credit policy imposed by the 
"even keel" strategy may be a small price to pay for the orderly mar­
keting of the Treasury's offer.
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